Researchers at Cisco Talos are tracking a sophisticated phishing-as-a-service operator panel called “ARToken” that’s built on the EvilTokens phishing platform. ARToken focuses on targeted social engineering attacks, allowing operators to customize phishing attempts for each victim.
Since the first V2 rocket sailed above the Kármán line back in 1944 and right up until the modern era, the trajectory of most space-bound rockets was more or less the same: after expending their propellants they would either crash into some desolate steppe or plunge into the ocean. In either event, the rocket was disposable. The important bit up top might go on to explore the stars or send a human crew off on their mission, but the booster rocket that lifted the spacecraft out of the atmosphere was always going to be sacrificed for the cause.
But in the 1970s NASA had a wild idea: what if we didn’t smash a brand-new rocket valued at millions of dollars into the ocean every time we wanted to put something in orbit? Instead, they would build a hybrid space vehicle that blended the vertical takeoff and raw power of a rocket with the capabilities of an airplane, allowing it and whatever it was carrying to make a gentle runway landing at the end of its mission. As such, the Space Shuttle was born.
With the benefit of hindsight, we now know the Shuttle wasn’t quite the spaceflight revolution that NASA had hoped for. The age of reusable rockets didn’t truly begin until 2015, when SpaceX landed the first stage of their Falcon 9. To date they’ve repeated the feat nearly 600 times, all the while increasing the reliability and speed of their operations. Today the Falcon 9 is the most prolific launch vehicle in history, and nearly every other rocket in active development is being designed to include some element of reusability.
Most recently, China demonstrated that they could recover their Long March 10B rocket by gently bringing it down into what amounts to a giant butterfly net. While it might seem a bit quaint compared to rockets that land on their tails like something out of a 1950s sci-fi movie, the idea offers considerable promise.
But why did it take 70+ years before we were able to regularly refly orbital-class rockets? It’s not that there’s anything inherently complex about reusing a spent rocket. Sure, there’s a case to be made that material science improvements have made the engines robust enough for repeated use. But even if you had to rebuild the engines after each flight it would still be better than slamming the whole vehicle into the ocean. Similarly, there’s nothing particularly unique about the structure of the Falcon 9 that enables it to fly multiple times — it’s a big metal tube with tanks inside of it, just like essentially every rocket that has flown before it.
The revolutionary technology demonstrated by SpaceX in 2015 didn’t have anything to do with making their rocket go up, it was that they were able to safely bring it back without damaging or physically altering it. The Falcon 9 first stage that came back to Earth was in the same condition it was when it left the launch pad eight minutes or so earlier, albeit with empty propellant tanks and a layer of soot on the outside.
As such, most of the variability we see when comparing the reuse of past, present, and future rockets comes not from how the vehicle ascends, but how it ultimately comes to rest back down on Earth.
Without question, the easiest way to recover a rocket intact is to simply slow it down before it hits the surface of the ocean using parachutes This is how all American crewed capsules, and more applicably the Space Shuttle’s Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs), have been recovered after their flights.
But even when descending under multiple huge parachutes, splashdown isn’t exactly a gentle event. It could probably best be described as “survivable”, in that the vehicle and crew will come through the experience in one piece, but neither is likely to be terribly happy about it.
The situation of course ends up being even worse for the rocket, as its structure is going to be subjected to the brunt of the impact force. Additionally, a complex aerospace vehicle getting partially submerged in salt water is a recipe for corrosion and electrical issues, to say nothing of the thermal shock the hot engines will experience when getting dunked.
One could argue that the only reason this method of recovery worked for the Shuttle SRBs is because of their relative simplicity when compared to a liquid-fueled rocket capable of independent flight. At the risk of oversimplifying the structure of the SRB, at splashdown it was effectively a hollow tube with minimal avionics and thrust vector control (TVC) hardware that could simply be replaced before the next flight.
