Europe wasted no time using its landmark Digital Markets Act (DMA) to try to rein in Big Tech. Companies like Apple, Meta, and Google have faced steep fines and orders to modify their business practices since the law came into force in 2024. And the hits keep on coming for Big Tech in Europe. After several months of consideration, the European Commission has announced new DMA measures that will force Google to support interoperability and competition in the European Union, and Google is not happy about it.

The new "specification measures" cover two elements of Google's business: Android phones and search. Both changes could theoretically increase competition and give users more choices, but Google claims they will undermine privacy and security. But as a "gatekeeper" under the DMA, Google has no choice but to comply. As the European Commission points out in its announcement, these decisions are legally binding.

On Android, Google will have to open up access to competing AI platforms. Currently, Google's Gemini gets preferential access to the system. Gemini is preloaded on all Google-certified Android phones and can wake up in response to the "Hey Google" hot word. Google's AI also includes system and app automation features, screen content access, and more.

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Ripple’s European license is more than a regional compliance milestone. It gives the company a cleaner institutional story at a time when XRP-related attention often gets pulled back into courtroom updates and market speculation.

By securing MiCA authorization in Luxembourg, Ripple can talk to European clients with a more straightforward regulatory pitch. That is exactly the kind of thing banks and payment firms tend to care about before they integrate new rails.

For more details, visit the official Ripple platform.

TL;DR

• Ripple secured authorization in Luxembourg under the MiCA framework.
• That creates a clearer route for regulated service expansion across the EEA.
• For XRP watchers, the bigger story is how Ripple’s institutional business matures beyond US legal headlines.

Why This Matters For Ripple’s Business

The EEA passporting angle is important because it can turn one license into broader regional access. That does not mean every product instantly launches everywhere, but it gives Ripple a stronger foundation for regulated growth.

For a company trying to sell enterprise payment and custody-related services, that foundation matters more than a short-term price reaction. Institutions usually move slowly, but they prefer clear rules.

What XRP Holders Should And Shouldn’t Read Into It

The approval does not automatically change XRP market structure overnight. It does, however, strengthen the company behind many XRP narratives, especially in the European institutional market.

That makes the story useful but not magical. It is a business-expansion signal, not a guaranteed token catalyst.

Why The Detail Matters Now

The practical takeaway is that Ripple stories now have to be read through both market structure and product execution. A headline can create attention, but the more durable signal is whether the underlying source points to real activity, a real filing, a real integration, or a measurable change in how users and institutions behave.

That is why this development is worth separating from ordinary market noise. It gives readers a specific point to track over the next few sessions rather than a vague reason to be bullish or bearish. If follow-up data confirms the direction, the story can build. If not, it still gives the market a clearer snapshot of where attention is concentrating today.

The Market Read

The cleaner way to read this story is not to force it into a simple bullish or bearish box. For Ripple readers, the useful part is the change in context. A new filing, integration, market signal, or regulatory step can alter how traders think about the next few sessions even when it does not instantly change price.

That is especially true after the last few volatile weeks, when crypto has been dealing with a mix of ETF flows, legal updates, exchange listings, protocol upgrades, and shifting liquidity. The market is no longer reacting to one dominant theme. It is weighing several smaller signals at once, and that makes source-backed developments more important than ordinary chatter.

Why Readers Should Keep This On The Radar

For Bitcoinist readers, the important question is what this changes from here. If follow-up data, filings, governance updates, or wallet movement confirm the direction, the story can develop into a larger market theme. If the next update is weak, delayed, or contradicted by new data, the market may quickly move on.

That is why the scope matters. This article is not treating the development as a guaranteed price trigger. It is treating it as a fresh signal inside a market that is trying to sort durable activity from short-term noise. The distinction is important because crypto narratives can move faster than the facts behind them.

The next thing to watch is whether this becomes part of a wider pattern. In some cases that means more institutional flows. In others it means stronger developer adoption, cleaner regulatory access, deeper exchange liquidity, or a clearer technical roadmap. Either way, the story is strongest if it is followed by measurable execution rather than another round of speculative headlines.

This report is based on information from Ripple.

This article was written by the News Desk and edited by Samuel Rae.

Source: Ripple

Welcome to The Iron Triangle, the Cipher Brief column serving Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the Policy Wonks analyzing its impact on the global order.

A little over a year ago I watched a good company die. They built technology that worked. It was not a slide or a concept, but a thing that did what it was designed to do. They had European clients interested, checkbook open, at exactly the moment Europeans started opening checkbooks for real. They did not close the deal. They could not figure out how to export their product without tripping over the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), they could not afford the lawyer who could tell them, and they ran out of runway waiting on a U.S. contract that was still three review cycles from signatures. The technology did not fail. The paperwork won.

