October 7^th, 2023, 06:29 AM. Probably the most tragic day in Israel’s history. A surprise attack conducted by Hamas from the Gaza Strip caught Israel completely off guard. Hamas terrorists infiltrated Israel, killing more than 1200 Israelis and abducting more than 250 individuals into the Gaza Strip. They exercised mass murder and rape, effectively conquering parts of Israel’s Western Negev for several hours. This was a colossal military and intelligence failure, more dramatic than that of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. It was also, of course, a policy failure. The core foundations of Israel’s security doctrine – defense, early warning, and deterrence – completely shattered.

How could this happen to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), one of the best militaries in the world, and to one of the best intelligence communities in the world? For me, as a brigadier general in the Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI) reserves with decades of practical experience, and as a scholar of Israeli strategic culture and intelligence culture, this was a puzzle. Almost inconceivable. I was surprised by the magnitude of Israel’s surprise. How could Israel’s security establishments reach October 7^th with their “eyes wide shut” about Hamas intentions and capabilities?

But as the regional war which followed October 2023 commenced, I recognized another interesting puzzle. Israeli security establishments have, writ large, recovered from the failure of October 2023, with Israel fighting for almost three years in several fronts, from the Gaza Strip to Iran. Although not gaining “total victory”, these establishments reached impressive operational achievements. They dismantled most of Hamas’ military and civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and eliminated most of Hamas leadership in the Middle East; dismantled most of Hizballah assets in Lebanon, while also eliminating Hizballah leader Nasrallah, and demoralizing Hizballah in the famous pagers operation; destroyed many of the Houthi assets in Yemen; and in June 2025 and March 2026, conducted unprecedented attacks in Iran, including the elimination of Iran’s Supreme Leader and most of Iran’s military leadership, and degrading Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities.

How could the same establishments, which colossally failed to prevent the Hamas attack in October 2023, reach such achievements during 2024 and 2025? How could an intelligence system completely surprised by Hamas allow Israel to completely surprise Iran, the regional super-power? How could Israel “turn the tides” of the war after October 2023, and then, like the Phoenix from Greek mythology, “rise from the ashes” and conduct phenomenal strikes in Iran?

These are the topics I discuss in my new book, which reveals the cultural roots of Israel’s strategic surprise in October 2023, and of Israeli resilience following October 2023. The book knowingly focuses on Israel’s security establishments, and not on Israeli policy makers. Its scope is limited, and its conclusions will naturally be debated.

I open the book by acknowledging that some of my previous insights, which characterized Israeli intelligence culture prior to October 2023, were wrong. For instance, I assessed that this culture relies on professional norms and values of critical thinking, a sense of individual responsibility, and moral courage in the face of hierarchy. October 7^th, unfortunately, showed that some of these remained aspirational norms rather than realized behavior in Israel’s security establishments.

Several typical facets of Israeli strategic and intelligence cultures account for both failure and success. For instance, the Israeli typical focus on operational, tactical, and targeting intelligence prior to October 7^th resulted in an under-appreciation for strategic analysis, military analysis, and strategic early warning from war. The low quality of these disciplines was one of the factors for the October 7^th failure. But the inclination towards targeting intelligence, and the close integration of intelligence into decision-making and operations, also enabled Israel to conduct ground-breaking overt and covert operations across the Middle East, relying on high-resolution and real-time targeting intelligence. Many more examples are discussed in the book.

However, the book stresses that strategic culture and intelligence culture are not unitary in essence, nor are they fixed in time. Changes in these cultures can be caused by trauma, or by competition for dominance between sub-cultures. For instance, in the years prior to October 7^th, hubris evolved in Israeli security establishments, which not just underestimated Hamas, but also overestimated their own military and intelligence capabilities. October 7^th, naturally, created a post-traumatic effect. Israeli deterrence-oriented security doctrine, which was dominant prior to October 7^th, became heavily oriented towards prevention after October 7^th, not just regarding adversary nuclear projects. This “move between extremes”, or “over-adaptation”, is for itself typical of Israeli strategic culture.

In conclusion, the book applies the frameworks of strategic culture and intelligence culture to a real-world case of security performance. This perspective does not only apply to Israel. In the US, for instance, it can allow critical introspection of the recent conflict with Iran, including the repeated experienced surprise the US seems to be experiencing. Furthermore, understanding partners’ and allies’ cultures, and not just adversary ones, is an imperative. Especially for American scholars and practitioners. The book makes an important contribution to this perspective. At the end of the day, national security is all about people. Society and culture play a major role.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Bitcoin Magazine

Israeli Bank Leumi to Debut Bitcoin Trading With Galaxy Digital

Israel’s biggest bank, Bank Leumi, will become the first lender in the country to offer customers Bitcoin trading, according to a Friday announcement. 

