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Before yesterdayHacking and InfoSec

C2PA and Pixel Glitter Milk

25 August 2026 at 10:01
The news has been full of incredible reports recently. Like this one:
BREAKING: Iowa Farmers Discover "Glitter Milk" from Unicorn Cows
DES MOINES, IA - May 25, 2026

A handful of Iowa dairy farmers say they've started milking unicorn cows, and the results have local nutritionists scratching their heads.

The milk sparkles.

"It's real pretty in the morning sun," said Polk County dairy farmer Dale Hutchins. "First time I saw one with a horn, I figured I'd accidentally bought somebody else's livestock. Then it started making glitter milk."

Researchers examining the milk say the shimmering particles appear to be naturally occurring protein crystals rather than actual glitter. Preliminary tests found the milk to be perfectly safe, with unusually high levels of vitamins and minerals. One eight-ounce serving reportedly contains an entire day's recommended vitamins A, C, D, E, B1, B2, B3, and B12.

"The numbers keep coming back looking impossible," said one nutritional biochemist involved in the testing. "Either we've discovered something genuinely remarkable, or one of our graduate students has been replacing the samples with breakfast cereal."

Children participating in a small nutrition study reportedly loved the milk, although several parents complained that the spilled cereal was "way harder to clean because the glitter goes everywhere."

Federal regulators have not commented, and the Iowa Department of Agriculture says it's waiting for additional testing before making any official statements.

If production continues, glitter milk could begin appearing in a few Midwestern co-ops later this year for about $8.99 a half-gallon.

- Staff Reporter, Heartland Agricultural Digest

As proof of this incredible story, we have a photo of a farmer milking a unicorn cow!



According to the metadata:
  • The photo is from a Google Pixel 10 Pro.

  • The picture has cryptographically signed C2PA metadata. This data says it is "Created by Pixel Camera". The C2PA metadata even includes a 1024x768 preview image of the photo. Everything in the cryptographically signed manifest is consistent with a real photo from a Google Pixel camera.

  • In my blogs, I have repeatedly detailed ways to create "authenticated forgeries" using C2PA. However, the one thing I cannot forge is the cryptographic signature itself. This picture has a valid X.509 certificate chain that traces back to the C2PA-managed trust list. The certificate is issued by Google for the Pixel cameras. To my knowledge, nobody can forge this signature; this was really signed by a Google Pixel camera.

  • The cryptographic signature includes a signed timestamp. The timestamp is dated "2026-05-25 17:04:19 GMT" and the signer is Google. Again, I cannot forge this signed timestamp; this is real.

  • The C2PA organization has a list of conforming products. If we upload this glitter-milk picture to Adobe's Inspect service (a conforming product), it reports that this is a legitimate photo from a Pixel Camera, recorded on May 25, 2026.

  • The Adobe-run Content Authenticity Initiative (CAI) provides C2PA implementations. Their CAI Verify validator reports that the contents shows "captured media", came from Google LLC, issued by a Pixel Camera with a notation that it is "Conformant" (a conforming product), and includes a verified timestamp of "May 25, 2026 at 11:04 AM MDT". (They show the time relative to your own time zone, and I'm in MDT.)
Everything says that this is a legitimate photo from a Google Pixel camera.

There's just one problem: It's a forgery. The picture is AI generated and the news article is fiction, but Google's signatures are real.

Industry best practices for responsible disclosure suggest giving vendors 45-90 days to respond. Since we are 90 days past the vendor notification, I'm following industry best practices and making the details public.

Early Reporting History

I've been working closely with a group of researchers at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC). They have a Provenance and Authenticity Standards Assessment Working Group (PASAWG) that has been formally evaluating solutions like C2PA. (While I'm a regular attendee, I'm there as a guest and resource, not a member.) One of the things I like about PASAWG is that they have a more formal way to report bugs than my typical "shouting into the blogosphere".

Nearly a year ago (September 2025), Google made a big announcement about the Pixel 10 product line. They explained "How Pixel and Android are bringing a new level of trust to your images with C2PA Content Credentials". Their bullet points (with their bold emphasis):
  • The Pixel 10 lineup is the first to have Content Credentials built in across every photo created by Pixel Camera.

  • The Pixel Camera app achieved Assurance Level 2, the highest security rating currently defined by the C2PA Conformance Program. Assurance Level 2 for a mobile app is currently only possible on the Android platform.

  • A private-by-design approach to C2PA certificate management, where no image or group of images can be related to one another or the person who created them.

  • Pixel 10 phones support on-device trusted time-stamps, which ensures images captured with your native camera app can be trusted after the certificate expires, even if they were captured when your device was offline.
As Carl Sagan said, "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." So we began to take a closer look.

Two months later (November 2025), PASAWG, one of my coworkers (Shawn), and I reported to representatives from Google and C2PA about a potential problem with Google's Pixel camera. In particular, we theorized that someone with root on the device could sign any picture as if it were from the camera. While the C2PA representative listened to the concerns, the Google representative was adamant that this type of attack was not possible. In particular, the signing keys are stored in a secure chip and cannot be extracted, and the Android architecture prevents unauthorized applications from accessing the keys.

More Researchers

Unrelated to our research and reporting, I had been contacted by other researchers who thought that they found the same theoretical flaw. One in Canada, one in the US, and one in the UK; this shows that other people are thinking the same way. (And just because I didn't list any state-sponsored threat actors doesn't mean they are not also evaluating this vulnerability.)

Three months ago (May 2026), a researcher named retr0id (David Buchanan) contacted me. He took the exploit from theoretical to implementation. He sent me two sample pictures that were signed using a Google Pixel device. To say I was impressed is an understatement. But I wanted hard proof that he had implemented it. I sent him a challenge:
  1. Using ChatGPT, I generated the source picture of a unicorn cow being milked.

  2. ChatGPT's picture was a PNG with an embedded C2PA manifest. I stripped out the manifest and re-encoded the picture as a JPEG.

  3. I found a different picture from a Pixel 10 and copied over the metadata. This way, the forgery had all of the correct metadata fields for that camera. I intentionally left the EXIF date wrong (dated 2025-08-29 02:10:17 GMT) and set the EXIF camera model name to "Pixel 10 Pro Totally Legit".

  4. I sent my forgery to retr0id.

  5. Two minutes later (not kidding), retr0id sent the signed forgery back to me. That two minutes includes receiving the image from me, transferring it to the Google Pixel for signing, signing it, and zipping it up to send back to me. Just the data transfers probably took him a minute and a half. This means that it's mostly an automated exploit. (He's released some of his tools on GitHub and a technical write-up on his blog.)
The example demonstrates how someone with a Google Pixel device could sign any picture (real, fake, AI generated, etc.) as if it came from the Google Pixel's camera. Moreover, the forgery (excluding my intentional artifacts) is indistinguishable from a real photo. C2PA's metadata provides no reliable assurance of provenance or authenticity.

The Vulnerability

I'm going to be intentionally vague here because I don't want to enable bad actors. However, the vulnerability isn't very deep and anyone who can get past the first step is almost certainly able to exploit it.

When I asked retr0id how he did it, he sent me back a wonderful picture that explains the process:



The C2PA signing keys are in a subsystem called 'StrongBox'. This is a secure storage area for handling the keys. The keys go in and never come out. You need a special program in the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to access the keys. This special program sends data to be signed by the keys and receives the signature.

The exploit:

Step 1: Get root on the device.
This is the hardest part. The Android operating system is intentionally locked down, so it's hard to get root access.

A common attack for Android devices replaces the bootloader. However, replacing the bootloader requires a factory reset, so you cannot access any secrets or protected data that existed prior to unlocking. To implement the exploit, retr0id needed root access without a reset.

As a hardware specialist, retr0id used a well-known chip-based approach to get a root shell. His implementation was hardware-specific, but the underlying methodology has been around for at least a decade. Moreover, preventing this attack vector requires completely redesigning the hardware architecture.

However, we are not limited to a hardware exploit. During the 90-day responsible disclosure waiting period, two other software-only exploits came out that also granted root access. (Exploit #1 and Exploit #2.) It doesn't matter that these software exploits have been patched; a malicious attacker won't patch their system and can gain root access on their own device. (As far as I can tell, you can still take signed photos, even if the device hasn't been patched recently.)

Regardless of your method, you just need to get root on the device.

Step 2: Sign your data
Find the program that signs the C2PA metadata using the protected keys. Use the program to sign anything. This is a Confused Deputy attack. When using Android's secured environment, only the TEE program can submit data to be signed, but the root user can provide any data to the signing program. Fixing this part of the problem requires redesigning the entire Android security model. In other words, there is no easy patch.

If you have root on the Pixel device (and you didn't change the bootloader), then you can sign any file as if it came from the Pixel camera. The signature will be legitimately signed by Google.

As an aside: For most exploits, saying "start with root" means that additional exploits add nothing. If you have root, then you already control everything. I.e., creating more backdoors is trivial if you can already alter every file. However, with Google and C2PA, we're not using root to stay on the device; we're using it to create authoritative files. Those files will leave the device as the forgeries are disseminated. With this attack vector, gaining root is just the beginning.

Reporting Timeline

I currently have over 40 blog entries about C2PA problems, and most of them disclose distinct vulnerabilities. While the public didn't know most of these problems until I made them public, none of the vulnerabilities have been new to C2PA members.

For this Pixel vulnerability, we recorded the reporting history:
  1. We reported it, via email and verbally, to both Google and C2PA representatives. The reporting included details and the demonstration picture. Following best practices for responsible disclosure, we gave them 90 days to respond. (Today, Aug 25, is 90 days from the initial vendor reporting, and about 9 months since the theoretical vulnerability was disclosed.)

    • We reported it to Google because the exploit is explicitly demonstrated against Google's flagship product, the Pixel series of Android devices.

    • We reported it to C2PA because the Pixel 10 was the first "Level 2" conforming product. Assurance Level 2 means that it must protect the signing keys. However, while the keys are protected from extraction by the Android StrongBox, this exploit shows that the keys can still be used to sign anything. In effect, the keys are unprotected. So either Google is not Level 2 conforming (false advertising), or they are Level 2 on paper but not in the implementation (deceptive practices), or Level 2 is grossly insufficient for providing any kind of assurance (misleading). In any case, this is definitely a C2PA conformance program problem.

  2. I made it clear that I planned to blog about this problem. But I also offered to work with them on the release cycle. For example, if they were about to provide a patch, then I would be willing to delay the blog and coordinate a release. Both Google and C2PA repeatedly acknowledged my offer during the 90-day period. However, I received no feedback from either organization.

  3. Google has a bounty program that pays researchers for finding vulnerabilities. I never signed up because Google requires agreeing to legal terms. (Even if I conceptually agree to the reasons behind their terms, I cannot sign anything that could be construed as a legal agreement. I just want to report a bug.) However, retr0id doesn't have those same limitations. Since he implemented it, we (PASAWG, myself, and Google) asked him to submit it through Google's Vulnerability Reward Program (VRP). He did.

  4. Google's VRP almost immediately sent retr0id two emails. The first said that the vulnerability was out of scope. The second said to ignore the first email and that it was in scope. They did end up logging it as a received report.

  5. Fast forward two months. Retr0id received an email from Google's VRP. (I am including it here with his permission.)
    jo...@google.com #9 Jul 14, 2026 12:36AM

    Status: Won't Fix (Infeasible).

    Hello,

    The Android Security Team has conducted an initial severity assessment on this report. Based on our published severity assessment matrix (1) it was rated as not being a security vulnerability that would meet the severity bar for inclusion in an Android security bulletin. If you have additional information that you believe we should use to reassess this report, please let us know.

    Please note that notwithstanding our severity rating and the closure of this external bug, we may nonetheless pass this issue on to the feature team for remediation. Therefore, please know that we appreciate this submission and any future contributions.

    The Resolution Notes label has been set to NSBC (Not Security Bulletin Class) to reflect this assessment.

    Thank you,
    Android Security Team.
    (1) Severity Matrix: https://source.android.com/security/overview/updates-resources#severity

    How did we do? Please fill out a short anonymous survey.
    They closed it out as a "Won't Fix (Infeasible)". Google defines "Won't Fix (Infeasible)" as "The changes that are needed to address the issue are not reasonably possible."

    More importantly, Google labeled it as "NSBC (Not Security Bulletin Class)". This code means that it either isn't a security vulnerability or isn't considered severe. In effect, Google explicitly said that a vulnerability in Google's flagship Pixel product line, which permits anyone to sign anything as if it legitimately came from the camera, is not a significant security vulnerability. I disagree with Google: verifiable history (provenance), reliable source attribution, and secure key management are explicitly security concerns. (See NIST SP 800-193 Platform Firmware Resiliency Guidelines, NIST SP 800-57 Recommendation for Key Management, and NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations.) This demonstrates a fundamental disconnect between how Google views "OS platform boundaries" and "content provenance integrity".
It took a while, but retr0id did receive payment for reporting this bug to Google. VRP bounties are only for security issues. By paying the bounty, Google implicitly confirms that this bug is a security problem, even though it was classified as NSBC and kept out of the security bulletin. The NSBC classification also means no CVE was assigned, which keeps the issue out of regulatory tracking, enterprise compliance audits, and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD).

We have done our due diligence for reporting this problem. Google has decided to downplay the vulnerability, claiming that it isn't a noteworthy security issue. In contrast, C2PA did not respond at all.

Revoking Certificates

Within days of demonstrating the bug and sharing the sample image, Google revoked the X.509 signing certificate used for the glitter-milk picture. That sounds like responsible incident response on the surface, but in practice, it reveals a fundamental flaw in how Content Credentials interact with public key infrastructure (PKI). Keep in mind, they quickly revoked the certificate (a security response), despite Google's formal response weeks later saying that it was not significant enough for a security bulletin.

There are two major problems with relying on revocation to fix forged media:
  1. Validators Don't Check Revocation
    The current C2PA specification does not require validators to perform revocation checks. As of this writing, I am unaware of any conforming validator products that check whether a manifest's certificate has been revoked. So even though Google revoked the certificate for the glitter-milk photo, most C2PA validation tools will still happily report the image as authentic.

