The latest investment round brings the total raised by Abstract to nearly $50 million.
The post Abstract Raises $25 Million to Expand Composable Security Operations Platform appeared first on SecurityWeek.
An updated advisory from federal agencies provides information on the techniques used to hack programmable logic controllers.
The post US Warns of Iranian Hackers Targeting Siemens, Schneider, and Rockwell ICS Devices appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Security Operations Centers (SOCs) are currently confronting scalability challenges on two fronts: structural and cognitive. The day-to-day reality of modern defensive operations is stark: an analyst frequently begins a shift facing a queue deeply saturated with unvetted alerts. To process a single event, the analyst must open the alert, pivot to a secondary console to complete an investigation, manually enrich an IP address, copy a file hash into a third interface, and cross-reference an asset inventory that may not have been updated in months. Following this, they must author and refine queries, waiting for overloaded databases to return historical context.
The actual work of assessing the investigation’s results and moving to decision-making and action has not even begun. This is the administrative burden of the modern SOC. The true threats are not just those that attempt to bypass defenses, but the critical operational hours lost before an active mitigation attempt is even initiated. While analysts are highly trained professionals, the relentless requirement to perform manual data aggregation inevitably leads to exhaustion.
Threat actors operate at machine speed, utilizing automation to pivot laterally across networks in a matter of seconds, frequently disappearing before defensive teams can even log into their terminals. Expecting human defenders to counter automated threat vectors by manually aggregating bad data is an architectural failure.
Every SOC inherits a highly fragmented data ecosystem. Telemetry is continuously generated by diverse sources, including firewalls, cloud workloads, identity providers, endpoint sensors, and legacy systems. This telemetry arrives in disparate dialects, varying formats, and highly inconsistent levels of fidelity. Before AI tools can accurately reason about a potential threat, or an analyst can initiate a logical investigation and run a playbook response, this raw telemetry must be synthesized.
Historically, organizations analysts take on these complex synthesis processes, manually normalizing data points across different vendor schemas. This represents a key misallocation of human intelligence. The asymmetry in modern security operations is not merely a discrepancy in speed; it is an imbalance in how security teams are forced to allocate their finite time. When operators spend the majority of their shifts wrangling data instead of actively investigating threats, the foundation of the SOC itself is inadequate. To achieve defensive velocity, organizations must recognize that fixing the data foundation is the mandatory prerequisite for improving all downstream security functions.
AI Data PipelinesAddressing the upstream data problem requires the implementation of advanced data pipelines capable of resolving enterprise data chaos before it impacts the detection engine. Frameworks such as SentinelOne’s® Singularity AI Data Pipelines serve as this foundational layer, engineered to ingest telemetry from every source and in every format without requiring months-long integration projects or heavy manual engineering.
Modern pipelines utilize AI to normalize raw telemetry into standardized formats, specifically aligning with the Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework (OCSF). This structural alignment transforms fragmented logs into structured data that is immediately actionable. It eliminates the need for analysts to construct complex regular expressions during critical incidents simply to reconcile how two different software vendors format data, such as usernames or a timestamp.
Efficient data ingestion also requires dynamic, in-flight optimization. Not all telemetry possesses the same analytical value, and storing all generated logs in highly indexed, expensive storage tiers is financially and operationally untenable. Data pipelines optimize data streams by filtering out extraneous noise, trimming excess volume, and routing specific logs based on dynamic criteria. High-value security events are routed and indexed for rapid search retrieval, while lower-priority compliance or operational logs are routed to more cost-effective tiered storage. The result is a substantial reduction in infrastructure costs, a higher signal-to-noise ratio, and a structured data foundation that is completely prepared the moment an investigation is required.
When underlying data pipelines automatically enrich that log with identity and asset information, revealing (for example) that a specific financial director’s laptop in a remote office is communicating with a known botnet, the output transitions from a raw data point into a definitive starting point. Crucially, this enrichment occurs systematically before the human operator ever interacts with the alert. Solving this data problem end-to-end is a primary reason SentinelOne was recognized in the IDC MarketScape for AI SIEM.
When a clean, structured data foundation is properly established, the performance of downstream security tools accelerates. Modern detection engines, such as the Singularity AI SIEM, leverage indexless architectures to manage enterprise-scale telemetry. Because the data is normalized and optimized prior to ingestion, these platforms can execute petabyte-scale queries with minimal latency, ensuring investigative results are delivered before the analyst’s attention wanes.
Within this architecture, detection logic is executed continuously against a stream of clean, correlated telemetry. This transforms an ocean of disparate event logs into readable, centralized dashboards that provide immediate situational awareness. The quantitative benefits of this approach are substantial. With AI SIEM, organizations are already executing their queries 70% faster. Adding AI Data Pipelines further augments this workstream, providing cleaner data for AI to run at optimal efficiency. These improvements represent the direct result of ensuring that the data arriving at the SIEM is inherently fit for purpose.
AI SIEM remains a single, comprehensive SKU with customers automatically receiving integrated pipeline functionality for everyday data optimization rather than treating it as a premium add-on. For every unit of paid Data Ingest capacity, customers can process twice that volume through Data Pipelines. A customer with 500 GB/day SIEM entitlement can push 1 TB/day through the pipeline at no additional cost.
The establishment of a structured data pipeline unlocks the capability for true agentic reasoning within the SOC. Unlike traditional rule-based automation, which executes static responses to predefined triggers, technologies like SentinelOne’s Purple AI operate as a dynamic investigative layer.
When an initial alert is generated, an agentic reasoning system does not simply pause and wait for human triage. It autonomously launches an investigation, comprehensively maps the potential blast radius of the incident, and synthesizes a clear, logical recommendation for containment. Then, the analyst logs into the console and is presented with a fully formed situational briefing rather than a blank investigation screen.
More importantly, an agentic AI layer possesses the capacity to evaluate broader adversarial campaigns rather than isolated security events. In isolation, a minor registry key modification, a singular file write, or a brief outbound network connection may not meet the threshold for a critical alert. Legacy security tools often fail to connect these disparate, low-signal events. However, Purple AI can assemble these seemingly unrelated activities into a cohesive narrative, exposing the overarching strategy of the attacker before a major breach occurs.
This level of autonomous intelligence is strictly dependent on the underlying architecture. Advanced AI algorithms cannot derive accurate conclusions from unparsed, low-quality telemetry. The analytical integrity of the agentic layer is entirely contingent on the principle of data quality; systems like Purple AI require clean, structured data to function effectively, avoiding the fundamental issue of “garbage in, garbage out”.
The final component of a modernized, agentic SOC is the deployment of Hyperautomation to execute defensive responses. To counter threats effectively, organizations must deploy automated workflows capable of executing decisions at machine speed. These no-code workflows can be configured to trigger autonomously based on AI triage verdicts, the disclosure of new high-severity vulnerabilities, or specific incoming alerts. By automating the mitigation phase, the SOC evolves from an environment strictly dedicated to passive observation into a dynamic system that actively neutralizes threats.
However, the implementation of automated response mechanisms must be rigorously governed. Executing changes to enterprise infrastructure carries inherent risk. To mitigate this, automated workflows must integrate critical approval steps, ensuring that highly consequential actions are paused until human authorization is provided. The analyst retains the ultimate authority, defining the precise parameters of what processes may run automatically and what workflows require manual judgment.
The strategic objective of integrating data pipelines, agentic reasoning, and Hyperautomation is not the removal of the human operator. Instead, the overarching goal is the restoration of the analyst’s primary function: exercising expert judgment.
By offloading repetitive tasks to technological systems, organizations systematically remove operational friction. The data layer filters out irrelevant noise, allowing the analyst to clearly see the threat. The AI investigation layer removes the administrative grind of data collection, allowing the analyst to focus purely on analytical thinking. Finally, the automated response layer eliminates procedural delays, ensuring the analyst’s decisions are executed rapidly enough to matter. This creates an intelligence fabric, known as Autonomous Security Intelligence (ASI), where data, investigation, and response function concurrently as a single, unified system.
Under this model, the operational output of a single analyst is exponentially multiplied, allowing one unburdened professional to accomplish the work of ten while still owning every critical decision. While the alert queue will perpetually require attention, the fundamental nature of the work fundamentally changes. The timeline of a manual initial triage to active investigation compresses from a multi-hour ordeal into a matter of minutes. The data arrives clean, the investigation runs automatically, and the response mechanisms are prepared. The hours previously consumed by administrative waiting are directly reallocated to strategic decision-making.
When defensive systems are finally architected to operate at the speed of the modern threat landscape, the role of the human operator transforms. Analysts are no longer forced to act as passive passengers, grateful to be carried by fragmented tools. They are elevated to the role of pilots, operating with full situational awareness, retaining their judgment, and actively directing the defensive posture of the organization. This is the paradigm of the agentic SOC, and it is entirely predicated on the foundation of clean, structured data.
Contact us today to learn more about how SentinelOne is leading the way forward with Agentic SOC.
Industry professionals broadly agree that the suspension pauses third-party CMMC audits but not the underlying legal obligation to protect CUI.
The post Industry Reactions to Pentagon Suspending CMMC Phase 2: Feedback Friday appeared first on SecurityWeek.
The researcher stripped the proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit to prevent immediate exploitation of the vulnerability.
The post Nightmare Eclipse Drops ‘LegacyHive’ Windows Zero-Day appeared first on SecurityWeek.
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has unveiled plans for Cyber Shield, an ambitious initiative that aims to use agentic artificial intelligence to transform the nation’s cyber defenses and counter increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. The proposal forms part of a broader effort by the NCSC and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) to build a national scale, AI powered cyber defense capability that can detect, analyze, and eventually respond to attacks at machine speed.
According to the NCSC, Cyber Shield will initially focus on using AI to identify vulnerabilities and detect threats before progressing toward automated mitigation, coordinated threat intelligence sharing, and national level response capabilities. The initiative is intended to help defenders keep pace with attackers who are increasingly using artificial intelligence to accelerate reconnaissance, vulnerability discovery, and exploitation.
AI changes the cyber defense equation
Rik Ferguson, Vice President of Security Intelligence at Forescout, believes the proposal reflects the reality of today’s threat landscape.
“The NCSC’s Cyber Shield proposal feels like a logical and necessary step, especially if we view it through the lens of ‘Assume Autonomy,'” Ferguson said.
“The core assumption should no longer be that autonomous cyberattacks are a distant or speculative problem. We should assume that adversaries will increasingly use AI agents to automate reconnaissance, vulnerability discovery, exploit development, credential attacks, lateral movement, and adaptation once inside an environment.”
Ferguson said security teams operating at human speed will struggle to defend against machine speed attacks, particularly across critical infrastructure, healthcare, and government networks.
“A national scale AI cyber shield is therefore not just about adding AI to existing security workflows. It is about building defensive systems that can detect, prioritize, and help contain threats at the same tempo at which AI enabled attackers can operate.”
However, he cautioned that autonomy must be implemented carefully.
“The opportunity is strongest where AI can improve visibility, correlation, triage, exposure management, and early intervention. The risk comes when automated systems act without sufficient context, governance, or operational guardrails.”
He added that AI alone cannot solve long-standing cybersecurity problems.
“AI can help defenders move faster, but it cannot compensate for poor asset visibility, weak segmentation, unpatched systems, or unclear ownership of cyber risk.”
Governance will be critical
Shane Barney, Chief Information Security Officer at Keeper Security, also welcomed the initiative but warned that the success of Cyber Shield will depend on strong governance.
“Cyber Shield is the right instinct, and it is arriving at a genuinely dangerous moment for both organizations and the wider public,” Barney said.
“Attackers are already using AI to compress reconnaissance and exploitation into minutes, and the NCSC is correct that human speed defense cannot keep pace with machine speed offense.”
Barney argued that many successful cyberattacks still rely on basic security weaknesses.
“Most successful attacks still exploit basic, preventable failures, including outdated systems, unpatched software, and weak access controls. No amount of agentic AI changes that equation if the underlying identity and access foundations are not solid.”
He also highlighted a potential new risk created by AI itself.
“Red and blue AI agents are themselves privileged non-human identities, granted authority to scan networks, share intelligence, and eventually remediate vulnerabilities autonomously.”
According to Barney, those AI agents will require the same security controls as privileged human administrators, including least privilege access, just in time provisioning, and complete visibility into their activity.
“An AI agent with unmanaged privileged access is not a defense. It is the next incident.”
A collaborative approach
The NCSC said Cyber Shield will rely on close collaboration between government, industry, academia, and critical infrastructure operators. Trusted information sharing and explainable AI will be central to the initiative as it evolves from vulnerability discovery toward coordinated national cyber defense.
While the idea of a Cyber Shield remains a long-term vision, security leaders broadly agree that AI will play an increasingly important role in defending against AI-driven cyberattacks. The challenge now will be ensuring those capabilities are introduced with the governance, transparency, and foundational security controls needed to make them effective.
The post UK Government Unveils AI Powered Cyber Shield to Strengthen National Cyber Defense appeared first on IT Security Guru.
Public exploit code targeting the Firefox flaws exists, but no in-the-wild exploitation has been observed.
The post Critical Vulnerabilities Patched With Fresh Chrome 150, Firefox 152 Updates appeared first on SecurityWeek.
A new CMMC review and reform task force will conduct a comprehensive review of the program.
The post Pentagon Suspends CMMC Phase 2 as It Rethinks Contractor Cybersecurity Rules appeared first on SecurityWeek.
The Israeli company has developed a cryptographic posture and post-quantum cryptography management platform.
The post QIZ Security Raises $17 Million for Cryptographic Governance Platform appeared first on SecurityWeek.
The US Federal Government is committing $600 million to build one of the world’s most advanced AI infrastructure systems. Executive Order 14363, the Genesis Mission, connects national laboratory supercomputers across nuclear simulation, biodefense, energy grid modeling, and every major scientific domain. Fifty-one organizations signed on, including NVIDIA, OpenAI, IBM, Microsoft, AWS, Google, and Oracle.
The security framework governing these workloads was not written for this scale of use.
NIST SP 800-234, the High-Performance Computing Security Overlay, is well-constructed, tailoring 60 controls across four security zones, building on the SP 800-53B moderate baseline. It was designed for deterministic HPC workloads such as climate simulations, finite element analysis, and computational fluid dynamics. These workloads share a common attribute: code that runs the same way, every time, and behaves predictably under well-understood inputs. The security controls governing those workloads assume you can scan at the perimeter, clear memory between jobs, and attest to integrity at load time.
AI workloads break every one of those assumptions.
SentinelOne has submitted a formal proposal to the NIST HPC Security Working Group regarding this gap, and NIST has acknowledged it. We have a post on LinkedIn to share our proposal, and welcome commentary from across the industry.
This spring, in just three weeks, three AI-driven supply chain attacks targeted widely deployed software: LiteLLM, the most-used AI infrastructure package in Python development environments, Axios, the most-downloaded HTTP client in the JavaScript ecosystem, and CPU-Z, a trusted system diagnostic tool with a legitimate signed binary from the official vendor domain.
SentinelOne stopped all three on the same day each attack launched, with no prior knowledge of any payload.
The most important aspect of this outcome is how these attacks were stopped, and why signature-based detection couldn’t work. Each attack arrived through a trusted delivery channel. LiteLLM was compromised after credentials were stolen via Trivy, a security scanner. The attacker published two malicious versions to the PyPI repository. In at least one confirmed case, an AI coding agent with unrestricted permissions auto-updated to the infected version, meaning there was no human review or approval step before the payload ran. The Axios attacker exploited a legacy access token that the project maintainers had forgotten to revoke, bypassing every npm security control. CPU-Z attackers targeted the vendor’s distribution infrastructure directly; anyone who downloaded from the official website received a properly signed binary containing a payload. In all three cases, while the authorization chain was legitimate, the intent was not.
This is the defining characteristic of modern supply chain attacks: the workflow is verified, but the intent has been subverted. Every perimeter control, signature library, and reputation lookup checks authorization and passes. These attacks were designed to exploit that gap, and they ran at machine speed through automated pipelines with no human checkpoint.
To put this into the context of HPC and AI workloads running at scale, a compromised Python package in a developer’s environment is a serious incident; a poisoned training pipeline on classified biodefense data on a national laboratory supercomputer is on a different order of magnitude. The model it produces may be correct 99.9 percent of the time and adversarially wrong under precisely targeted conditions. No perimeter scan, signature check, or load-time integrity verification will catch it after training completes.
Of the 60 controls SP 800-234 tailors, three bear directly on AI workload protection, and each carries a documented gap. In a fourth area, supply chain, the overlay does not tailor at all.
The attacks against AI workloads on HPC are not theoretical, and they are not detectable at the perimeter.
The characteristic that makes AI workloads uniquely difficult is persistence. A compromised simulation may produce visibly wrong results, but a compromised model can produce correct results the overwhelming majority of the time and adversarially wrong results under precisely targeted conditions. By the time anyone has reason to investigate, the window for recovery has often closed.
We know the technology required to address these gaps exists and has been proven at scale in environments with performance constraints far tighter than those in HPC. What is needed is a well-defined architecture that enables the secure execution of large-scale AI workloads.
Dedicated security compute. Runtime security that shares CPU resources with the workload it monitors can be starved of CPU time under heavy load and interfered with by a workload that achieves kernel-level access. The SPiCa research demonstrated that eBPF monitoring pipelines can be manipulated from within the kernel by rootkits filtering events before they reach the analysis engine, meaning that a co-scheduled monitor is not a reliable monitor.
Every other infrastructure function on an HPC node has dedicated resources. The job scheduler, the filesystem client, and the out-of-band management plane. Security monitoring is infrastructure and should be afforded the same dedicated resources.
Modern HPC nodes have 128 to 256 CPU cores. One reserved for security monitoring is less than one percent of the available compute. Linux kernel CPU isolation via isolcpus, nohz_full, and rcu_nocbs is production-proven in high-frequency trading and real-time systems, with bounded, predictable overhead.
eBPF-based behavioral telemetry at the training layer. Effective monitoring of an AI training pipeline means continuous observation of compute behavior profiles, memory access patterns, GPU utilization, and inter-node communication, with behavioral baselines established for approved training configurations. A poisoning attack that executes within expected statistical ranges is not visible to a perimeter scanner, but it is visible to a behavioral baseline that knows what the training job should look like.
This is the same principle that SentinelOne’s on-device Behavioral AI detected for LiteLLM, Axios, and CPU-Z. The LiteLLM detection flagged a Python interpreter executing Base64-decoded code in a spawned subprocess. The CPU-Z detection flagged an anomalous process chain: cpuz_x64.exe spawning PowerShell, which spawned csc.exe, which spawned cvtres.exe. CPU-Z doesn’t do that. The behavioral baseline knew what legitimate execution looked like, and in these cases, that behavior was the decisive signal.
Cloudflare uses an eBPF-based architecture to mitigate DDoS attacks exceeding 7 Tbps. SentinelOne uses it to detect and stop threats in under one second across enterprise fleets. A training job that begins writing to unexpected locations, establishing anomalous inter-node communication, or deviating from its expected compute profile is detectable at runtime, before the model completes training. The performance argument against runtime monitoring on HPC was never about the technology; it requires a shift in architecture.
Inference-time output monitoring. Deployed models require continuous observation of output distributions, latency patterns, confidence score distributions, and input-output statistical properties. A model under adversarial input attack, or serving modified weights, exhibits detectable output patterns before any human analyst notices the outputs are wrong. Circuit-breaker logic needs to be designed into the serving architecture, not added after the first incident.
Model integrity verification that runs during inference. Load-time attestation is a necessary and important requirement; it is not sufficient. Long-running inference deployments are vulnerable to hot-swap attacks that replace weights after the initial integrity check passes. Continuous cryptographic hash verification of loaded model weights, running on the dedicated security core with automated circuit-breaker logic on failure, closes that vector. For a model serving safety-critical calculations, the re-verification frequency should match the workload’s risk profile with predictable overhead.
An SR-family extension for the AI supply chain. The existing SR controls address software supply chain risk. They do not address training data provenance, model weight integrity at ingestion, or pre-trained model validation. An AI bill of materials, including cryptographic documentation from the training data source through intermediate checkpoints to the deployed model, is the model-layer equivalent of software supply chain controls. Without it, every pre-trained model loaded into an HPC environment is an unverified artifact from an unverified chain.
The supply chain attacks this spring demonstrated what happens when defense architecture falls behind the delivery mechanisms attackers use. LiteLLM, Axios, and CPU-Z all arrived through trusted channels, carrying payloads no signature database contained. They were stopped because behavioral detection does not require prior knowledge of the payload. It requires knowing what legitimate execution looks like and acting when execution deviates.
Defenders protecting AI workloads face that same problem across every layer they own. HPC is the hardest version of it. But identities, endpoints, applications, and infrastructure all carry the same exposure at different scales. SentinelOne gives defenders coverage across all four, with behavioral AI running at each layer to catch what signatures miss. The specifics of how that works across your AI environment are in our AI security overview.
1 “Data Poisoning 2018–2025: A Systematic Review. IACIS (2025)”, and “Data Poisoning Vulnerabilities Across Health Care AI Architectures. JMIR (2026)
2 “Poisoning Attacks on LLMs Require a Near-Constant Number of Poison Samples” (2025). arXiv:2510.07192 and Huang et al., 2020.
3 OWASP (2025) LLM04:2025 Data and Model Poisoning. OWASP Gen AI Security Project.
The audits are reportedly being spearheaded by CISA’s Attack Surface Evaluation team, a specialized unit tasked with conducting digital defense assessments and simulated hacking exercises.
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