Still, the NASA document Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Refurbishment Practices goes over the considerable work required to bring each booster back to flight status after coming down in the ocean. Given the challenges of refurbishing the boosters, it’s perhaps unsurprising that NASA elected to forgo their reuse on the Space Launch System despite its SRBs being largely identical to their Shuttle predecessors.
In the very early days, while they were still trying to reach orbit with the Falcon 1, SpaceX had actually considered a Shuttle SRB-style recovery procedure. But in the end they decided to outfit the Falcon 9 with deployable landing legs and the rest, as they say, is history.
Landing legs allow a rocket to come down on effectively any flat surface, be it a concrete pad next to the launch facility or a floating platform. But there are some fairly serious drawbacks to this approach. For one thing, the requirement for precise terminal guidance means parachutes are out of the question. The rocket needs fins, attitude thrusters, or other control surfaces to come down on the center of the pad.
It also means the rocket needs to perform a propulsive landing. That is, use its own primary engines to bring its velocity on touchdown to as close to zero as possible. This in turn requires engines that can not only restart in flight — a capability that has not traditionally been required by first stage boosters — but are able to throttle down low enough to control the rocket’s descent without simply pushing it back upwards. It’s difficult to overstate how unnatural a state of operation this is for a rocket. Indeed, it’s the antithesis of how nearly every rocket has operated since the Song Dynasty started experimenting with gunpowder in the 10th century.
Even if you can accomplish all that, the true cost of landing a rocket is in the extra mass. Although the legs will be stowed away and unused for 99.8% of the rocket’s flight time, it still has to lug all that weight uphill. If that wasn’t bad enough, there’s also the extra weight of whatever control mechanism is in place to guide the rocket’s descent trajectory as well as the propellant that needs to be kept in reserve for the landing burn.
All told, landing a rocket on legs comes with a massive payload penalty. In the case of the Falcon 9, the rocket’s maximum capacity to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) in its expendable configuration is approximately 22,800 kg (50,300 lb). But when outfitted with the hardware necessary to land, that number is reduced by nearly 25% to 17,500 kg (38,600 lb).
There was a time, not so very long ago, when critics doubted the financial viability of recovering and reusing rockets like the Falcon 9. But today, reuse has gone from theoretical to standard operating procedure. Outside of a few Old Space holdouts, it’s top of mind for every launch provider and critical for remaining competitive in a fast-moving commercial market. In November, Blue Origin even managed to land their New Glenn heavy-lift rocket on only its second flight.
So at this point the question isn’t whether or not future rockets will be reusable, but rather, what is the most efficient way to achieve that reusability?
With that in mind, it’s easy to see the appeal of China’s net recovery. While the rocket must still perform a propulsive descent — although in theory the necessary positional accuracy, and therefore the technical challenge, is somewhat reduced — it doesn’t need to have landing legs installed. This mass savings increases the vehicle’s useful payload capacity, which in turn makes it more profitable to operate. Achieving the same end goal while being easier and cheaper is an improvement in anyone’s book.
Admittedly, having the rocket come down in a huge net adds a certain amount of whimsy to the whole endeavor, but the overall logic is sound enough. It should also be said that SpaceX, for all the success they’ve had with landing their Falcon 9 on a set of deployable legs, are themselves planning on catching both the first and second stages of their next-generation Starship vehicle. Instead of a net, their goal is to pluck the rocket out of the air with a huge robotic pincer mechanism.
One is reminded of the old joke about how the Americans and Russians approached the problem of writing in space: NASA spent millions of dollars developing a pen that would work in microgravity, while their Russian counterparts simply used pencils. If China can demonstrate the ability to reuse a rocket they snagged in their net, the more elaborate methods of recovery employed by American rockets may one day look like a similarly overengineered solution.
Having the information shown on the display of a digital multimeter also recorded off-screen can be incredibly useful, but unless the device exposes something like SCPI on a network interface, you will have to get creative. In the case of the budget ANENG AN870 digital multimeter (DMM), [Bits und Bolts] really wanted to show its display clearly as an overlay in OBS instead of just the camera view, but with said DMM not offering an easy way he had to resort to just copying the data sent to its multiplexed LCD.
The GitHub project page contains the background information, as well as the instructions if you too have this DMM. It might of course also be useful as the jumping off point for your own DMM modification. In total the project requires three modules: an RP2040 Zero and HC-12 433 MHz transceiver on the DMM side, and another HC-12 plus ESP32-C3 module on the receiving side. A boost module is also added to generate 3.3 V out of the 2.4 V – 3 V provided by the meter’s two AA cells.
To be able to read the LCD signal lines, a custom PCB was created that is installed inside the DMM. With the LCD’s segments mapped, this meant being able to send a perfect copy of the display’s state to the ESP32-C3 and from there making it available via WiFi.
Picture this: Your company just fell victim to a massive data breach. The culprit wasn't a sophisticated malware strain, a zero-day exploit, or a compromised firewall. It was a perfectly legitimate-looking login from a VP’s account, originating from an unrecognized IP address, requesting an urgent wire transfer via a spotless, text-only email.
Apple is warning iPhone users about FaceTime scams. Learn how the fraud works, what Apple recommends, and how to report suspicious calls.
The post Apple Warns Millions of iPhone Users: FaceTime Scams Are Spreading appeared first on TechRepublic.
Apple is warning iPhone users about FaceTime scams. Learn how the fraud works, what Apple recommends, and how to report suspicious calls.
The post Apple Warns Millions of iPhone Users: FaceTime Scams Are Spreading appeared first on TechRepublic.
Threat actors continue to rely on social engineering as AI is incorporated into their attacks, according to ESET’s Threat Report for the first half of 2026.
ESET’s Director of Threat Prevention Labs, Jiří Kropáč, stated, “Rather than relying on entirely new methods and tools, attackers are quickly adapting established techniques to new platforms, technologies, and user behaviors. The number of AI skills within this new ecosystem is growing rapidly as we speak, further expanding the attack surface.”
WHOOP does not have the presence in the wearable space as other brands, but in certain circles, it’s a household name. Their business model requires you to have a yearly app subscription to use their fitness tracker, but here at Hackaday, we are big fans of actually owning the devices you buy — which is why we were happy to hear about an open source and subscription free WHOOP compatible app!
The goal of the so-called OpenStrap project is not to re-create the WHOOP app. Rather, the algorithms and processing methods are developed from scratch, based on public research. It’s all calculated locally on a 1 Hz interval, based on the data the WHOOP 4.0 device feeds the app. As such, the health data collected from the watch, never leaves the phone. While not the main goal of the project, the privacy improvement of the app’s serverless nature cannot be overstated. However, to display metrics, you first need to get data off the WHOOP to begin with.
The crux of the issue with making the WHOOP 4.0 work without the official app is the reliance on proprietary Bluetooth protocols. Fortunately, the protocol itself ended up being relatively simple. The WHOOP 4.0 amounts to little more than a series of sensors that sit on the user’s wrist. As such, the app can subscribe to the Bluetooth feed and decode the data, right? Well, the devil is always in the details with such things, and the protocol came with its fair share of quirks. The hardware clock needs to be synchronized, or it simply defaults to zero Unix time. Moreover, the analog sensors like, ambient temperature are given in relative ADC values, and are not terribly useful without calibration. Regardless, the result of the reverse engineering effort speaks for itself with the OpenStrap app able to recreate much of the functionality in WHOOP’s official app.
Quite often, devices reliant on proprietary apps are little more than manufactured e-waste. While we don’t expect many of you to actually own a WHOOP 4.0, we do hope to see the OpenStrap project keep at least a few out of the landfill in the future.
The ClickFix social engineering technique is now the top malware delivery method, according to a new report from ReliaQuest. These attacks trick users into copying a malicious command, then pasting it into a terminal and running it on their computers.
Scammers can use AI tools to find your location in photos you post to social media, according to researchers at McAfee. This information can then be used in targeted social engineering attacks. The researchers found that free AI models can correctly identify a photo’s location with around 90% accuracy.
Threat actors continue to use AI tools to automate their attack flows and increase efficiency, according to researchers at ReliaQuest.
Welcome back, aspiring cyberwarriors!
Let’s talk about something most people never think about. When the news reports on a cyberattack against a big retail chain, the story usually sounds the same. A database got leaked or ransomware locked up the company’s files. These are real threats, and they deserve attention. But what happens if a hacker skips all of that and simply walks into a physical store with a laptop tucked in a backpack? No malware sent through email and no phishing link, just being there physically.
In this article, we are going to build a picture, drawn from several real walkthroughs of ordinary retail stores, all pointed toward one goal. We want to see the store the way a pentester sees it.
Imagine someone stepping through the front doors with that mindset. Within a few minutes of walking the floor, a handful of things stand out.
There are the transformer checkout terminals and the self service kiosks, the modern face of retail, and also a possible weak point. There are staff call buttons mounted near the aisles, small radio transmitters that broadcast a fixed code each time someone presses them, a code that could potentially be captured and played back later. There are wireless DECT handsets still in use on some sales floors, the same cordless phone technology many offices have relied on for years. There are data collection terminals, plain Android devices that sometimes carry no password protection at all, with access to the store’s Wi-Fi settings. And running along the floor and behind the counters, there are network cables, which in the wrong circumstances could let anyone plug in and reach the store’s internal network.
Many corporations believe their internal network is sealed off from the outside world, safe behind firewalls and passwords. That sense of safety can end at the first unlabeled cable lying loose on the floor.
Someone can walk up to a transformer checkout terminal, unplug its network cable, plug in a laptop instead (or better yet, one of those devices we showed in previous articles), and type a simple command.
Login
kali > sudo dhclientThat laptop could be handed an IP address from the store’s own internal network. If the network uses a /27 mask, that means an entire segment of the corporate infrastructure could open up right there.
Scanning the network might take only a couple more minutes, and inside, a hacker could find exactly what you would expect from a typical store. There could be the store manager’s workstation, with an open RDP port for remote access. There could be a Wi-Fi router still running its factory default settings. There could be a DECT base station handling internal telephony. There could be surveillance cameras, other registers and terminals, and tucked away in shared folders and configuration files, credentials and passwords saved in plaintext.
From there, someone could try connecting to the manager’s computer. If the RDP client offers a choice of accounts, and one of those accounts, say one named operator, needs no password at all, that should raise a flag. Normally Windows blocks RDP logins for accounts with blank passwords, so a setup like that means someone deliberately switched that protection off, likely to keep an easy access route open for themselves. Sysadmins often do it. But that’s a backdoor. We often see the same issue with VNC. That route could lead to the remote desktop of an employee with access to corporate email, internal messenger conversations, financial documents, work schedules, and delivery data.
And since Chrome is installed on nearly every computer in sight, opening Passwords could show saved logins for internal services, everything from the CRM system to the warehouse management software, sitting there in plain view.
Passwordless accounts feel almost like a relic from an earlier era, yet they still turn up in retail environments from time to time. Alongside them, flat, unsegmented networks are common, where cameras, workstations, and Wi-Fi routers all sit together on the same segment. Add to that the simple physical accessibility of the equipment. Network cables, ports, and switches are often placed exactly where any employee, or any visitor, could reach them without much trouble.
Segment the network properly, giving separate VLANs to registers, service equipment, and employee workstations, so a breach in one area does not open a door to everything else. Restrict which devices are even allowed to connect through RDP in the first place. Turn on MAC address whitelisting along with Port Security, so an unknown device cannot simply be plugged into an open port and join the network. Require real passwords on every local account, without exception. Disable browser based password storage for anything tied to internal systems.
And finally, ask security staff to keep a closer eye on the registers themselves.
Consider a small, easy to overlook detail, a staff call button tucked into a corner near an aisle. Pressed once, it sends a chime ringing across the store, and a salesperson comes over a moment later. Simple enough, on the surface.
Except with a HackRF One someone could intercept and record the exact signal the button sends the moment it is pressed. If that button broadcasts the same static signal every time, with no protection against replay, then anyone who plays that recorded signal back over the air could trigger the same chime, without ever touching the actual button. This is what we call a replay attack, and it remains a real possibility even now.
Once that chime lives on someone’s laptop, a single click could ring it out across the entire store. Employees might rush toward the sound, leaving a register briefly unattended, while someone else nearby has a short window to act.
The same HackRF One, paired with an open source tool called gr dect2, could also be used to listen to the surrounding airwaves. If a store still relies on wireless DECT handsets for internal communication, a call placed from one handset to another could, in principle, be intercepted and decrypted in real time as it travels through the air. From that point, anyone listening could pick up delivery schedules, work rosters, and conversations about register problems, all carried over employees’ DECT handsets.
Older pentest reports sometimes describe this kind of attack as only medium risk, mostly because of the cost of the equipment and the technical skill it supposedly requires. It’s different now. An original HackRF One costs somewhere around three hundred dollars, and less expensive clones can be found on online marketplaces for a fraction of that price. And gr dect2 makes the whole process more accessible, since it is an openly documented, freely available project.
The fixes here lean more organizational than technical. It makes sense to retire primitive call buttons in favor of systems that use dynamic, constantly changing codes instead of a single static signal. Alongside that, replacing outdated DECT telephony with modern VoIP or straightforward wired communication removes much of this risk entirely.
What about the Wi-Fi? On paper, it can look genuinely solid, not a simple router with a shared password, but full WPA-Enterprise authentication requiring a proper login and password from each user. That sounds like a real obstacle, and in many ways it is. But it does not fully close the door. Someone could set up a rogue access point using the exact same network name as the legitimate one. If an employee’s device, whether a work tablet or a personal smartphone, tries to reconnect automatically, it might see two access points broadcasting the identical name and simply pick whichever one offers the stronger signal and the faster response. A rogue access point built for this purpose could easily be tuned to answer faster than the real one. Once a device connects to that convincing twin, it attempts to authenticate as usual, and in doing so, it sends its credentials straight into someone else’s logs.
Setting up EAP TLS with proper certificate validation on every client device helps ensure a fake network cannot simply mimic its way into a successful login. Monitoring the surrounding radio spectrum regularly is also worthwhile. Even simple, freely available tools can detect unauthorized access points broadcasting names that match or closely resemble the real corporate network. And training staff matters. If a Wi-Fi password is unexpectedly requested a second time, or a connection seems to take suspiciously long, employees should feel comfortable reporting it to security or the IT security team right away.
A transformer register is really a combined hardware and software unit, built around a metal cash drawer, both stationary and handheld barcode scanners, and a receipt printer. Along its bottom panel often sits a row of unprotected USB ports. Plugging in an ordinary keyboard there opens the door to some experimentation.
Pressing Ctrl Alt and one of the function keys from F1 through F5 can switch the screen to a text console, prompting for a login and password. Full system access could sit right there within reach. Even if the Alt F2 shortcut for quickly launching commands has been disabled, the multi user Linux console underneath may remain fully accessible regardless.
Power cycling the device and pressing Delete could open the BIOS. Without a boot password protecting it, the machine could be booted from an outside USB drive, handing over full control of the system, along with the ability to change settings or install unwanted software.
The most interesting risk, though, waits underneath the register itself. The metal cash drawer typically has a mechanical emergency release button on its underside. If the drawer has not been locked with a physical key, which happens more often than store staff would like to admit, then any customer could simply lean down, press that button, and slide the cash right out.
No discussion of registers is complete without mentioning their close relatives, the self checkout kiosks. These are essentially the same transformer registers, just packaged in a form factor that happens to be even more exposed. USB ports, network ports, and power ports often sit within easy reach. The real difference is that a transformer register might occasionally be watched by a nearby salesperson, while a self checkout kiosk usually sits alone in a corner, without much oversight at all.
Standing casually near a kiosk for just a few minutes could be enough to observe an employee entering their access code. From there, that access could open up the kiosk’s full functionality, including the ability to ring up items, process returns, and open that same metal cash drawer hiding underneath.
The solution here is fairly clear once the problem is understood. Restricting physical access to the register hardware itself, through USB port blockers, closed enclosures, and sealed covers, prevents outside devices from being connected in the first place. A BIOS password combined with disabling boot from removable media protects against attempts to seize control of the system through a flash drive.
Employee authorization deserves attention too. Since the register already comes equipped with a barcode scanner, a smart approach is issuing personal ID badges with the employee’s password encoded directly into the barcode. The employee scans their badge, the system authenticates them instantly, and the actual password stays hidden from anyone watching nearby. Leaving the alphanumeric combination off the badge entirely prevents it from being typed in manually as a way to bypass the scanner.
And of course, the lock on the cash drawer matters. If it is even possible to leave that drawer unlocked, sooner or later it probably will be. Drawers that lock automatically, without relying on a person remembering to do it, offer a much more reliable solution.
Consider someone playing the role of an ordinary, everyday customer. They buy a small item in the store, pay with a card, and walk away with a receipt like anyone else. Once a self checkout kiosk sits idle for a moment, tapping the top left corner of the screen could open a hidden staff menu.
The system would ask for authorization. If someone types in a password they had observed a cashier enter earlier, often a simple employee ID number, that alone could be enough to land inside the cashier menu.
From there, selecting a refund by sales receipt option could display a list of recent transactions, including the very purchase just made. A further step worth testing is whether the refund could be redirected, not back to the same card used to pay, but to a completely different one, belonging to someone else entirely. You might expect the terminal to block an operation like that, or at least demand confirmation from a senior employee before proceeding. In some systems, neither of those things happens, and an ordinary cashier’s password turns out to be enough to redirect the funds elsewhere.
To its credit, a system like this may honestly display a warning that the money will be sent to a different card than the one used for payment. But it can carry out the operation anyway, without further checks.
The item would stay with the customer, the original purchase would turn into a refund on paper, and the store’s money would end up in someone else’s account. One more detail worth checking is whether the refund function has any built in time limits. Many places only allow refunds within a set window, say fourteen days, in line with consumer protection law. But in some systems, attempting to process a refund for a purchase made several months earlier goes through without any resistance at all.
This points to a deeper gap in business logic and access control. The authorization threshold can sit far too low, since a rank and file salesperson’s password may be enough to trigger a real financial operation, and that password is often easy to observe over someone’s shoulder. There may be no check to confirm the refund card actually matches the original payment card. A refund landing on a different card is not automatically suspicious on its own, since many banks and retail chains support this for customer convenience. But operations like that should require sign off from the store manager, a financially liable employee, or someone else holding proper authority. And finally, there may be no meaningful time or amount limits at all, meaning refunds could remain possible over an unlimited stretch of time, and theoretically for an unlimited amount, up to whatever balance the register happens to hold.
Two tier authorization is genuinely useful here, paired with a strict time window governing refunds. Automatic refunds could be limited to the last fourteen days, with anything older switching over to manual processing, complete with multi level review and documented sign off.
Tying the refund card to the original payment card by default, as a standing rule, closes much of this gap. Cash refunds, or refunds sent to a different card, should remain the exception rather than the norm, strictly regulated and logged separately from everything else.
A dedicated audit log for every refund operation, tied clearly to the cashier’s ID, the receipt number, and the recipient card, makes it possible to review the whole trail later if something looks off.
Nothing here requires exotic tools or rare expertise. The overall picture is worth taking seriously, because a store is never just a building full of shelves and registers. It functions as a branch of the corporate infrastructure itself, a set of trusted interfaces placed out into public space, right in front of every customer who walks through the door.
But these small, easy to overlook pieces can chain together. Network access can lead to credentials, credentials can lead to internal systems, internal systems can lead to operational data, and operational data can eventually lead to real financial consequences. A useful security assessment in an environment like this does not simply end with a recommendation to close a port and set a stronger password. It ends with a more useful question worth asking. Who decided, at some point along the way, that all of these things should sit within the customer’s reach in the first place?
If you enjoy hacking and would like to get started in cybersecurity, we have created the Cybersecurity Starter Bundle II to equip you with the knowledge and skills needed to begin your journey. If you want to advance your skills even further, our Cyberwarrior Path is made to help you delve deeply into the technology and show you how to break it
The post Pentesting: Hacking the Supermarket first appeared on Hackers Arise.
OpenWorks Engineering, a counter-drone specialist based in Northumberland, England, announced this week that it recently attended an industry-focused counter-unmanned aircraft systems, or C-UAS, event at the British Army’s Larkhill Garrison, where the company demonstrated its Vision Pace targeting system to defense and security partners. Larkhill sits on Salisbury Plain in Wiltshire and has served as […]Having a pump in a remote location where you aren’t constantly monitoring it is a common scenario, which can be unfortunate when said pump runs into problems like a dry well, jammed impeller or power issues. This is where pump monitors like the older SymCom (now Littelfuse) PumpSaver Plus 233P will protect the pump if such conditions are detected. Of course, the infrared communication port on it uses an undocumented protocol that was meant to be used with a long-since discontinued handheld device. Ergo [Elizabeth Camporeale] saw fit to reverse-engineer this protocol.
In the installation manual for this device this Informer unit is briefly mentioned along with the information it will display on its screen, making it clear that it’s quite literally just there to act as a display for the information that’s constantly generated on this interface. Naturally, this is incredibly useful if you wish to tie the system into a wider monitoring and automation system.
Somewhat unusual, this IR interface on the used 233P-1.5 unit turned out to be use a 5,000 baud NRZ, MSB-first protocol, with the juicy details fully documented and a Python-based decoder implementation provided.
Naturally [Elizabeth] didn’t just reverse-engineer this for the fun of it, but also for ESPHome integration. This uses a setup as can be seen in the top image, with an ESP32-C6 module providing the processing power and Wi-Fi, with a standard phototransistor recording the data pumped out by the pump monitor.
An initial access broker associated with the Payouts King ransomware group is using Microsoft Teams phishing to deploy a malicious Microsoft Edge web browser extension, according to researchers at Zscaler. Once the hackers have a foothold within an organization, they sell the access to the ransomware gang to conduct follow-on attacks.
A technical walkthrough of the kerberoasting attack: the Kerberos quirk it abuses, RC4 vs AES, and how to detect and fix it in Active Directory.
Kerberoasting Attack Explained Step by Step on Latest Hacking News | Cyber Security News, Hacking Tools and Penetration Testing Courses.
Threat actors are abusing Shop, a legitimate app developed by Shopify, to launch phishing attacks, according to researchers at Gen Digital. Shop is used for making purchases and tracking orders, but threat actors are exploiting the platform to generate in-app notifications for phony invoices.
A phishing campaign is targeting small businesses across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and the United States with emails that impersonate Interpol’s cybercrime investigation unit, researchers at Bitdefender report.
Boxers will often say, the punches that hurt the most aren’t the ones which are thrown with the most force, but the ones they didn’t see coming. I think the same is true in cybersecurity. It’s not the most advanced technically efficient, 0-day utilizing attacks that have the biggest impact, but rather those quiet ones. With no malware or suspicious login at three in the morning from an IP address in a country your company has never done business with. No alert fires. No dashboard turns red.