The lender will work with Galaxy Digital to provide the service, which will become available to customers early next year, the announcement said.  

Bank Leumi first announced plans to debut crypto trading in 2022 but shelved the initiative. The latest project will use GalaxyOne Institutional, Galaxy’s institutional platform for banks, asset managers and other institutions for trading and other services, to debut the service. 

“We believe that digital assets are gradually becoming an integral part of the global financial system, and it is our role to enable customers to benefit from this development within a reliable, secure, and regulated banking framework,” Bank Leumi’s Head of Strategy, Maya Ravia, said in a statement. 

The statement added that customers will also be able to trade other cryptocurrencies on top of Bitcoin. Leumi’s mobile banking app, PEPPER, will also provide the service. 

“The future of finance will run on open, programmable rails, and we believe the banks that move first will define the era that follows,” Galaxy Israel CEO Lior Lamesh said. 

“We are building one platform for trading and custody, with institutional-grade security at its core, and the onchain rails beneath it, through Galaxy Infrastructure and GalaxyOne Institutional, for banks around the world.”

According to Chainalysis, crypto adoption in Israel has been steadily growing over the years, with geopolitical headwinds including the war in Gaza and Iran, leading Israelis to digital assets as a “safe-haven.”

This post Israeli Bank Leumi to Debut Bitcoin Trading With Galaxy Digital first appeared on Bitcoin Magazine and is written by Mathew Di Salvo.

On March 25, 2025, Israeli aircraft struck a set of Syrian airfields. The targets were not Syrian assets, instead they were the sites Turkey had surveyed for planned forward military bases. Ankara quietly shelved the deployment.

That is what the Israel-Turkey rivalry looks like when it is working as designed: a NATO member and a US major non-NATO ally maneuvering against each other in a third country, close enough to require a deconfliction hotline, disciplined enough that neither has yet acknowledged the confrontation for what it is. The two governments have run a channel through Azerbaijani mediation to prevent accidents. Turkish officials describe it as, "strictly technical," signaling neither normalization nor any convergence.

The conditions that made the channel necessary are getting worse, and the outside power that has historically kept this rivalry from becoming a rupture is changing.

Trump's Gift to Erdogan

When Donald Trump landed in Ankara on July 7, 2026 for the NATO summit he became the first sitting US president to visit Turkey in over a decade. He arrived with what aides openly called a "gift bag" for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. On CAATSA sanctions, imposed in 2020 over Turkey's purchase of Russia's S-400 system, Trump was categorical: "We're going to be taking the sanctions off; it's time. We don't want to sanction friends." On F110 engines for Turkey's homegrown KAAN fighter, the administration notified key lawmakers it was proceeding. The F-35 remained genuinely conditional, something his administration would "certainly consider." Erdogan told reporters Trump had pledged six aircraft and “always keeps his word”.

Standing beside Erdogan, Trump said Turkey had proven a more loyal partner than some allies Washington once counted on.

Israel's reaction was immediate and unprecedented. Speaking to Fox News and CNN, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that arming Turkey with F-35s would upset the regional balance. He described Erdogan's government as ideologically hostile to Washington and openly threatening to Israel, and pointed to Turkey's continued presence in northern Cyprus. It was the first time Israel had publicly opposed a US arms sale to a fellow NATO member.

Trump was reportedly irritated. Netanyahu insisted the two governments still saw eye-to-eye on the big picture. This difference is worth noting.

They do not see eye-to-eye, and the reason is not sentiment. This administration's Middle East policy seems focused on commercial and strategic arithmetic. On that scale Turkey scores well: 85 million people, a NATO air force, a fast-growing arms industry, control of the Bosporus, and a leader willing to transact. Israel's ability to shape US decisions in the region has always rested on an unstated premise: Washington values the relationship with Israel above the deal in front of it. Ankara is testing that premise. So far, Washington is not objecting.

The pattern repeated within three weeks. On July 8, the State Department initiated the rescission of Syria's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, a status in place since 1979, following Trump's meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. On July 22, Washington and Riyadh announced a nuclear cooperation agreement. Neither move was calibrated to Israeli preferences, but to American interests.

What Turkey Gained While Israel Was Fighting

Ankara's leverage did not appear in July. It accumulated while Israel was occupied elsewhere.