Around the same time, I sat with a foreign team with excellent tech who wanted to build in the United States. They decided against it. Their reason was not taxes or visas. It was that the moment their intellectual property became American, it might become ITAR-controlled, and they were terrified that a regulation written in Washington would strand the hardware they were shipping to Ukraine to kill Russians. Restated, our export-control regime is so feared that talented people keep their best work out of the American ecosystem. That is not security. That is self-harm.

The $3,000 Toll to Export Nothing

Start with the cost of admission. To legally export a defense article, you first register with the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). As of January 2025 the base registration fee rose to $3,000 a year, and you pay it whether or not you ever ship a single item. That fee is the insult, not the injury. It’s the trivial part that buys you the right to then apply, per transaction, for a DSP-5 license, a process that consumes months, specialized counsel, and a full-time compliance officer that a nine-person startup does not have and cannot afford to hire.

For Lockheed Martin, this is a rounding error and a competitive moat all at once. The primes have entire floors of export-control lawyers; the regulation that annoys them is the regulation that buries smaller companies. The same $250,000-a-year compliance function is a nuisance on a $61 billion contract base and a death sentence on a Series A. ITAR does not have to be designed as a moat to function as one.

The See-Through Rule and the Birth of "ITAR-Free"

Here is the part that turns a domestic annoyance into a strategic own-goal. ITAR does not stop at the first sale. Every onward move, a re-export to a third country, a retransfer to a different end user, needs its own license. Control follows the item forever. Two features make this uniquely radioactive. The first is the "see-through rule": American law looks straight through a foreign-built system to control the U.S. part buried inside it. The second is that ITAR, unlike Commerce's export rules, has no de minimis threshold; there is no amount of American content small enough to escape. One controlled datalink in a drone taints the entire aircraft, permanently, and Europe cannot freely sell it onward, or keep sending it to Kyiv, without asking for permission.

So Europe did the rational thing. It started designing us out. "ITAR-free" is now a selling point, a feature you advertise the way you'd advertise waterproofing. The control regime we built to protect technology has taught our allies to build parallel supply chains that don't need us at all. We are not catching diversion. We are losing the room, one clean-sheet component at a time.

We Are Guarding a Henhouse the Fox Already Breeds

Now the objection every serious reader is forming: won't loosening the rules help China? It is the right question, and it deserves an honest answer. Post-sales diversion to Beijing is a threat, and the wall against it should stay standing.

But look at what the small companies I'm talking about actually build; let’s be precise about it. The airframe of an attritable FPV drone is commodity hardware, every component sourceable on Alibaba, and China manufactures the world's drones at a scale and price we cannot approach. Nobody in Beijing is combing American startups for quadcopter know-how. What can be genuinely sensitive is the layer you can't buy on Alibaba: the autonomy stack, the radio's waveform library, the ISR payload's processing. Control that. But applying munitions-grade export control to benign parts isn't guarding the crown jewels. It's standing armed guard over a henhouse the fox already owns, breeds, and exports. Control the narrow band that matters; stop strangling everything downstream of it with rules written for an age when a weapons system took a decade to build and stayed secret for two.

The Money Nobody Talks About

Investors should sit with the scale of the mismatch. In 2025, venture capital poured a record $49.1 billion into defense tech, up more than 80 percent over the year before. It sounds like a golden age until you notice most of it stacked into a handful of nine-figure megarounds while the Forgotten Bench, the small firms building the actual arteries of the future force, fought over grants. A typical DoD SBIR Phase I award runs about $256,000; a Phase II might reach a couple of million, if the company survives the wait. Many do not.

Now hold that against one ITAR-specific insult. On an ordinary afternoon, RTX booked $183.7 million for Patriot hardware bound for the United Arab Emirates. The prime exports to the Gulf on a Tuesday while the startup cannot work out how to ship a drone to a NATO ally. That is not a difference in risk. It is a difference in legal firepower. And the Pentagon posts these awards daily, every one above $7.5 million. The primes' budget rounding errors could fund the next generation of warfare. Instead they accrue to the incumbents while the little guys are fenced out of a market currently on fire.

What Each Corner of the Triangle Should Want

For the Procurement Officer, this is about coalition speed. You cannot field an allied force at the pace of a per-transaction license queue. Interoperability that requires a lawyer is not interoperability.

For the Investor, ITAR reform is a total-addressable-market unlock. European defense budgets have gone vertical, and right now your portfolio company is legally walled off from them. The moat you think protects your prime holdings is the same moat drowning your early-stage investments. Your small companies are not competition for the primes; there is plenty of room for both to be successful.

For the Policy Wonk, the pitch is precision. A control regime that treats a drone like an ATACM has no credibility left to spend when it actually needs to stop something dangerous. Overcontrol is how you get evasion; targeted control is how you get compliance.

The Fix Already Exists: We Just Gave It to Two Countries

We do not have to invent anything. In September 2024, the State Department stood up the AUKUS exemption, a license-free environment for defense trade, between pre-approved, vetted users, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, fenced by an "Excluded Technology List" that keeps the genuinely sensitive items behind the wall. In an early three-month sample, only 18 percent of requests fell on the excluded list; the other 82 percent could move without a license. The mechanism works; State approved it six months ago.

So extend it, carefully, because this is the part the cynics should watch. AUKUS worked because State vouched for allies whose export-control systems were judged comparable to our own. Thirty-two NATO members are not thirty-two equal risks, so the honest version of this is tiered: the most-trusted governments first, each on its own comparability finding. Build a NATO Trusted Trade tier on the same architecture: license-free authorization for vetted allies on the commodity tier, a narrow excluded list. Industry's loudest complaint about AUKUS is that the list is already too broad. Then build a small-business fast lane that waives the registration toll for firms below a revenue threshold. Keep the wall. Widen the gate. Stop making a startup spend its entire budget on compliance lawyers to sell drones to Poland.

I have spent a career watching good technology lose to bad processes. This is the purest example I know. The threat is real, the fix is proven, and the only thing missing is the will to admit that a rulebook written in the era of glacial weapons development is actively kneecapping the fast, cheap, disposable systems that are winning wars right now. Europe wants viable technology. Our young innovators are starving for a customer. ITAR is standing between them, collecting a $3,000 toll, and calling it national security.

I am not naive about post-sale diversion to China. The real leak in a trusted-ally tier is not China raiding our startups; it is a vetted ally re-exporting onward. This is why truly sensitive items stay behind the wall. A trusted-ally tier is only as good as the "trusted" part: the whitelist has to be policed, the excluded list has to be honest, and end-use monitoring has to be real. I will not pretend reform fixes everything. For some European governments "ITAR-free" is industrial policy, a way to protect their own primes and their own jobs. No amount of American good behavior erases that motive. But reform removes the legitimate excuse, and keeps our companies in contention where today they are auto-excluded. The answer to a blunt instrument is a sharper one, not no instrument at all.

We wrote the words "ITAR-free" onto our allies' marketing brochures ourselves, one anachronistic rule at a time. The question is whether we notice in time to erase them, or we keep guarding the henhouse until the last American startup gives up and the last European customer stops asking. Who are we protecting, and from what?

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Ripple’s European expansion just became a lot more concrete. The company says it has secured MiCA authorization in Luxembourg, giving it a regulated base from which it can offer services across the European Economic Area. For a crypto company that has spent years fighting legal uncertainty in the United States, that is not a small operational detail.

The important point is not merely that Ripple has another license. It is that Europe’s crypto rulebook is now mature enough to reward firms that can clear the compliance bar. MiCA has turned regulatory access into a competitive advantage, and Ripple is trying to position itself on the right side of that line.

For more details, visit the official Ripple platform.

TL;DR

• Ripple secured MiCA authorization in Luxembourg, according to the company.
• The approval gives Ripple a route to passport regulated services across the EEA.
• The move strengthens Ripple’s institutional Europe strategy at a time when crypto firms are racing to secure compliant regional footprints.

Why Luxembourg Matters

Luxembourg has long been a serious jurisdiction for funds, payments, and financial infrastructure. For Ripple, securing authorization there gives the firm a credible European base rather than a vague regional ambition. That matters when the target customers are banks, payment firms, and institutional clients that want regulatory clarity before they touch crypto rails.

The passporting element is the key commercial piece. A license in one EU jurisdiction can support activity across the wider EEA, which means Ripple can pitch its services with a much cleaner regulatory story than it could in a fragmented market.

A Different Kind Of Ripple Headline

Most Ripple headlines still get dragged back to XRP price or the SEC fight. This one is different. It is about operational expansion, regulated service delivery, and the slow professionalization of crypto payments infrastructure.

That does not mean the market should treat the approval as an instant XRP catalyst. It means Ripple has strengthened the non-token side of its business, which is exactly the kind of development institutions tend to care about most.

Why The Detail Matters Now

The practical takeaway is that Ripple stories now have to be read through both market structure and product execution. A headline can create attention, but the more durable signal is whether the underlying source points to real activity, a real filing, a real integration, or a measurable change in how users and institutions behave.

That is why this development is worth separating from ordinary market noise. It gives readers a specific point to track over the next few sessions rather than a vague reason to be bullish or bearish. If follow-up data confirms the direction, the story can build. If not, it still gives the market a clearer snapshot of where attention is concentrating today.

The Market Read

The cleaner way to read this story is not to force it into a simple bullish or bearish box. For Ripple readers, the useful part is the change in context. A new filing, integration, market signal, or regulatory step can alter how traders think about the next few sessions even when it does not instantly change price.

That is especially true after the last few volatile weeks, when crypto has been dealing with a mix of ETF flows, legal updates, exchange listings, protocol upgrades, and shifting liquidity. The market is no longer reacting to one dominant theme. It is weighing several smaller signals at once, and that makes source-backed developments more important than ordinary chatter.

Why Readers Should Keep This On The Radar

For NewsBTC readers, the important question is what this changes from here. If follow-up data, filings, governance updates, or wallet movement confirm the direction, the story can develop into a larger market theme. If the next update is weak, delayed, or contradicted by new data, the market may quickly move on.

That is why the scope matters. This article is not treating the development as a guaranteed price trigger. It is treating it as a fresh signal inside a market that is trying to sort durable activity from short-term noise. The distinction is important because crypto narratives can move faster than the facts behind them.

The next thing to watch is whether this becomes part of a wider pattern. In some cases that means more institutional flows. In others it means stronger developer adoption, cleaner regulatory access, deeper exchange liquidity, or a clearer technical roadmap. Either way, the story is strongest if it is followed by measurable execution rather than another round of speculative headlines.

This article is based on information from Ripple.

This article was written by the News Desk and edited by Samuel Rae.

This report is based on information from Ripple. at Ripple

Welcome to The Iron Triangle, the Cipher Brief column serving Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the Policy Wonks analyzing its impact on the global order.

A little over a year ago I watched a good company die. They built technology that worked. It was not a slide or a concept, but a thing that did what it was designed to do. They had European clients interested, checkbook open, at exactly the moment Europeans started opening checkbooks for real. They did not close the deal. They could not figure out how to export their product without tripping over the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), they could not afford the lawyer who could tell them, and they ran out of runway waiting on a U.S. contract that was still three review cycles from signatures. The technology did not fail. The paperwork won.

Around the same time, I sat with a foreign team with excellent tech who wanted to build in the United States. They decided against it. Their reason was not taxes or visas. It was that the moment their intellectual property became American, it might become ITAR-controlled, and they were terrified that a regulation written in Washington would strand the hardware they were shipping to Ukraine to kill Russians. Restated, our export-control regime is so feared that talented people keep their best work out of the American ecosystem. That is not security. That is self-harm.

The $3,000 Toll to Export Nothing

Start with the cost of admission. To legally export a defense article, you first register with the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). As of January 2025 the base registration fee rose to $3,000 a year, and you pay it whether or not you ever ship a single item. That fee is the insult, not the injury. It’s the trivial part that buys you the right to then apply, per transaction, for a DSP-5 license, a process that consumes months, specialized counsel, and a full-time compliance officer that a nine-person startup does not have and cannot afford to hire.

For Lockheed Martin, this is a rounding error and a competitive moat all at once. The primes have entire floors of export-control lawyers; the regulation that annoys them is the regulation that buries smaller companies. The same $250,000-a-year compliance function is a nuisance on a $61 billion contract base and a death sentence on a Series A. ITAR does not have to be designed as a moat to function as one.

The See-Through Rule and the Birth of "ITAR-Free"

Here is the part that turns a domestic annoyance into a strategic own-goal. ITAR does not stop at the first sale. Every onward move, a re-export to a third country, a retransfer to a different end user, needs its own license. Control follows the item forever. Two features make this uniquely radioactive. The first is the "see-through rule": American law looks straight through a foreign-built system to control the U.S. part buried inside it. The second is that ITAR, unlike Commerce's export rules, has no de minimis threshold; there is no amount of American content small enough to escape. One controlled datalink in a drone taints the entire aircraft, permanently, and Europe cannot freely sell it onward, or keep sending it to Kyiv, without asking for permission.

So Europe did the rational thing. It started designing us out. "ITAR-free" is now a selling point, a feature you advertise the way you'd advertise waterproofing. The control regime we built to protect technology has taught our allies to build parallel supply chains that don't need us at all. We are not catching diversion. We are losing the room, one clean-sheet component at a time.

We Are Guarding a Henhouse the Fox Already Breeds

Now the objection every serious reader is forming: won't loosening the rules help China? It is the right question, and it deserves an honest answer. Post-sales diversion to Beijing is a threat, and the wall against it should stay standing.

But look at what the small companies I'm talking about actually build; let’s be precise about it. The airframe of an attritable FPV drone is commodity hardware, every component sourceable on Alibaba, and China manufactures the world's drones at a scale and price we cannot approach. Nobody in Beijing is combing American startups for quadcopter know-how. What can be genuinely sensitive is the layer you can't buy on Alibaba: the autonomy stack, the radio's waveform library, the ISR payload's processing. Control that. But applying munitions-grade export control to benign parts isn't guarding the crown jewels. It's standing armed guard over a henhouse the fox already owns, breeds, and exports. Control the narrow band that matters; stop strangling everything downstream of it with rules written for an age when a weapons system took a decade to build and stayed secret for two.

The Money Nobody Talks About

Investors should sit with the scale of the mismatch. In 2025, venture capital poured a record $49.1 billion into defense tech, up more than 80 percent over the year before. It sounds like a golden age until you notice most of it stacked into a handful of nine-figure megarounds while the Forgotten Bench, the small firms building the actual arteries of the future force, fought over grants. A typical DoD SBIR Phase I award runs about $256,000; a Phase II might reach a couple of million, if the company survives the wait. Many do not.

Now hold that against one ITAR-specific insult. On an ordinary afternoon, RTX booked $183.7 million for Patriot hardware bound for the United Arab Emirates. The prime exports to the Gulf on a Tuesday while the startup cannot work out how to ship a drone to a NATO ally. That is not a difference in risk. It is a difference in legal firepower. And the Pentagon posts these awards daily, every one above $7.5 million. The primes' budget rounding errors could fund the next generation of warfare. Instead they accrue to the incumbents while the little guys are fenced out of a market currently on fire.

What Each Corner of the Triangle Should Want

For the Procurement Officer, this is about coalition speed. You cannot field an allied force at the pace of a per-transaction license queue. Interoperability that requires a lawyer is not interoperability.

For the Investor, ITAR reform is a total-addressable-market unlock. European defense budgets have gone vertical, and right now your portfolio company is legally walled off from them. The moat you think protects your prime holdings is the same moat drowning your early-stage investments. Your small companies are not competition for the primes; there is plenty of room for both to be successful.

For the Policy Wonk, the pitch is precision. A control regime that treats a drone like an ATACM has no credibility left to spend when it actually needs to stop something dangerous. Overcontrol is how you get evasion; targeted control is how you get compliance.

The Fix Already Exists: We Just Gave It to Two Countries

We do not have to invent anything. In September 2024, the State Department stood up the AUKUS exemption, a license-free environment for defense trade, between pre-approved, vetted users, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, fenced by an "Excluded Technology List" that keeps the genuinely sensitive items behind the wall. In an early three-month sample, only 18 percent of requests fell on the excluded list; the other 82 percent could move without a license. The mechanism works; State approved it six months ago.

So extend it, carefully, because this is the part the cynics should watch. AUKUS worked because State vouched for allies whose export-control systems were judged comparable to our own. Thirty-two NATO members are not thirty-two equal risks, so the honest version of this is tiered: the most-trusted governments first, each on its own comparability finding. Build a NATO Trusted Trade tier on the same architecture: license-free authorization for vetted allies on the commodity tier, a narrow excluded list. Industry's loudest complaint about AUKUS is that the list is already too broad. Then build a small-business fast lane that waives the registration toll for firms below a revenue threshold. Keep the wall. Widen the gate. Stop making a startup spend its entire budget on compliance lawyers to sell drones to Poland.

I have spent a career watching good technology lose to bad processes. This is the purest example I know. The threat is real, the fix is proven, and the only thing missing is the will to admit that a rulebook written in the era of glacial weapons development is actively kneecapping the fast, cheap, disposable systems that are winning wars right now. Europe wants viable technology. Our young innovators are starving for a customer. ITAR is standing between them, collecting a $3,000 toll, and calling it national security.

I am not naive about post-sale diversion to China. The real leak in a trusted-ally tier is not China raiding our startups; it is a vetted ally re-exporting onward. This is why truly sensitive items stay behind the wall. A trusted-ally tier is only as good as the "trusted" part: the whitelist has to be policed, the excluded list has to be honest, and end-use monitoring has to be real. I will not pretend reform fixes everything. For some European governments "ITAR-free" is industrial policy, a way to protect their own primes and their own jobs. No amount of American good behavior erases that motive. But reform removes the legitimate excuse, and keeps our companies in contention where today they are auto-excluded. The answer to a blunt instrument is a sharper one, not no instrument at all.

We wrote the words "ITAR-free" onto our allies' marketing brochures ourselves, one anachronistic rule at a time. The question is whether we notice in time to erase them, or we keep guarding the henhouse until the last American startup gives up and the last European customer stops asking. Who are we protecting, and from what?

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

If you're reading this while the blinds are drawn against yet another heat wave and wondering whether it’s finally time to buy an air conditioner, you're far from alone. At the end of June, as temperatures climbed well above 40° Celsius across Europe, shoppers in France literally forced their way into stores to snatch up portable fans and ACs before they sold out. Such scenes are likely to become more common. As the planet warms, the demand for cooling is rising worldwide. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts two-thirds of households could own an AC by 2050.

Politicians are, of course, turning ACs into a weapon in their broader culture wars. Far-right figure Marine Le Pen pledged to roll out air-conditioning across France if her party comes to power, while the British Conservatives vowed to overturn net-zero rules that restrict AC installation in new builds. On the left, the argument runs that air-conditioning would mainly benefit the rich and not those who need it most. It would also lock Europe into the same high-energy cooling spiral seen in the US and Asia. To date, only around 20 percent of Europeans have AC at home (and a mere 4 percent in the UK), compared with roughly 90 percent in the US, where electricity is considerably cheaper.

In Europe, air-conditioning is no longer just about comfort. It helps adults stay productive through extreme heat, and children concentrate in poorly ventilated schools. It helps people nod off when the air is still stiflingly warm long after sunset. It can even save lives. One research group estimated that air-conditioning prevented nearly 200,000 premature deaths among people over 65 in 2019 alone.

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Bitcoin Magazine

Bull Bitcoin Files Landmark Legal Challenge to Annul France’s DAC8 Crypto Data Surveillance Rules

Bull Bitcoin exchange, recently licensed under MiCA, is challenging the European directive in French courts that sets up a mass surveillance database, putting millions of crypto users at risk. 

Bull Bitcoin, the world’s oldest Bitcoin-only and non-custodial exchange, recently licensed under MiCA by France’s financial markets regulator AMF, has filed a legal challenge before the Conseil d’État, France’s supreme administrative court. The challenge seeks to annul Decree No. 2025-1276, the main measure transposing the European DAC8 directive into French law, on the grounds that it creates a massive surveillance grid and database that institutions can not secure from leaks and data hacks, ultimately putting civilians at risk of kidnapping and physical harm. 

Alongside the legal action, the company is making dac8.com public: “a complete, fully sourced resource for citizens, journalists and policymakers,” according to a press release shared with Bitcoin Magazine. 

In recent years, there has been an alarming rise in kidnappings and physical attacks on crypto users, most concentrated in Europe, with France being an epicenter. Organized crime seems to be exploiting poor data reporting laws of law-abiding crypto users who, by paying their taxes, expose their ownership of crypto assets. Given that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are not reversible and can be transferred internationally with ease, criminals are hunting down crypto users. France has had the second most physical attacks on crypto users after the USA, which has a much larger population, according to Gart, a company dedicated to protecting users from this rising threat.

High-profile figures in the Bitcoin and broader crypto industry have been targeted in recent years, such as Binance France CEO David Prinçay and Ledger co-founder David Balland, who lost a finger during the incident, among many others. Jameson Lopp, co-founder of Casa, a high-security Bitcoin and Ethereum wallet company, has organized ‘wrench attack’ data for years in a database on GitHub showing an accelerating trend of attacks. 

Bull Bitcoin argues in its legal challenge to the DAC8 that further consolidation and sharing of crypto user data will only perpetuate this trend of physical attacks. However, they also argue that these personal security risks created by the DAC8 are also working against the stated intentions of the regulations. They argue that users will simply find legal alternatives to centralized, regulated exchanges, opting to purchase the assets off the grid via peer-to-peer exchanges, home mining or offshore unregulated alternatives, making tax collection even more difficult.

User Data Honey Pots

DAC8 turns the natural incentive a company has to protect its users’ data into a valuable multinational database with many entry points, which cybersecurity experts have for a long time called a honey pot. Bull Bitcoin points out that regulated crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) under MiCA, DORA and the GDPR are supervised, sanctionable professionals with financial incentives to protect their customers. DAC8, in turn, does the opposite: it moves data into administrative reporting networks where access is broader, and accountability is harder for users to assess. The security of the whole — Bull Bitcoin concludes — is then only as strong as its weakest link. 

The history of data security over the past decades shows that amassing user data and keeping it safe over time is very difficult. Just this year, the French National Agency for Secure Credentials (ANTS, also known as France Titres) suffered a major breach detected on April 15, 2026, exposing data from up to 11.7–19 million accounts. Compromised information included login IDs, full names, email addresses, dates of birth, account identifiers, and, in some cases, postal addresses, places of birth, and phone numbers. 

Months earlier, the French National Bank account registry also suffered a major hack, exposing data tied to approximately 1.2 million accounts. The compromised information included IBANs, account holder names, addresses, and, in some cases, tax identification numbers, though officials stated the attacker could not view balances or conduct transactions.

In the United States, the situation is not much better. The Equifax Data Breach in 2017 affected 147 million Americans, and the National Public Data Breach of 2024 affected over 200 million Americans, leading to leaks of social security numbers among other critical information. And back in 2015, the Office of Personal Management of the U.S. government was also breached, compromising a large number of U.S. Government officials. The data stolen included everything from social security numbers to medical records. 

The list of such breaches is long, and the only logical conclusion to draw from it is that the less user information that ends up in these honeypots, the better, as ultimately all of these hacks put civilians at risk either from physical attacks or from identity-theft related fraud. 

Families On the Front Lines

Of the many issues identified by Bull Bitcoin and documented on the DAC8 website, the most alarming one might be how even individuals who have not purchased crypto might end up harmed by this concentration of data, just by familial association with a Bitcoiner or crypto user.

Citing data by Certik, Bull Bitcoin highlights that more than half of the violent incidents recorded in 2026 against crypto owners targeted a family member — spouse, child, elderly parent — as a direct victim or as a pressure lever over the key holder. On the topic, Bull Bitcoin assets that  “DAC8 therefore exposes not only crypto-asset holders, but their entire close family circle: between 40 and 135 million Europeans fall into a physical-risk zone, without any of them ever having consented.”

Francis Pouliot, CEO of Bull Bitcoin considers this overreach into the privacy of Euroeans to be potentially catastrophic for the prosperity of the continent, he minced no words in the press release saying that “DAC8 has transformed the concept of Know Your Customer into Kill Your Customer.” He added, “We cannot let the very foundations of civilization be shattered by this attack on privacy rights. We must draw a line in the sand and refuse to cede any more territory before we have nothing left. Someone must take a stand. It appears that no one else is willing and able to do so. Therefore, it falls to BULL to lead this fight.”

The DAC8.com is rich with facts, figures, official sources (EUR-Lex, OECD, Legifrance) and analysis, in French, English and other European languages for those interested in reviewing it and freely using it.

This post Bull Bitcoin Files Landmark Legal Challenge to Annul France’s DAC8 Crypto Data Surveillance Rules first appeared on Bitcoin Magazine and is written by Juan Galt.

Blood pressure is one of the so-called “vital signs” that medical practitioners use to determine the basic state of a patient in any given moment. It’s exactly what it sounds like—a measurement of the pressure of the blood flowing through the body, with some complications to account for the pulsatile nature of human blood flow.

You might think measuring blood pressure is a solved concern, and it mostly is. With that said, some blood pressure monitors out there aren’t quite doing their job properly, and [Milos Rasic] came to Hackaday Europe 2026 to spell out the problem.

Under Pressure

Before exploring the issue, it’s worth first understanding how blood pressure is actually measured. On a baseline level, it’s the same as pressure being measured in any other fluid. Specifically, though, when it comes to blood, it’s important to measure the pressure at two points. There is the peak, when the heart muscle is contracting, referred to as systolic pressure, and the low point, when the heart relaxes, referred to as diastolic pressure. Thus, blood pressure is referred to with two numbers, such as “140 over 90” or 140/90, referring to systolic and diastolic pressures respectively. It’s sometimes important to track the mean arterial pressure, too. Typically, nominal blood pressure would be considered around 120/80 mmHg. High blood pressure, or hypertension, starts at figures over 130/80 mmHg, while low blood pressure, or hypotension, would be considered relevant below 90/60 mmHg.

Blood pressure can be monitored in a number of ways. Most of the time, non-invasive methods are preferred, whether in the doctor’s office or at home. [Milos] notes that the classic hand-pumped blood pressure cuff device (sphygmomanometer) and a stethoscope is still a perfectly excellent way to measure blood pressure in a clinical scenario. This is referred to as the Korotkoff method, where the doctor listens for pulsations in the artery to begin as the pressure of the cuff slowly drops below the systolic pressure, and then later ease as it reduces below the diastolic pressure, monitoring pressure in the cuff on a gauge as they go. Then there are digital versions of arm cuff blood pressure monitors, which [Milos] notes can have some problems. Meanwhile, there are advanced technologies in development to do live measurement with things like mmWave radar devices or ultrasonic tricks, but they’re still emerging and less established in clinical contexts.

It’s an interesting exploration of a very specific part of vital sign measurement that few of us ever think about in detail. Sometimes it pays to know how the machines that you’re getting measurements from actually work, and whether you can trust what they’re saying. In the world of blood pressure measurement, [Milos] has done just that.

Welcome back!

This is the final article of our Drone Warfare series on Ukraine’s rise as a drone powerhouse. But Ukraine’s success story is not one it achieved alone. The country’s drone industry was built with the support of partners from around the world who helped Ukraine during its most difficult times. Here we look at Ukraine’s export strategy and how it can serve as a way to give back by sharing hard-earned battlefield experience and technology with the nations that helped make this success possible.

Battlefield Experience

For most of the war, Ukraine’s drone sector existed on the demand side of the defense market. The country needed huge volumes of FPV drones, interceptor drones and reconnaissance systems simply to keep pace with the battlefield. By 2026, that position began to change. Ukraine started to present itself not only as a state that needed drones, but as a state that could supply them, co-produce them, and teach others how to use them. In March 2026 President Volodymyr Zelenskiy discussed joint arms production with Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten and said Ukraine was ready to export interceptor drones that are not needed on its own battlefield.

Ukraine is not trying to sell a platform developed in peacetime and polished for foreign buyers. It is offering weapons and systems that were shaped by daily combat against a technologically capable enemy. That gives Ukrainian exports a different value proposition. They are presented as battlefield-tested tools that have already survived the hardest possible proving ground.

The Export Model

Ukraine’s export strategy depends on the fact that it is producing more than it can immediately absorb on the front line in certain categories, especially interceptor drones. In June 2026 Ukraine said it could produce 2,000 interceptor drones per day, with about half potentially available beyond domestic needs, and that it could supply at least 1,000 interceptor drones a day to allies facing Shahed attacks if investment improves. That is the logic behind the export conversation. Ukraine is not opening the floodgates on every weapon it makes. It is identifying categories where production has moved beyond immediate domestic consumption.

Business Insider also reported that Ukraine wants to protect its own security first and only share technologies that do not compromise its battlefield position. That means exports are likely to focus on systems that are already partially superseded on the Ukrainian front, or on systems that can be co-produced under controlled conditions.

Europe

Europe is the most obvious destination for Ukraine’s export strategy because the continent is already moving in Ukraine’s direction. The Netherlands are going to spend €248 million on drones for Ukraine, with production split between the Netherlands and Ukraine. On 17 June 2026 the Netherlands pledged another €500 million for drones and air defense equipment. These are signs that European governments are beginning to fund drone production as an industrial activity.

The broader European defense picture points the same way. It was reported that G7 countries and the United States had agreed to allow Ukraine-based and European firms to produce long-range missiles and air defense systems under license. Europe is no longer only buying Ukrainian results, it wants to buy into the production model behind them.

The broader European defense market is also moving in Ukraine’s direction. For instance, Airbus partnered with the French counter-drone startup Alta Ares. Under the June 2026 memorandum of understanding, Airbus will integrate Alta Ares’ AI-guided interceptors, including the Black Bird and X-Lock systems, both combat-tested in Ukraine since 2024, into its Fortion IBMS command-and-control platform, connecting Alta Ares’ targeting software and interceptor drones to Airbus’ battle management systems to create a sensor-to-shooter chain against drone and cruise missile threats.

Middle East

The Middle East is the second major market because it faces a different but equally urgent drone threat. In March 2026 Zelenskiy said Ukraine was ready to send instructors to the Middle East and export interceptor drones that are not needed at home. Business Insider added that Ukrainian officials see older Ukrainian counter-drone technology as still useful for allies facing Shahed attacks, even if those systems are already outdated by Ukraine’s own battlefield standards. A weapon does not need to be the newest model to be valuable if the user’s threat environment is less intense than Ukraine’s.

That makes the Middle East a natural fit for Ukraine’s export model because the buyer often wants a system, not just a drone. The package includes interceptor drones, training, radar integration, and electronic warfare resilience. Zelenskiy explicitly framed the issue that way, saying that without radar coverage and software that can operate under jamming, an interceptor is not a real defender.

Production

The most interesting part of Ukraine’s export strategy is not the sale itself. It is the move toward co-production. The point of co-production is to make exports more durable and less vulnerable to disruption. It also lets allies develop industrial capacity while Ukraine keeps access to the newest combat-tested designs. The G7 agreement reported by The Guardian shows a model where production can be shifted into partner territory while still drawing on Ukrainian experience and requirements. That approach helps solve three problems at once. It spreads risk away from the battlefield. It makes procurement faster for partners. And it creates a legal framework for sharing sensitive technology without handing over full control of the most advanced systems.

The Financial Logic

The export strategy also has a budget logic. Drone exports and co-production can help bring in foreign money, expand industrial capacity, and reduce pressure on the domestic defense budget. The Netherlands’ funding would support drones and air defense equipment for Ukraine, while Ukraine’s officials see export volume as a way to unlock more production capacity. The practical idea is that external orders help keep factories busy, while revenue and investment help scale the next generation of systems.

This logic is important in wartime because the domestic state cannot fund every possible expansion on its own. Exports make production more sustainable. They also let Ukraine distribute risk across several partners rather than relying only on its own budget and wartime aid flows. In other words, the export strategy is partly about money, but it is also about industrial resilience.

Main Constraints 

Ukraine’s export strategy is still tightly constrained by its own security needs. Ukrainian officials want to keep priority for domestic forces and treat exports as selective. That means the country is not trying to become a free-market weapons bazaar in the middle of a war. It is trying to manage surplus capacity without weakening the front line. There is also the issue of sensitivity. Not every system can be exported, and not every partner can receive the same level of access. Licensed production in allied countries solves part of that problem, but only part. The more advanced the system, the more likely it is to remain under stricter Ukrainian control. That is why the export strategy is likely to be layered. That means some hardware is going to be sold directly, while some systems will be co-produced, some software and training will be shared for integration, and some capabilities will stay in-house.

Strategic Value

Ukraine’s biggest advantage in the export market is not price alone. It is combat credibility. Allies are interested because Ukraine’s drones and counter-drone systems were developed in the harshest possible environment. A state that has spent years fighting under heavy electronic warfare pressure, missile strikes, and mass drone attacks has something to offer that many peacetime defense industries do not. That does not mean Ukraine will dominate global drone exports. Competition is still strong, and certification with production security all remain real obstacles. But the country has already crossed an important threshold, where it’s no longer only asking for help. It is now a partner that can supply systems, share production, and train others to fight the same kind of war.

Conclusion

Europe wants production. The Middle East wants interception. Ukraine wants revenue and industrial depth. That creates a new model built around selective exports and battlefield-tested expertise. Ukraine is no longer only defending itself with drones, but it is using drone expertise to build alliances. That is the meaning of its export strategy today.

The post Drone Warfare: Ukraine’s Drone Industry, Part 3 – Export Strategy first appeared on Hackers Arise.