  2. The Privacy Paradox: Unique Signing Certificates
    To prevent third parties from tracking users across photos, Google designed their C2PA implementation to issue an ephemeral, unique signing certificate for every single photo.

    The trust chain looks like this:

    • Root CA: Google's root certificate sits on the C2PA-managed trust list.

    • Intermediate Certificate: Google's root issues an intermediate certificate. As far as I can tell, every Pixel device uses the same set of intermediate certificates.

    • Leaf Certificate: The intermediate cert issues a brand-new, single-use leaf certificate that is used to sign an individual image capture.

    Because every picture gets its own unique signing certificate, revoking the glitter-milk certificate only invalidated that one specific photo. This does not prevent retr0id (or anyone else with this exploit) from generating millions of additional forged images on that exact same compromised Pixel.
This signing approach, with unique signatures per picture, introduces serious problems:
  • Ineffective Revocation: Google can only revoke certificates for forgeries that are actively discovered and reported to them. Unreported forgeries remain 100% valid.

  • Denial of Service: An attacker running an automated batch script could sign millions of synthetic images. Reporting all of these intentional forgeries would likely swamp Google's certificate revocation infrastructure.

    (At the technical level: this is an attack against the ingest pipeline and OCSP signer; C2PA does not support CRLs for revocation. Google currently lacks a portal or documented process for users to submit individual forged photos for revocation. If Google were to build a portal without rate-limiting, it risks becoming a bandwidth/DoS problem on its own. If they add CAPTCHA or other throttling to protect the ingest pipeline, then known forgeries may not be submitted in a reasonable time, and humans could become discouraged. Moreover, bulk OCSP revocation could plausibly strain cryptographic signing throughput.)

  • Verification Problem: When a user submits a picture to Google for revocation, how does Google know that it really is a forgery? With the glitter-milk example, we explicitly showed them how it was made. However, a malicious person could submit legitimate photos and claim they are forgeries. Google needs some way to identify whether a signed picture from a Pixel device is actually from the camera. This remains a hard problem. Depending on their implementation, Google could reject real forgery reports if the verification process is too strict or revoke legitimate photos if it's too lenient.

    • Without C2PA: Individual analysts must evaluate the media using whatever tools they have available.

    • With Google's C2PA signature: When someone submits a picture for revocation, the onus is on Google to provide the verification. (I suspect that nobody asked Google's legal department about whether the company wanted to be put in the position of validating all pictures.) Keep in mind: the entire premise of C2PA is that Google cannot otherwise verify whether a picture is authentic, so asking Google to verify whether a revocation request's media is real just restates the same unsolved problem.

  • Painted Into a Corner: With the current architecture, Google cannot revoke the device's intermediate certificate without instantly invalidating every authentic, legitimate Pixel photo ever taken. Google's revocation approach effectively becomes all or nothing. In either case, they cannot stop one individual from creating signed forgeries.
Since the core exploit impacts Android's StrongBox and TEE architecture, revoking individual certificates does not resolve this problem. Revoking a certificate, only to have an attacker compromise the replacement certificate in the exact same way, is not an effective security solution.

By choosing privacy through single-use certificates, and without addressing local key abuse, Google created a system where revoking a compromised image is nothing more than security theater.

Real-World Problems

It is easy to treat "Glitter Milk" as an amusing and harmless proof-of-concept. But the implications of a broken content provenance model are anything but funny.



Image provenance is critical for determining whether the media represents something real or fake. Whether it's a political proof-of-life, images of war or strife, or even something less extreme, like an insurance claim, there are direct consequences from forged provenance.
  • This Mitch McConnell picture has no camera-original metadata, but does include an XMP record showing that it was altered with an Adobe application hours before being released to the public. If someone replaced the metadata with fake Google Pixel information, and then had it signed by a real Google Pixel device, would it be more trustworthy?

  • The second picture is from an artist who creates AI-generated pictures of life in Russia. If we removed the Facebook re-encoding artifacts and had it signed by a Google Pixel device, would you think it was authentic?

  • The third picture is part of a product defect claim. Unlike the first two, this one isn't hypothetical: it carries a cryptographically-valid C2PA signature that genuinely came from a Google Pixel device. But now that we've shown that same "came from a camera" signature can be applied to non-camera media, should you trust it?
It's hard enough to debunk one false picture. However, with a little effort, a malicious actor could add in fake camera metadata and have it authoritatively signed by a trusted device. That significantly increases the effort to debunk a picture since it has the backing of Google's cryptographic signature as an unbreakable "official truth". (Remember kids: Strong cryptography over untrusted data does not make the data more trustworthy.)

Untrusted By Design

This glitter-milk picture demonstrates how any image can be assigned false provenance and signed with a cryptographically valid Google signature. Moreover, this problem also works in reverse: genuine photos with signatures can be easily dismissed as "just another C2PA forgery." Regardless of the ground truth, an analyst cannot determine if a picture is real or fake based on Google's implementation of C2PA; the signature effectively means nothing.

Google's initial announcement made some extraordinary claims that have failed to stand up to scrutiny:
  • Claim: "Pixel and Android are bringing a new level of trust to your images with C2PA Content Credentials".

    Fact: The devices can be used to sign any file, real or fake, with legitimate C2PA-signed claims identifying that the media came from the camera. This does not introduce a new level of trust; it enables a new way to commit fraud and disinformation.

  • Claim: "The Pixel 10 lineup is the first to have Content Credentials built in across every photo created by Pixel Camera."

    Fact: This is false. Nikon shipped C2PA Content Credentials in Z6 III firmware in late August 2025, weeks before Google's announcement. Days later, researcher Adam Horshack showed the camera could be used to sign arbitrary images, forcing Nikon to indefinitely suspend the service and revoke every certificate it had issued. Google isn't first; it's just the first to repeat Nikon's mistake with better marketing.

  • Claim: "Pixel Camera app achieved Assurance Level 2 ... only possible on the Android platform."

    Fact: While they acquired Assurance Level 2 on paper, it appears to be absent from the implementation. Moreover, they stated that protecting the keys from signing arbitrary images is not possible ("Won't Fix (Infeasible)"), so whatever Assurance Level 2 is meant to guarantee, it clearly doesn't hold up in practice on the Android platform.

  • Claim: "A private-by-design approach to C2PA certificate management, where no image or group of images can be related to one another or the person who created them."

    Fact: While true, this prevents them from revoking future pictures from a known-compromised device. A device that has been rooted and is generating signed forgeries can continue to operate unabated.

  • Claim: "Pixel 10 phones support on-device trusted time-stamps, which ensures images captured with your native camera app can be trusted after the certificate expires, even if they were captured when your device was offline."

    Fact: While it is true that the Pixel 10 has a built-in trusted time-stamp service, that does not mean that it is only applied to "images captured with your native camera app". This claim is misleading.
In effect, Google's C2PA-enabled devices provide no reliable protections or 'truth' about the media -- and Google knows it.

Flawed Foundations

The problems detailed in this blog are not limited to the Google Pixel or its C2PA Assurance Level 2 rating. These problems are fundamental and impact other C2PA implementations. For example, Evergreen Labs has a C2PA Assurance Level 2 application called "GreenCheckmark" (screenshot) that can be used to sign any image or video as if it came from the device. However:
  • C2PA's Conformance Program only checks the paperwork for compliance, not the implementation. In this case, the Conformance Program states that the app has Level 2 assurance.

  • According to Evergreen Labs, the app received approval for Level 2, but only implemented Level 1. There is no C2PA-provided or user-identifiable information that identifies this discrepancy.

  • Even if the app was fully implemented, Assurance Level 2 requires using Android's StrongBox/TEE, and Google already stated that it knows the environment does not provide adequate protections ("Won't Fix (Infeasible)").
GreenCheckmark isn't the point of failure here; failures are inherited from Google and C2PA.



If you still believe that C2PA works, then I have news for you: Scientists have created multi-colored sheep for dye-free yarn. According to Adobe Inspect (a conforming validator) and CAI Verify, this is legitimate "captured media" from a camera, signed by GreenCheckmark, and it is a Level 2 conformant application (screenshot). Similarly, YouTube's description reports that this video clip from the CGI movie "Big Buck Bunny" is signed by Evergreen Labs and "Captured with a camera" (screenshot).

The same class of vulnerability exists for Android and iOS (except that iOS is harder to root). Moreover, retr0id has additional working demonstrations from many other C2PA-enabled apps, including Proofmode (a Level 1 conformant app; see forgeries at Adobe Inspect and CAI Verify). To date, no C2PA implementations are immune to signing forged media.

We live in an era of deep skepticism, where public trust in visual media is at an all-time low. Proponents of C2PA argue that cryptographic signing solves this problem: if an official photo carries a valid, hardware-backed C2PA signature, the public can trust it. But the truth is that the C2PA signature carries no weight for providing any type of reliable authentication, validation, or provenance. Instead, it turns every device into a powerful tool for laundering disinformation as fact, which is worse than doing nothing.

Special thanks to retr0id, Shawn, and PASAWG for their assistance. All vendors whose products are shown signing forgeries in this blog were notified of the problem. Claude and Gemini were used to help write portions of the code for these demonstrations. (At one point, we had to pause for a few hours after running out of free tokens.) Getting root is hard. Writing the code to implement the vulnerability is a very low bar and can be done with an AI assistant.

OSINT: WireTapper – Mapping Surveillance and Wireless Devices Around You

28 July 2026 at 10:06

Welcome back, aspiring cyberwarriors!

Take a second and think about how many devices are actually working around you right now. Cameras on street corners, routers sitting inside nearby homes, Bluetooth earbuds in someone’s pocket, cell towers just outside of view. All of that is happening constantly, yet almost none of it is visible to the average person walking by. If you actually wanted to check what devices were nearby today, you would probably end up jumping from one app to another, waiting for each one to load, and still walking away without the full picture. It is slow, it is frustrating, and honestly, it takes all the fun out of exploring what is really going on around you.

A lot of these devices are not just sitting there minding their own business. Many of them are built specifically to track you. A recent video on X showed this. It captured a flock camera taking several pictures of a moving vehicle, running those pictures through some kind of analysis, and then filing everything away in an indexed format.

In the screenshot above, you can see the guy picking up the signal coming straight off the camera, while the camera itself keeps emitting a steady beam of infrared. Here is the full video.

Privacy is not a crime, and you have every right to know what might be watching you. The real challenge has always been figuring out where all of these surveillance devices are hiding. That’s where WireTapper can help us. It pulls data from Wigle, Shodan, and OpenCelliD one at a time. That way, you can see every one of these devices in your area.

WireTapper

WireTapper is a wireless OSINT tool designed to discover, map, and analyze radio based devices using passive signal intelligence. WireTapper detects and correlates signals coming from all the common wireless technologies you would expect to run into. This helps you understand what devices actually exist nearby and where they are likely located all without ever having to actively intrude on anything.

WireTapper can identify leaked Wi-Fi network credentials, and it does this through a privacy-protecting k-Anonymity query scheme, meaning it can check for exposed passwords without ever exposing your own search to the outside world.

Setting Up

Let’s quickly walk through the installation process. It’s a lot simpler than it looks.

kali > git clone https://github.com/h9zdev/WireTapper.git
kali > cd WireTapper
kali > python3 -m venv venv; source venv/bin/activate
kali > pip3 install -r WireTapper.txt

Once that finishes, you will need to grab API keys from each of the services mentioned above. Do not worry too much about Shodan, since its API is paid and WireTapper will still run fine without it. There are two ways to plug these keys into the app. You can either open app.py and enter them directly, or you can use app-env.py instead, which pulls the keys in through environment variables.

After you have picked your method, we recommend also installing python-dotenv, since it makes handling those environment variables a lot smoother.

kali > pip3 install python-dotenv

Working with WireTapper

Once everything is installed, you are ready to start the app and open the web interface.

kali > python3 app.py

The web interface will be waiting for you right here: http://localhost:8080/map-w

This is the dashboard you will land on the moment you open the page. It takes a little while to load everything, so give it a few minutes before you start clicking around. Once it settles in, you can zoom into whatever area you are curious about and start picking apart what is actually hiding there.

Just keep in mind that you need valid API keys for the app to work the way it is meant to. Without them, WireTapper will simply generate dummy data so you can still see how everything normally looks inside it. On Wigle specifically, your email needs to be verified before the connection will work properly.

At the top of the dashboard, you will notice a switch that lets you jump between Wi-Fi uplink and Bluetooth scanners. That is how you filter what you are looking at.

Flip the switch back the other way, and you get the same kind of view but for Wi-Fi devices instead. This side usually includes things like cameras, routers, and other similar devices.

Exporting Results

All of these results can be exported complete with their names and coordinates, in case you decide to use them somewhere else later on.

The example above is just a taste of how those exported results are going to look. You can use this JSON file with other tools.

Summary

There is far more happening around us than most people realize. WireTapper makes it easier to visualize that activity by bringing together information about nearby wireless infrastructure in one interface. If you’re into OSINT, privacy, or wireless security, it’s a handy tool.Β 

OSINT is a valuable skill in many areas, especially when it comes to privacy, cybersecurity, and cyber warfare. The more you understand what information is publicly exposed, the better you can protect yourself and your digital assets. Our Ultimate OSINT Beginner training covers OPSEC, tracking, investigations, and much more across 23 lessons and 7.5 hours of video content.

We’re also hosting a live Remaining Anonymous training on August 11-13 at 3:00 PM UTC for all Subscriber and Subscriber Pro students.

The post OSINT: WireTapper – Mapping Surveillance and Wireless Devices Around You first appeared on Hackers Arise.

Wi-Fi Hacking: Wi-Fi Can Now Identify You Without Your Phone

8 July 2026 at 10:31

Welcome back, aspiring hackers!

The density of WiFi access points in modern cities has now reached a point where a large-scale surveillance system may be able to identify almost anyone who walks near a router, even if that person is not carrying a mobile phone. Researchers from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) have published a scientific paper describing this kind of system and the technology that makes it possible.

At the center of this surveillance method is a feature called beamforming, which first appeared with the WiFi 5 (802.11ac) standard in 2013–2014. The basic idea was introduced with WiFi 5, but it became much more refined and effective with WiFi 6 (802.11ax), where the technology matured into something more practical.

Beamforming

Beamforming, also called spatial filtering, is a signal processing technique used to send and receive wireless signals in specific directions rather than spreading them evenly in every direction. In simple marketing language, this is often described as a router that β€œdoes not broadcast equally everywhere anymore, but instead follows the user with a focused beam.” That description is not wrong, but it leaves out the technical depth behind the idea.

Beamforming

From an engineering point of view, beamforming works by combining several antennas into a group called an array. When the signals from these antennas are timed and lined up correctly, they boost each other in certain directions. In other directions, they cancel each other out. The result is a signal that is far more focused and efficient than older systems, which simply broadcast outward in every direction at once.

Beamforming gives both senders and receivers the ability to focus on signals coming from one direction while blocking out noise from others. Because of that, the technique is used not only in WiFi, but also in radar, sonar, seismology, wireless communications, radio astronomy, acoustics, and biomedical engineering.

Identifying People Through WiFi Signals

As radio waves move through space, they do not simply travel in a straight, clean line. They interact with the world around them in many different ways. They can pass through objects, reflect off surfaces, become absorbed, become polarized, bend around obstacles, scatter in different directions, or refract as they cross boundaries between materials. This means that when a WiFi system sends a signal and later receives it back, the final result contains information about everything the signal encountered along the way. By comparing the expected signal with the received one, it becomes possible to measure interference and use that information to correct transmission errors. But that same interference also reveals details about the environment itself.

For example, when a person enters the path of a WiFi signal, the signal changes. Human bodies affect radio waves in measurable ways. The signal may weaken, shift, scatter, or behave differently depending on movement, posture, and position. If researchers analyze these changes carefully, they can infer a surprising amount of information about the surrounding environment. They may detect whether people are present, what they are doing, and in some cases even who they are.

This whole research area has grown into a separate field known as WiFi Sensing.

Most WiFi Sensing research is presented as useful and harmless, and in many cases it really is. It can support smart-home features, occupancy detection and other practical applications. But the privacy concerns are obvious. When these methods are combined with activity recognition and the massive spread of WiFi hotspots, they can reveal highly sensitive information. One of the most troubling possibilities is that someone could be identified in the range of a hotspot and then tracked over time without ever knowing it.

Using Channel Information for Identification

There are several ways a person can be identified through WiFi. One important method relies on analysis of Channel State Information (CSI), which is sent at the physical layer of WiFi communication. CSI is detailed and useful for WiFi sensing. It gives a rich picture of how the wireless channel behaves. The problem is that CSI is not always easy to access. In many cases, it requires modified firmware and specialized hardware support, which limits how widely it can be used in practice.

Comparison of CSI-based identity recognition methods

The table above compares roughly 25 different systems, evaluating them across several key dimensions. The Paper column lists the name of each system, while the Identities column shows how many different people each system is capable of distinguishing between. The Accuracy column then reflects how reliably each system correctly identifies a person. On the technical side, the Pre-Processing column describes the signal processing techniques each system applies to clean and transform raw WiFi data before passing it to a machine learning model, and the Model Architecture column identifies what type of model is used. The Perspective column shows how subjects were positioned or moving during data collection, such as standing orthogonally, performing gestures, or typing keystrokes.

Beamforming entered the picture for a different reason. As mentioned earlier, it was introduced in WiFi 5 to improve throughput and make wireless communication more efficient. But beamforming also depends on environmental information that is similar to CSI. The difference is that this information is gathered on the transmitter side rather than the receiver side.

Comparison of BFI-based WiFi sensing methods

The key new dimensions here are the Inference column, showing the wide variety of tasks these systems tackle, from respiratory rate monitoring and crowd counting to sign language recognition.

In a typical beamforming setup, client devices send something called Beamforming Feedback Information (BFI) back to the access point. BFI is a condensed snapshot of current signal conditions. It tells the access point how the wireless channel looks so that it can adjust its transmission for better performance.

The key difference between CSI and BFI is that BFI is transmitted back to the access point without encryption. This makes it much easier to collect using standard, off-the-shelf hardware, without needing any special software modifications. That significantly lowers the bar for potential misuse. The privacy concern gets even more serious when you consider that the IEEE is already working on making WiFi sensing an official standard through the upcoming 802.11bf update and based on the current draft, without putting strong privacy protections in place.

KIT Researchers Demonstrate Phone-Free Identification

Researchers at KIT showed that people can be identified using only BFI data, even when they are not carrying a smartphone or any other wireless device. The method does not depend on a person bringing along a tracked gadget. It works using ordinary WiFi devices already present in the environment and already communicating with one another.

Placement of TP-Link Archer BE800 access points, measurement locations, and participant walking routes in the WiFi-based identity recognition experiment

As radio waves move through space and interact with the human body, they create patterns that can be captured, analyzed, and compared. In that sense, the process starts to resemble imaging, almost as if the wireless system were building a rough picture of a scene without using a camera. The result is not a photograph in the normal sense, but the data can carry enough structure to support identity inference.

WiFi Routers as Silent Observers

β€œThe technology turns every router into a potential surveillance device,” says Julian Todt, one of the study’s authors. β€œIf you regularly walk past a cafΓ© that has a WiFi network, you could be identified without your knowledge and later recognized by government agencies or commercial companies.”

That is a serious warning, and it captures the core concern very well. Intelligence services and cybercriminals already have many easier ways to monitor people, including compromising CCTV systems or intercepting video communications. But wireless networks are different. They create a nearly invisible surveillance layer that already exists in a huge number of places.

Unlike earlier approaches that depended on LiDAR sensors or on reflection-based systems using walls, furniture, and human bodies, this method works with standard WiFi equipment. By collecting BFI data, researchers can build representations of people from several different viewing angles. These representations are then used to distinguish one person from another, even when the number of people is large. Once the machine learning model has been trained, the identification process can happen in just a few seconds.

BFI vs CSI accuracy as the number of WiFi packets increases. BFI reaches near-perfect accuracy almost instantly, while CSI requires hundreds of packets to approach similar performance

Experimental Results

The study involved 197 participants. The researchers reported that they were able to identify individuals with nearly 100% accuracy, regardless of viewing angle or walking style. That is an impressive result, but it did not come easily. To reach that level of accuracy, the model needed a substantial amount of machine learning training. Each person in the training set performed around 20 walking passes before the model was trained.

BFI vs CSI accuracy across different walking styles. BFI maintains near-perfect accuracy regardless of how a person walks or what they carry, while CSI struggles significantly when walking styles change

During the research two TP-Link Archer BE800 routers were used. The experiment relied on channels 37 and 85. It also used two non-overlapping 160 MHz channels in the 6 GHz band available under WiFi 6E. The hardware included Intel AX210 WiFi network adapters.

Accuracy of five WiFi identification systems as the number of people grows. BFId (BFI) and LW-WiID maintain near-perfect accuracy even at 170 individuals, while competing systems degrade sharply with FreeSense dropping to near 15% at scale

The researchers stress that the technology is powerful, but also potentially dangerous. The risks are especially serious in authoritarian states, where systems like this could be used for large-scale population surveillance. In such settings, the ability to identify people without their phones, without cameras and without obvious visible monitoring would be a major privacy threat.

For that reason, the authors strongly recommend that privacy protections and security safeguards be built into the upcoming IEEE 802.11bf standard from the start, rather than added later as an afterthought.

WiFi 6 Routers as Motion Sensors

In fact, WiFi-based sensing has become so effective that some modern routers already include motion-detection features right out of the box, and manufacturers openly advertise them.

Xfinity

Features such as WiFi Motion Detection allow homeowners to monitor activity inside their homes through mobile apps, using nothing more than changes in WiFi signal patterns.

A feature designed for convenience in a home can also become part of a much broader surveillance system when deployed at scale.

Related WiFi and Bluetooth Scanning Tools

As an additional note, several tools already exist that monitor wireless activity in nearby environments. They don’t work exactly the same way as the techniques we covered earlier, but they’re still useful.

Pi.Alert scans devices connected to a WiFi network, detects unknown devices, and sends notifications when devices unexpectedly disconnect from the network. It is often used as a practical awareness tool for keeping track of what is present on a home or local network.

WireTapper discovers nearby wireless signals, including WiFi networks, Bluetooth devices, hidden cameras, vehicles, headphones, televisions, and cellular towers. It gives the user a broader view of the wireless environment around them, which can be useful for awareness and inspection.

Video

We also have an video on this topic with Master OTW and Yaniv Hoffman. In the video, OTW explains how hackers can use SDR, AI, and Wi-Fi signals to detect human movement through walls, how the technology works, and talk about practical ways to defend against it. Feel free to check it out.

Summary

As modern routers gain advanced sensing, they can also become tools for observing and identifying people through the way their bodies interact with wireless signals. The KIT research shows that this is a practical technology that can identify individuals with remarkable accuracy using ordinary WiFi hardware. Although WiFi sensing can be valuable for smart homes and automation, it also raises serious privacy concerns. Privacy protections will need to become just as important as performance improvements.

If you’re interested in Wi-Fi security, our Wi-Fi Hacking training can help you gain the necessary experience. This attack vector is often underestimated, and many organizations are vulnerable to it. It is definitely valuable in penetration testing.

The post Wi-Fi Hacking: Wi-Fi Can Now Identify You Without Your Phone first appeared on Hackers Arise.

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