Syria is the clearest case. Since Bashar al-Assad's fall in December 2024, Turkey has established itself as the dominant external patron of al-Sharaa's government. On July 19, 2026, al-Sharaa consolidated the security apparatus under Interior Minister Anas Khattab, who now also heads the National Security Bureau, with Abdul Qader Tahan installed at General Intelligence and Hussein al-Salamah as Khattab's deputy. For Turkey, a centralized Damascus under a friendly government is a forward base, a reconstruction market, and a check on Kurdish autonomy along its southern border all at once.

Israel reads the same arrangement as a threat under construction, and has acted accordingly. In the seven months after Assad fell, Israel conducted roughly 988 air and artillery strikes in Syria, nearly triple its previous rate, including against the Presidential Palace and Ministry of Defense in Damascus. The March 2025 framework for integrating Kurdish forces into the Syrian state remains frozen, which Turkish officials blame largely on Israeli operations destabilizing the Syrian government.

Beyond the Levant, Turkey's footprint keeps widening. In Somalia it operates its largest overseas military base, has trained more than 15,000 soldiers, deployed F-16s and armor, and in 2026 began offshore oil drilling protected by Turkish naval assets. These are moves aimed in part at countering Israel's outreach to Somaliland. Turkey's defense minister says other African governments are now requesting the same security-and-investment package. Layered onto bases in Qatar and northern Iraq, Ankara has assembled a chain of footholds from the Horn of Africa to the Caucasus.

Two structural shifts accelerated this. Iran's regional network was degraded by the 2026 war, leaving a vacuum in Syria and Lebanon that Turkish diplomacy, trade, and reconstruction capital are filling faster than anyone else. Iran is not finished, and Russia was preparing Su-35 deliveries to Tehran the same week Trump was in Ankara.

Meanwhile Moscow's grip on the South Caucasus eroded after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, when most of its forces was deployed in the Ukrainian war, and after the US brokered the 2025 Armenia-Azerbaijan framework, which opened the Zangezur corridor linking Azerbaijan to Turkey.

Israel forging new alliances

Israel has also been forging alliances, no longer counting on the US as their sole guarantee.

In December 2025, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus held their tenth trilateral summit in Jerusalem, where Netanyahu spoke against those who dream of restoring old empires. The three signed a 2026 military cooperation plan covering joint air and naval exercises, intelligence sharing, and reported discussions of a roughly 2,500-strong rapid-deployment force. By February 2026, Netanyahu was describing a broader "hexagon of alliances" built around Greece, Cyprus, and India.

Ankara's counter-positioning is equally deliberate. Turkey has hosted Hamas officials for years and holds real influence over any postwar settlement in Gaza. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's remark that Israel had become a burden humanity could no longer bear drew an Israeli rebuke as incitement. Each government now treats the other's regional relationships as evidence of intent.

Where It Breaks

Direct confrontation remains unlikely, but not impossible. Both capitals understand the costs. But the deconfliction channel is a technical fix for a strategic problem, and four scenarios handled incorrectly could force the two powers into collision.

Syria is the live one. Israeli strikes to prevent hostile entrenchment collide directly with Turkey's project of a unified, centrally governed Syrian state. Israel has already struck sites Turkey intended to occupy. Repeat that once with Turkish personnel present and the hotline becomes a record of a failure rather than a mechanism preventing one.

Lebanon compounds it: Hezbollah degraded but intact, Turkey's expanding humanitarian and political footprint, and continued Israeli operations against Hezbollah infrastructure pulling outside patrons into direct rivalry. Trump is suggesting that Syria should intervene, something Israel can not accept.

Cyprus, divided since 1974, is where Israeli-Greek-Cypriot military integration and a prospective joint rapid-reaction force meet Turkish assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean. While several of the nations are NATO members, new hostility risks drawing in allied nations.

The F-35 decision itself is the fourth. If Congress and the Pentagon proceed over Israeli objections, it is a tangible erosion of the qualitative military edge that Netanyahu argues is the foundation of deterrence.

Conclusion

Israel and Turkey have been rivals for a decade; and for most of that decade, the fault line stayed closed because the US had an interest in keeping it closed. But the Ankara summit demonstrated, reinforced by the Syria delisting and the Saudi nuclear agreement, that this administration will price each decision on its own merits without allowing allies to veto them. That is a coherent policy. But it risks removing the pressure that has been holding two armed, ambitious, US-aligned states apart in the same contested space.

Washington is not choosing between Israel and Turkey. It is counting on the two allies staying away from an armed conflict. The question is whether a deconfliction hotline routed through Baku can carry the weight that American guarantees used to.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief