Astronomers sorting through data from the Vera C. Rubin Observatory in Chile have found an icy world that has a good chance of joining Pluto in the solar system’s retinue of dwarf planets.

University of Washington astronomer Mario Jurić joined the astronomer who made the discovery, Matthew Holman of the Harvard & Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, to announce the findings today at a meeting of the American Astronomical Society’s Division for Planetary Sciences in Spokane, Wash.

Jurić, the Rubin team’s solar system lead scientist, said the observatory’s capabilities made it possible to detect and characterize the new dwarf planet candidate, known as 2026 ED138.

“Rubin is giving us an unprecedented capacity to explore the sky through a combination of speed, depth, and precision,” Jurić said in a news release. “And the discovery is just the beginning: Once we identify a new object, we can search back months, and sometimes even decades, finding it in images where nobody knew to look. This ability to both discover and ‘precover’ objects is transforming how quickly and accurately we can determine their orbits and understand the distant solar system.”

2026 ED138 traces a tilted orbital path that takes it well beyond Pluto, the solar system’s best-known dwarf planet. It’s currently at a distance of 46 astronomical units, where 1 AU equals the average distance between Earth and the sun. Pluto, by comparison, is currently about 40 AU from the sun.

Astronomers suspect ED138 formed billions of years ago closer to the sun before being flung into a wider orbit by gravitational interactions with Neptune.

Based on an analysis of its distance, brightness and assumed composition, ED138 is thought to be somewhere between 600 and 1,500 kilometers (373 to 932 miles) in diameter. At that size, an icy object should possess enough gravity to pull itself into a round shape — satisfying the primary physical criterion for a dwarf planet.

ED138 may be Rubin’s first dwarf planet candidate, but it almost certainly won’t be the last. Thanks to the observatory’s Simonyi Survey Telescope — named after the family of Seattle software billionaire Charles Simonyi — the Rubin team detected more than 11,000 new asteroids even before June’s official start of a 10-year survey of the southern sky.

Rubin’s researchers analyze the data from those scans to find objects of interest — ranging from asteroids to gamma-ray bursts — and track them over time. On Oct. 13, Holman was running data through a search code that he developed with Kevin Napier, a colleague at the Center for Astrophysics. ED138 stood out due to its exceptional size and brightness.

“My first reaction was one of excited disbelief,” Holman said. “Objects like this are very rare, so I immediately started checking whether I or the code had done something wrong.”

To confirm the discovery, Holman, Jurić and their colleagues found 30 archived observations of ED138 dating back to March 4. The Asteroid Institute’s ADAM Precovery service found still more images of the object, going back to 2016, in the archives of a different astronomical survey.

The precovery data confirmed that ED138 was a special case.

“Finding an object this big, roughly 1,000 kilometers across, is something that happens maybe once in a generation,” Jurić said. “It’s the largest trans-Neptunian object found in about 20 years, and Rubin turned it up while we were still commissioning the telescope.”

In 2006, the International Astronomical Union defined dwarf planets as planetary objects that are big enough to crush themselves into a roundish shape — technically speaking, into a state of hydrostatic equilibrium — but not big enough to clear their orbital neighborhood.

So far, the IAU has classified five solar system objects as dwarf planets — including Ceres in the main asteroid belt, plus Pluto, Eris, Haumea and Makemake in the region beyond Neptune. 2026 ED138 joins a host of other celestial objects that are thought to be dwarf planets but haven’t yet been added to the IAU’s official list.

“The official list hasn’t moved since 2008,” Jurić told GeekWire in an email. “I’m not sure if there’s an active process that reviews candidates, and what are the timelines.”

Jurić and his colleagues hope additional observations will boost ED138’s chances of attaining true dwarf planethood.

“The next step in building the case would be to prove it’s round (in hydrostatic equilibrium),” he wrote. “The means to do that would be directly through occultations (and there’s a good chance of that, given it’s in a dense stellar field), and then thermal measurements plus modeling and light curves (or the absence of variability).”

University of Washington leaders are weighing whether to separate the Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering from the broader College of Engineering, after a task force recommended the move as part of proposed changes to UW’s computing and AI programs.

The split would give new independence to what has become one of the world’s leading schools for computer science and AI, and a major source of talent for the Seattle region’s tech industry.

As an independent, college-level school, the Allen School would gain greater control over its finances and a seat at the table with UW’s other deans. It could also put more of its own revenue toward teaching, as student demand for computing courses continues to outstrip its capacity.

The task force’s report, released this week, concluded that UW’s successes in computing, data science and AI have come “not because of the organizational structures we have in place but in spite of them.” The nine-member group included UW faculty leaders from across campus, two outside academics and an Amazon executive.

The report also described a “difficult relationship” between the Allen School and the College of Engineering, and “significant distrust” across campus over resources and priorities.

UW Engineering Dean Nancy Allbritton, in a statement to GeekWire on Tuesday, called the relationship “complex rather than difficult.”

The College of Engineering supports the university’s decision to “carefully evaluate” the task force’s recommendations, Allbritton said. She praised the Allen School and said the school and college share a long history of working together, with a commitment to students, research and service to Washington state.

The stakes extend well beyond university politics: The Allen School’s graduates are in high demand across the tech industry. Nearly 100 graduates from the 2025-26 class went to work full time at Amazon, and more than 70 went to Google, Microsoft or Meta, according to a survey of recent graduates by the school. In all, graduates went to more than 150 different companies.

No decision yet: UW President Robert J. Jones and Provost Tricia Serio said Monday that they aren’t making a decision yet. In a letter to the UW community, they announced two implementation committees.

• One committee will plan for a possible independent Allen School, including its finances. The letter calls the continued strength and growth of the College of Engineering “a central consideration.”
• The other will develop plans for a new campus-wide “Federation of Information, Computing and Society,” which would coordinate computing, data science and AI work across UW, including fundraising, and hold its own funding for hiring across departments.

Both committees are due to report by the end of winter quarter 2027, and UW leaders plan to announce next steps in spring 2027. Any changes would still need approval through the university’s usual processes, including the Faculty Senate and Board of Regents, with a goal of putting them in place by the end of the 2027-28 academic year.

The task force was co-chaired by Andy Connolly of UW’s eScience Institute and Kathy Yelick of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Its other members were Dan Grossman, now the Allen School’s interim director; Remzi Arpaci-Dusseau of the University of Wisconsin; UW’s Elizabeth Nance (chemical engineering), Abel Rodriguez (statistics), Emma Spiro (Information School) and Peter Tarczy-Hornoch (UW Medicine); and Anne Szeto of Amazon.

Allen School faculty voted 83-0 in late September in support of “moving forward with a process to determine how the Allen School would become an independent school,” with 13 not voting because they were absent or on leave, according to the school. A formal decision and vote would follow that process, the school said.

Budget and a seat at the table: The issue comes down to money and influence. UW’s budget model sends tuition and a share of research grant funding to the college where the courses are taught and the research is based.

For the Allen School, that’s the College of Engineering. As an independent school, the Allen School would control those funds directly, and its leader would sit with UW’s other deans when the university sets strategy on AI and other priorities, a voice the task force says computing has largely lacked.

UW’s Information School already operates as an independent, college-level unit. But the report says its focus on the human, societal and organizational side of computing and information is different from the Allen School’s focus on computing as a discipline.

As an initial step, Jones and Serio invited Grossman to participate in the Board of Deans and Chancellors. The letter says the move is “independent of any future decision about administrative structure.”

In a message to the Allen School community, Grossman called the invitation “a reflection of the Allen School’s scale and reach,” adding, “I’m pleased to have this opportunity to make meaningful contributions to discussions among UW’s leaders.”

He described the task force’s proposals as “exciting recommendations that will be great for the whole of UW and its impact on Washington state and beyond.”

Grossman also said there are “no planned changes to the Allen School’s structure, staffing, budget, policies and procedures, or degree programs” while the committees do their work.

A longtime Allen School professor and its former vice director, Grossman was named interim director this summer when Magdalena Balazinska’s nearly seven-year term as director ended. At the time, UW said it was opting for an interim leader for about a year while it weighed the task force’s recommendations, which hadn’t yet been made public.

The board seat was one of several early steps the task force recommended to show that UW was committed to the process. The task force also suggested having the Allen School’s director report jointly to the provost and giving the school more control over its budget, but UW hasn’t taken those steps for now.

Rooted in Paul Allen’s gift: The prospect of independence goes back to the Allen School’s creation in 2017.

When a $40 million gift from Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen turned UW’s longtime computer science department into the Allen School, the gift agreement said the school would “remain a unit of the College of Engineering, at least for the time being,” according to a copy obtained by GeekWire.

The agreement called for the school to receive the same prominence, visibility, support and privileges as UW’s other schools and colleges “to the greatest extent possible,” and anticipated that it could someday become “a free-standing School or College.”

The agreement also spelled out what would happen to the name if the school were ever “elevated to a College of the University”: it would change to reflect the new structure, but would “always prominently include” Allen’s name.

Impact on Engineering: The College of Engineering would lose its largest unit. The Allen School, which awarded 894 of the college’s 3,132 degrees in 2025-26, accounts for a little more than a quarter of the college by degrees, enrollment and faculty, according to figures from the college.

The report acknowledges “significant short- and long-term financial implications” from a separation and suggests options such as permanent financial support for Engineering to offset the loss.

Allbritton said the college is committed to helping shape an outcome that “strengthens the College of Engineering, strengthens computer science as an independent discipline, and advances the University of Washington’s broader mission of innovation, discovery, economic opportunity and public impact.”

The Allen School “is an extraordinary unit that has experienced remarkable growth and operates at a scale unlike any other department in the College,” she said. “As both organizations have evolved, there have naturally been questions about structure, governance, and how best to support future growth.”

She also noted that the College of Engineering has nearly doubled in size over the past decade “amid increasingly constrained public resources,” and said the college’s focus is on ensuring that students, faculty, staff, research partnerships and industry relationships “continue to thrive.”

“What has remained constant is a shared commitment to student success, research excellence and service to Washington state,” Allbritton said.

The report doesn’t detail the friction between the Allen School and Engineering. It says independence “does not directly address concerns voiced about collegiality” but could remove “a structural asymmetry that has complicated those relationships.” Opinion across campus on Allen’s independence was “genuinely divided,” the report says.

The federation’s role: The proposed federation is partly a way to keep the rest of campus on board. Other units worried that the Allen School would win independence while the federation never got real resources, according to the report, which recommends that the split not be finalized until the federation is up and running.

Much of the “distrust” cited in the report centers on whether one recommendation would advance at the expense of the other.

If the Allen School’s separation is finalized first, the report says, “other stakeholders are unlikely to trust that the federation will ever achieve the size and stature it needs.”

If the federation moves ahead without a clear commitment to independence, the Allen School and its supporters “are unlikely to trust that their important contributions toward the federation’s success will achieve meaningful change.”

The Allen School is already helping lead cross-campus efforts, including a new AI minor for students in all majors, developed with 18 academic units and set to launch in spring 2027.

Toward a college of computing: Other top universities have taken similar paths. Carnegie Mellon and Georgia Tech run computer science as standalone, college-level schools, while MIT, UC Berkeley and Cornell have created broader colleges of computing, according to the report.

Peer institutions’ computing colleges were “frequently propelled by a transformational naming gift,” the report notes, as with MIT’s Schwarzman College of Computing and Cornell’s Bowers College of Computing and Information Science.

The report describes the federation as a possible “transitional phase” toward a full College of Computing at UW, which would house the Allen School alongside other units, and recommends revisiting that idea in about five years.

Correction: An earlier version of this story overstated the Allen School’s size relative to the rest of the College of Engineering. The story has been updated with figures from the college.

Researchers at UW Medicine’s Institute for Protein Design (IPD) have created new proteins that act like molecular scissors, chopping up targets associated with Alzheimer’s disease and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, also known as ALS or Lou Gehrig’s disease.

The University of Washington scientists are using sophisticated AI models developed at IPD to design proteins called proteases — a class of enzymes that cut specific proteins at specific locations in their structure. The proteases can make those cuts over and over again.

“You have this catalytic capability to destroy one target, and then immediately your molecule can hop over to the second, third and thousands of different targets,” said Anqi Chen, a postdoctoral fellow at the institute.

Many pharmaceuticals bind to a single target, inactivate it and stay there. That approach requires high doses of medicine to have an effect on disease. These enzymatic proteins, by contrast, have an amplified impact.

“There’s this potential to use your drug at very, very low concentrations,” Chen said.

The researchers have made proteases that attack proteins associated with neurodegenerative disease and are now working on targets for malaria, chronic diseases and cancer. They also could make proteins to defang viruses or bacterial toxins.

“There’s super exciting applications,” said David Baker, director of IPD and a 2024 Nobel laureate in chemistry.

Baker is the senior author of two papers describing this work that were published today in the journal Nature. Chen and Kejia Wu are the first authors of one paper, and Hojae Choi, an IPD graduate student, is the first author of the other.

Baker said the research is significant because of how well the enzymes work and the range of potential applications, which beyond medicine include breaking down hazardous pollutants and plastic waste.

Chen and her colleagues designed proteases that use a metal ion, rather than an amino acid, as the cutting blade. More than one-third of the new proteases that they created precisely cut their target, a protein implicated in Alzheimer’s disease, and did so 100 million times faster than cuts made without the enzymes.

The work by Choi and his colleagues used an activated amino acid called cysteine as the blade. The proteins designed by the scientists had a 19% success rate in cutting their targets and were up to 30 million times faster than uncatalyzed reactions.

Much work remains before these newly designed proteins can become drugs for humans. One challenge is ensuring that the proteases don’t trigger a response in which a patient’s immune system attacks the therapeutic before it has a beneficial effect. Another potential hurdle is turning the enzymes off and on to modulate their impact as needed.

Choi is studying that immune system issue, called immunogenicity. He’s working to combine the catalytic, cutting component of the enzyme with a benign-appearing antibody that won’t alert the immune system — sort of a protease wolf in antibody clothing.

“It is a newly launched project, so we don’t have any official data to show to public,” Choi said. “But we’re really working on it.”

The Nature publications are titled: “Computational design of metalloproteases” and “De novo design of cysteine proteases”

Other institutions contributing to the research are: University of Oxford, NVIDIA, University of Cambridge, Imperial College London, Universitat Ramon Llull, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Zhejiang University, Max Planck Institute of Molecular Cell Biology and Genetics, ETH Zurich, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Stanford University and Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology.

The University of Washington’s College of Engineering has received a $12 million gift from a semiconductor company whose chairman earned a master’s degree from the school more than 45 years ago.

The donation is from Winbond Electronics Corporation America, a U.S. subsidiary of Taiwan-based Winbond Electronics Corp. Arthur Y.C. Chiao is Winbond’s chairman and CEO and has been with the company since 1987. He earned his master’s degree in electrical engineering from the UW in 1980.

The gift will create the Winbond Endowed Fund for Excellence in the College of Engineering to support student scholarships, faculty recruitment and retention, research and interdisciplinary collaboration.

“Arthur Chiao’s vision, leadership and lifelong commitment to the University of Washington make this gift especially meaningful,” Nancy Albritton, dean of the College of Engineering, said in a statement.

Chiao envisions the new fund “as a catalyst for breakthrough discoveries” that will allow the college to “pursue bold initiatives and respond to evolving opportunities in engineering, technology and fields of future strategic importance,” according to a UW release. That includes semiconductors, AI, quantum tech and advanced manufacturing.

The College of Engineering is among the UW’s largest colleges, enrolling 10,136 students last fall and employing a faculty of 350. The college says it is the fifth-largest producer of electrical and computer engineering graduates in the U.S.

“Seattle is a gateway to the Pacific Northwest of North America, and the University of Washington will play an important role in connecting future technology innovation between North America and East Asia,” Chiao said.

The gift comes amid a push to bring chipmaking closer to home. Taiwan is the global center of manufacturing for the most advanced semiconductor chips, and the United States has been working to reduce its dependence on East Asian chip production. In 2022, Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act to incentivize domestic fabrication, R&D work and workforce training.

The University of Washington and Microsoft today celebrated the opening of the permanent home of the UW’s Global Innovation Exchange (GIX), an institute supporting tech leaders, on the tech giant’s Redmond, Wash., campus.

GIX is the first UW program to set up full-time operations at Microsoft, whose headquarters are just across Lake Washington from the university’s main campus. The company provided a $42 million in-kind donation to establish the embedded facility.

The UW is leasing the new 48,500-square-foot GIX space in Microsoft’s Building 92 rent-free.

“At a time when AI is transforming how we learn and work, that proximity will create new opportunities for University of Washington students, Microsoft employees, and researchers to learn from one another and accelerate innovation,” Microsoft President Brad Smith said in a statement.

GIX’s mission is to provide interdisciplinary graduate and professional education to tech leaders. It enrolls more than 150 students each year in its Master of Science in Technology Innovation program, which offers in-person and hybrid online options.

“At GIX, we keep people — not technology — as our focus, recognizing that technological change is not an end unto itself. Its value depends on how people use it to create opportunity, strengthen institutions, and contribute to broader social progress,” said Sean Carr, executive director and CEO of GIX.

The institute opened in 2017 in Bellevue’s Spring District. From then until 2023, Microsoft provided $70 million in endowment support, facility improvements and lease payments. GIX moved to its new Redmond home in July. The space includes classrooms, labs, prototyping and makers space facilities, and a high-tech remote learning studio.

GIX was initially created as a collaboration between the UW and Beijing’s Tsinghua University to offer graduate technology degrees for American and Chinese students, with the Chinese research university establishing a physical presence in the U.S.

It appears the arrangement did not come together as planned. The GIX website notes that students can earn dual master’s degrees, one from the UW and the other from Tsinghua, but the links for Tsinghua are dated. Under its “global experiences” heading, the site lists a two-week immersion program last summer for students from National Taiwan University to study in Seattle.

The announcement of the new facility says GIX participants will have access to “scholars, researchers, technologists, and business professionals from around the world” who are onsite at Microsoft.

Other GIX partners include T-Mobile, Amazon, Meta, Aigen, Cisco, Mitsubishi, Responsible Innovation Labs, AI2, Vaisala, King County Metro, Sound Transit, and the UW’s Applied Physics Laboratory and Urban Freight Lab.

The institute is a self-sustaining unit of the UW and does not receive operational funding from the university or the state. It operates in partnership with the UW’s College of Engineering and Foster School of Business.

The UW and Microsoft said in a release that the arrangement “demonstrates how a public research university can engage deeply with industry without sacrificing its academic independence or public purpose.”

The University of Washington today marked the groundbreaking of its Chemical Sciences Building, a $231.1 million facility that will provide new laboratories for instruction and research in areas including sustainable chemistry, human health, advanced materials and quantum science.

The five-story, 104,500-square-foot building will replace the Chemistry Library Building, which sits west of Bagley Hall.

The new facility will also allow for a complete renovation of Bagley Hall, the longtime home of the Department of Chemistry. Bagley, which stands alongside the UW’s iconic Drumheller Fountain, was built in 1937.

Funding for construction of the Chemical Sciences Building comes from a $129 million appropriation from Washington state, with the remainder provided by the UW’s College of Arts & Sciences, the UW and private donations. Funding for the Bagley renovation is still being identified, a university spokesperson said.

The new building is slated to open in 2029.

“The work that happens here will help advance science, strengthen our state and improve lives for generations to come,” said UW President Robert Jones in a statement.

The UW’s Department of Chemistry, among the largest in the U.S., has about 275 staff and faculty, according to its online directory. At the start of the 2025 academic year, it reported 985 undergraduate majors and 320 graduate students and postdoctoral researchers.

The department managed $28 million in funding in 2025, including grants from the National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health, Department of Energy, Department of Defense, industry and foundations.

UW and state leaders framed the project as bringing economic and academic benefits, including workforce training, industry collaboration and the ability to attract and retain talented students and researchers.

“Washington’s economy is built on innovation,” said Gov. Bob Ferguson, who attended the groundbreaking. “Maintaining our leadership requires a reliable pipeline of skilled, highly educated workers. We’re proud to be an investor in this state-of-the-art new building.”

The design-build team for the project is Skanska and Payette+EHDD.

The chemistry building will be among the UW’s largest new academic facilities in Seattle since the Interdisciplinary Engineering Building, a 72,000-square-foot College of Engineering facility, opened in the spring of 2025.

The university had planned to build a 345,000-square-foot building just west of the main campus to house research programs in clean energy, protein design and precision medicine. The Brightwork facility was scuttled last year.

Beijing says artificial intelligence will give the state a visible hand to allocate capital. Here’s the rub: Washington’s economic authority sits in five places, and none of them is in command.

This column begins a four-week series ahead of The Cipher Brief Threat Conference on economic-warfare. The author is hosting a live session on this topic with former Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, General Bryan Fenton (Ret.). Apply now to attend.

On September 26, the President answered the week's largest security question in just four words: "I'm rejecting their deal." Iran's offer to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days, in exchange for lifting the blockade and waiving oil sanctions, had been on the table since September 24. It received its answer in public, from the one official authorized to give it, inside forty-eight hours.

The week's economic questions received no answer of that kind. The trade truce with China, and the pause on Beijing's rare-earth licensing regime tied to it, moved from November 10 to January 10 on the strength of a Treasury Secretary's statement; Beijing has yet to publish a matching notice.

The Russia sanctions act the President signed on September 18 requires determinations on the largest buyers of Russian energy by October 18, a deadline set by Congress rather than the executive, with waivers broad enough to let it pass unenforced. In February, the Supreme Court ruled six to three in Learning Resources v. Trump that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize tariffs, removing the instrument the executive had used for its broadest tariffs.

This is important because Washington can decide a war in a sentence. But on the economic front, authority rests with Treasury, Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, Congress, and the courts. Each is competent. None is in command. The arrangement is by design and has served the country well for most of the last eighty years. But not anymore.

Beijing is now claiming a different design. In a recent lecture on Xi Jinping's economic strategy, former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who has tracked Chinese ideology for fifty years, described a shift in the Communist Party's theoretical literature. Artificial intelligence (AI) and other "new quality productive forces" are portrayed not only as sources of productivity but also as "a superior macro-allocation mechanism for resources," driven by algorithms. Rudd says the literature now uses the term "the visible hand of the state," offered for the first time as a rival to the market's invisible one. He is careful about its status: the idea sits in the ideological literature, "not yet in the policy literature," and not yet in the behavior of firms. But in his reading, ideology in China is where policy begins.

The hand is already visible without the algorithm. The rare-earth regime now paused until January, the Ministry of Commerce's Announcement No. 61, applies to any product anywhere that carries more than 0.1 percent Chinese-origin rare-earth content by value. One ministry notice imposed it; one more can reimpose it. The capital moves the same way. Chinese households, burned by property and wary of equities, hold record savings in low-yield bank deposits, and the state draws on those deposits through local, provincial, and national loan instruments to fund its technology bet. Rhodium Group puts China's AI capital spending at 932 billion renminbi this year, double last year's, financed by state banks and equity placements rather than bond markets.

America's AI buildout is financed the other way. Its five largest builders raised a net $163 billion in debt in the first half of this year, compared with $90 billion in all of 2025, in a bond market where the ten-year Treasury has reached 5.18 percent, its highest since 2007. No ministry allocated that capital. The market did, and the market will reprice it.

Neither design is simply superior, and the distinction matters more than the verdict. A single allocator is fast and brittle. It can direct capital, licenses, and supply to a strategic target within a week, and it can misallocate at the same speed. The household savings now financing the AI bet were poured into a property boom that left many of those households with assets worth only a fraction of what they paid. A distributed system is slow and resilient. Its errors stay local, its capital carries a price, and no single notice can switch it off. In peacetime competition, resilience compounds. In economic warfare, tempo is the contested variable, and the side that can decide within the other's cycle sets the terms. Beijing has already shown what that looks like. It imposed its rare-earth regime by notice on October 9 of last year and suspended it by another on November 7, having collected in between Washington's agreement to delay its own rule extending export controls to the affiliates of blacklisted firms. Two notices, one month, one American concession.

This column has traced the same gap from the drone fleet to the power grid: the capacity exists, and the decision does not. The economic front shows it at national scale. Washington holds the reserve currency, the deepest capital markets, and the reach of the dollar system. What it lacks is a place to settle competing claims on those instruments and to make them binding on the timeline decided by an adversary.

October 18 is the first live test. The sanctions act's determinations are due that day, just sixteen days before the midterm elections. They will be imposed, waived, or deferred, and whichever it is will say more about the American economic hand than any strategy document published this year. Beijing will be watching the same date, holding a notice it can publish on any morning it chooses.

The question for Washington is who, when economic warfare requires a decision, is empowered to make it, and whether that decision can arrive before the adversary's action. Coordination assigns. Integration arbitrates.

Read more expert-driven national security insights in The Cipher Brief. Need full access to more content like this? Become a Subscriber+Member here.

In a cramped corner workspace in a mechanical engineering building at the University of Washington, a team of students is working to harness the power of the sun.

They operate on a fraction of the budget of elite international programs, fitting build hours around class schedules and other extracurriculars. Yet this summer, the scrappy crew took their handmade, solar-powered car — dubbed Sakura — out of the shop and onto the open road.

Over seven days in July and 1,778 miles from Minnesota to Texas, they outpaced nearly every competitor to finish fourth overall and cross the line as the top-ranking American team in the American Solar Challenge.

Now entering its fourth year, the Solar Vehicle Team at UW (SVTUW) is still a relative newcomer to collegiate solar racing. Officially affiliated with the university’s Mechanical Engineering Department, the roughly 50-person group has evolved into a broader interdisciplinary effort spanning electrical engineering, computer science, business, aerodynamics, and more.

Operated entirely by undergrads, the club handles every aspect of the operation in-house — from sponsor outreach and logistics to hands-on fabrication.

While top international competitors rely on multi-million dollar budgets and years of development, the Huskies assembled their vehicle (named after the Japanese word for cherry blossom) in just 11 months — a lightning-fast turnaround for a machine built entirely from scratch.

For team president Rudy Heredia-Jantz, an electrical and computer engineering senior, even making it to the starting line felt like a triumph.

“Frankly, we have no idea [how we pulled it off],” Heredia-Jantz said. “This car — it was a little bit of a miracle. We did not have it up and running until the day before we left for competition. We didn’t even have it moving. We just spun the rear motor, threw it in the trailer, and figured we’ll blow something up eventually.”

Things did indeed blow up — 12 tires in total along the way — but the Huskies kept rolling. For a third-year program competing against seasoned international juggernauts, simply keeping the car on the road was an achievement; outpacing them was a statement.

UW didn’t just survive the route to Texas — they blew past expectations for a young club, clinching the Aesthetics Award and Spirit of the Event Award alongside their top-four finish.

For second-year mechanical engineering student Elijah Yan, who serves as the team’s mechanical lead, the learning curve was immediate.

“Building a car is just not something I’ve done before, so it’s very new to me, and it’s super cool to learn that type of stuff — suspension stuff, how to do vehicle dynamics,” Yan said.

That hands-on engineering paid off when Sakura hit highway speeds on open pavement. Designed to maximize efficiency, the ultra-lightweight vehicle — weighing roughly 500 pounds with a driver inside — stretches 19 feet long to fit its array of solar panels while keeping its profile as narrow as possible.

Under the hood, Sakura is a blend of precision engineering and strict energy conservation:

• Solar array: 386 Maxeon Gen 7 photovoltaic cells covering six square meters, producing up to 1,540 watts of max power output directly from sunlight.
• Battery pack: A student-built 5.125 kWh lithium-ion battery in a 36S9P cell configuration (121V nominal), supplemented by a secondary backup battery used solely for system startups.
• Drivetrain and motor: Powered by a 2 kW Mitsuba 2096-III hub motor capable of pushing the 500-pound vehicle up to 65 mph on open highways.
• Data and cockpit: A custom steering wheel equipped with push-to-talk comms, digital telemetry displays, and regenerative braking controls, paired with an onboard Samsung Galaxy smartphone that streams real-time battery and motor analytics back to the pit crew.

To pull off a competitive build on a shoestring budget, the team combined its resourcefulness with local industry support. The vehicle’s lightweight frame, for instance, relies on carbon fiber sandwich panel flooring donated by Boeing, held together with specialized fiberglass tape.

“It’s the perks of being a Seattle-based team — we work with some amazing materials,” Heredia-Jantz said.

Yet even with aerospace-grade composites, bringing a prototype car across the finish line required plenty of improvised shop hustle.

“The car is held together with cardboard and duct tape, essentially,” Yan joked.

And managing the technical hardware on the road is as much a game of data processing as it is driving.

During the race, a dedicated strategy team monitors Sakura‘s health in real time. Using a custom dashboard that feeds off the onboard smartphone’s data stream, students track battery state-of-charge, individual array voltages, and motor temperatures from a trailing support vehicle.

By pairing live telemetry with incoming weather forecasts, the crew calculates optimal cruise speeds on the fly — relaying instructions to the driver via walkie-talkie so they can balance energy consumption, leverage regenerative braking, and avoid tripping the battery’s protection systems on steep climbs or hard accelerations.

That real-time power management was also put to the test right before the cross-country journey, when the team competed in the Formula Sun Grand Prix — an annual three-day track race where cars run on a single initial charge and whatever sunlight they can harvest along the way. Despite navigating a track that pushed their power distribution system to its limits, the track time gave the team crucial baseline data and momentum before taking on the road race.

Now the club is already preparing for its next evolution. While repairing Sakura for upcoming competitions, students are designing their next-generation vehicle from scratch — overhauling power distribution, reinforcing the chassis, and building a new solar array.

For a club building sun-powered technology in a city known for grey skies, the project is ultimately driven by something deeper than weather.

“I believe this team is building something special in the early morning hours on UW’s campus: talent that shows up before sunrise, a refusal to wait for better resources before doing great work, and a stubbornness that looks a lot like faith,” said Caoilin Krathaus, the team’s administrative lead. “It reminds me of the story behind Boys in the Boat, and what I’ve always thought of as the true Husky experience.”

— Silvia Candiani has been named corporate vice president of Worldwide Telco & Media within the Microsoft Frontier Company, a $2.5 billion initiative launched by the tech giant in July to embed engineers inside customers to build and run AI systems. In her new role, Candiani will lead Microsoft Frontier Company’s work with some of the largest telecommunications operators and media conglomerates.

“The momentum across our industry is extraordinary, and I believe we are only at the beginning of what AI can make possible,” said Candiani, who is based in Milan.

Before joining Microsoft in 2010 as a general manager, Candiani was a marketing director for Vodafone in Italy for more than a decade.

— Kevin Frey has been appointed vice president and chief impact officer of Microsoft Elevate, the company’s philanthropic effort providing technology support, donations, sales and AI training for educational organizations and nonprofits. Frey joined from UNICEF, where he was the first CEO of Generation Unlimited, the organization’s skills and employment initiative.

Frey said he was joining Microsoft because it’s “one of the only organizations in the world with the scale, scope and influence to bend the arc of the AI-powered future we are entering.”

“I will be spending my time and energy trying to ensure that the benefits of AI are shared broadly and safely across society — by every teacher, every student and every worker — regardless of their postal code,” he added.

— And while we’re on Microsoft, Anne Linge has been promoted to director of communications for commercial and consumer experiences after nearly 10 years with the company. She previously worked in communications at Weber Shandwick and Waggener Edstrom Worldwide, which has since rebranded as We.

— Alexis Bateman has been promoted to director of global sustainability at Amazon Web Services after more than five years with the company. She was director of the MIT Center for Transportation & Logistics for 14 years before coming to Amazon.

Her work with AWS has given her the chance to help “shape sustainability at enormous scale,” Bateman said. “AI and cloud are transforming technology and society at an unprecedented pace, creating both enormous challenges and incredible opportunities for sustainability.”

— Gradial has appointed Lynn Girotto as chief marketing officer. In June, the Seattle startup announced $65 million in new funding for its agentic AI platform that automates enterprise marketing. The company is No. 127 on the GeekWire 200, a ranked index of the Pacific Northwest’s top startups.

Girotto joins from Qualtrics, where she was CMO for two years. She has previously led marketing teams at companies including Vimeo, Tableau and Getty Images, and was a senior director at Microsoft for nine years earlier in her career.

“The best marketers I know want to build ideas and customer relationships, not manage processes,” Girotto said. “Gradial is the first company I’ve seen that’s built to give them that time back.”

— A Seattle-area nonprofit group known as the Fermi Explorer Mission announced that Kam Ghaffarian has joined as co-founder. Earlier this month, the organization shared its plans to send a spacecraft on an 80,000-year trip to the nearest alien star system, Alpha Centauri.

Ghaffarian is a billionaire who helped launch companies including X-energy, Axiom and Intuitive Machines. “By committing to launching a spacecraft to Alpha Centauri by 2029, we are not just pushing the boundaries of current technology; we are inspiring a new generation to look up and dream of interstellar exploration,” Ghaffarian said.

Philip Johnston, co-founder and CEO of the Fermi Explorer Mission, also leads Redmond, Wash.-based Starcloud, a startup aiming to launch up to 88,000 satellites to serve as AI data centers.

— Yoodli, the Seattle-based AI roleplay platform for enterprise training, has named Rachel Cougan vice president of human resources. Cougan previously served as a fractional HR leader through her consultancy, Possible HR. Before that, she was VP of people for Logixboard and Hiya, and also served as VP of talent for Textio.

Yoodli, which launched in 2021, has grown to more than 100 employees. The company is No. 17 on the GeekWire 200.

— Kestra Medical Technologies has promoted Daniel Finney to vice president of research and development. The Kirkland, Wash.-based company sells cardiac monitoring and therapeutic devices. It raised $202 million in its IPO in March 2025 and was nominated for Deal of the Year at this year’s GeekWire Awards.

Finney has been with Kestra since 2019. CEO Brian Webster praised his role in developing the company’s FDA-approved monitoring device, adding that his “technical depth, product experience, and demonstrated leadership positions him to guide our next phase of innovation.”

Finney succeeds Phillip Foshee, Jr., who recently retired after leading Kestra’s R&D organization for nearly a decade.

— PATH has named Dr. Jeremy Farrar chief of its Asia, Middle East and Europe regional division. Farrar, a globally recognized leader in public health and clinical medicine, will join PATH effective Oct. 1 and be based in Geneva. His past roles include assistant director-general at the World Health Organization and director of the Wellcome Trust.

PATH CEO Nikolaj Gilbert praised the appointment, and noted that Farrar “possesses deep knowledge of the realities that prevent access, the people that make health care possible, and the need for PATH’s mission of ensuring breakthrough innovations reach all who need them.”

— American Astronomical Society (AAS) announced that University of Washington scientist Emily Levesque is the next editor in chief of the AAS journals. She will succeed Ethan Vishniac, who is stepping down from the role at the end of summer 2027 after 12 years.

“In the writing and publishing landscape we’re facing today, sharing information has never been easier, but trusting information has never been harder — which makes the AAS journals’ combination of rigorous peer review and accessible science more valuable than ever,” Levesque said.

Levesque has been an assistant astronomy professor at the UW for 11 years. She leads the massive stars research group, which studies the evolution and death of the largest and “most extreme” stars in the universe.

— The Seattle Metropolitan Chamber has added eight members to its board of trustees:

• Deniz Anders, Nordstrom’s executive vice president and chief marketing officer
• Reuven Carlyle, founder of Earth Finance and former state senator
• Carl Gipson, vice president of government and community affairs for Comcast
• Trevor Gooby, executive vice president and chief operating officer for the Seattle Mariners
• Daniel Huber, BNBuilders’ vice president of operations for the Northwest and Colorado
• Karen Lee, CEO of Plymouth Housing
• Holli Martinez, vice president, head of belonging, recognition and corporate responsibility for T-Mobile
• Rajat Puri, executive vice president and chief operating officer for Premera Blue Cross

“This is not at all a strategy-driven [FY 2027 defense] budget. This is a budget-driven budget. If you look at the Truth Social posts by the President [Trump] and the statements of the people around him, he [President Trump] makes very clear that this budget was driven by a budget number, a budget target, an arbitrary level that was set based on five percent of last year's GDP…They set this arbitrary level and then at relatively the last minute in the budget development process the [Defense] Department was told come up with a request that gets you to this number, this $1.5 trillion number. And so they did.”

That was Todd Harrison of the American Enterprise Institute and one of the nation's top experts on defense strategy and the defense budget, speaking last Tuesday at the Brookings Institution as part of a panel on The FY 2027 defense budget: How much is enough?

Remember, as I wrote last week, the Trump FY 2027 defense request is for $1.15 trillion with another $350 billion request to be placed in a FY 2026 reconciliation package; and there now also is the new FY 2026 supplemental request, which has another $67 billion for the Defense Department.

House members have been weighing all the defense numbers and this week may be voting on a FY 2026 reconciliation package of $95 billion with only $73 billion for defense – far less than what was being sought.

Last Tuesday, Harrison went on to explain what may have been going on: “I say it is absolutely not a strategy-driven [FY 2027 defense] budget because they didn't have to make hard choices. They made some easy choices.”

As an example, Harrison said, “Do you want, you know, a fourth generation fighter jet? Buy some new fourth generation [F-15s]; or do we want to continue buying the fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 we have in production; or do we want to invest in sixth generation fighters? Do all of them, right? You can do all three at once, if you have a virtually unlimited budget, you don't have to make those hard tradeoffs.”

And, in fact, all three are included in the proposed FY2027 defense budget.

But Harrison goes on to suggest another way to view this Trump defense budget giant increase saying, “There's still a limit to how much the department can consume in terms of this funding…because I don't think they [the Trump budgeteers] actually intend this to be like a one-year budget authority number, especially with the reconciliation [set at $350 billion]. I think it is actually more like a five-year budget number that they're trying to get pre-funded up front, but they actually plan to spend it at a slower pace over the next five years.”

Harrison also looked at “the parts that I think absolutely don't belong in here are these big pots of money they created in defense-wide accounts that have very little description with them.”

For example, he picked out “$54 billion in the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG) line item. That is a single program element that's got $54 billion in it,” Harrison said. “That's unprecedented. If you read the budget description with it, it gives very little detail. You know, it's [clears throat] supposed to be investments in drones and things like that, but like tell us

quantities, tell us specific types of drones, like tell us what you're going to be using it for, and that detail is not there.”

Harrison went on, “It appears they haven't figured that out yet, so I think $54 billion is quite a reach, trying to ask for that much money for something that has not yet been well defined. So, I think that there are areas here where they've really overshot and they've tried to just throw everything in there and ask for a super high number. And I wonder if they almost expect that they're not going to get that full number -- that Congress will cut them back down quite a bit. But they were just trying to reach that overall $1.5 trillion level.”

As Yahoo Finance pointed out earlier this month, the $54 billion for DAWG sought for FY 2027 is 243 times greater than what DAWG got this year, and “now exceeds the entire Marine Corps budget request of $52.8 billion and represents nearly 15% of the entire $350 billion reconciliation package.”

Harrison’s view: “You get to the endgame, Congress is going to have to sort through this and say, ‘Okay, what are the what things in here are serious things that really do need to get funded one way or the other, and we'll have to figure out how to make that happen, and what are the other things that were just budget gimmicks or just filler?’"

Harrison was not the only expert on last Tuesday’s Brookings panel.

Joining him were David Wessel, who runs Brookings’ tax and fiscal policy in the economic studies program; and Mara Karlin, professor at John's Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, who has worked for six Defense Secretaries over her career.

Wessel took a broader financial view saying, “The President is proposing a big defense budget at a time when we have unsustainable fiscal trajectory, and so I think that raises an important question and that question is…budgeting is about tradeoffs and the President and Congress at the moment seem to be avoiding trade-offs. There are ways we could offset if defense spending is really important. We should think about ways to pay for some of it either by cutting some other places in defense or raising taxes. And there's some ideas floating around on that, but none of them are politically popular.”

Wessel also raised two other issues: “I think it also requires some trust on the part of the public that the money is being well spent and that relies on Congress doing oversight. And secondly, that we are sticking with a military that is nonpartisan and follows the leadership of the President and the Congress, but is not totally politicized. And I'm afraid that the trust in the military is being eroded by some of the personnel decisions that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is making. And I think that's a problem.”

As for Karlin, she referred to the Trump national strategy and focused on what she called “a break with the bipartisanship that has characterized how folks have thought about these threats for a long time.”

Karlin noted, “The real emphasis of this [Trump national] strategy is on the Western Hemisphere, right? The real threat is seen in this strategy as these alleged narco-terrorists as they're so named…So, that's the priority.”

But, she adds, “You then see China mentioned, but in a pretty circumscribed way, just the first island chain. And in general, the language reads a lot softer than almost any recent defense strategy. You see a desire to downgrade involvement in European affairs, a little bit of mention of the Middle East, but in no way signaling that we would be starting this massive [Iran] conflict. And so here's where I think, there's some confusion worth highlighting because traditionally a national defense strategy is a decoder ring. It's going to tell you where the Secretary of Defense will put their energy and attention.”

“When we look at this budget, this very large budget, that's really at kind of World War levels,” Karlin said, “and frankly, the number [$1.5 trillion] isn't really merited by the strategy.”

She explained, “If one were really to just prioritize the Western Hemisphere and this quite circumcised focus on China as a major threat, and not be involved in most other regions of the world, in fact, the Trump administration could have put out a quite tiny defense budget request. So I leave you with a bit of perplexity.”

Two more things Harrison mentioned need recording.

“I forgot to address the [Trump] battleship issue,” Harrison said at one point, “because you know that's in here and far from defending it, I think that's one of those examples of things that got thrown in because they didn't have to make tough choices.”

Then he explained, “No one in the Navy can say with a straight face that we're going to go from starting a brand-new, clean-ship design in FY 2027, to procuring the lead-class [battle]ship in FY 2028, to going to all the way by FY 2031 being at full rate production, ready to buy them at one per year. That doesn't pass the laugh test…And so are we just setting ourselves up to spend a few billion dollars chasing, you know, this weird idea before we eventually have to cancel it and then things go back to the way they were before.”

Finally, Harrison said, “I think there needs to be some fundamental look on the congressional side at just how do we reform the budget process to get it working again; open the aperture to things like changing the start date of the fiscal year [which now begins October 1], re-jiggering the committee structure.”

I believe Harrison is questioning why each year the Armed Services Committees in both the House and Senate each authorize spending programs, and then the House and Senate Appropriations Committees set the actual dollar-level of funds made available for that year.

“You know,” Harrison said, “I'm talking a lot of third rails here, but I think we're at that kind of point like we were in the early 1970s where Congress realized it [the budgeting process] just wasn't working. I think that they need to do some serious inward-looking reform like that.”

I agree, having twice worked on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the 1960s, and followed defense spending over the past 60 years. Harrison is right – the Legislative Branch system for passing Executive Branch funding needs to be repaired.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

The Department of War has just executed the most ambitious acquisition reform in six decades. It scrapped JCIDS — the requirements process that ossified innovation for a generation; replaced program offices with portfolio executives, and built a Warfighting Acquisition System designed for speed.

The changes deliver on years of reform proposals. They also risk repeating a costly mistake of the post-9/11 wars: chasing evolving threats with rapid fixes while no one is responsible for understanding them. Industry will help determine which path prevails.

Counter-drone fight as test case. We’ve seen this movie before

Consider the counter-drone fight, the clearest test of the new system. Washington treats it as an engineering puzzle: build a better jammer, field a cheaper interceptor. The technology shelf is full — directed-energy weapons at $12 a shot, drone-on-drone interceptors with more than a thousand kills in Ukraine.

While the technology works, the process for getting it to the warfighter does not.

Soldiers today engage FPV drones that cost a few hundred dollars with $400,000 Stinger missiles, because the cheap interceptors proven in Ukraine still have no fast path into U.S. formations. A new drone variant appears on the battlefield every week, built from commercial parts and open-source software. A firmware update that defeats a jammer costs nothing and takes hours. Our counter, even through the reformed system, takes months.

This is not a technology gap. It is a cycle-time gap. And I have seen it before. From 2010 to 2013, I led the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force at the height of the counter-IED campaign in Afghanistan. The structural parallels are exact: cheap dual-use components, knowledge that spreads faster than countermeasures, adaptation at near-zero cost, tactical variation that defeats one-size-fits-all solutions, and an institutional reflex to throw technology at a systems problem. We spent $75 billion on counter-IED and lost that fight anyway. Drones are IEDs that fly.

The part nobody owns

Here is what the reforms miss: Successful innovation runs in six phases — detect, define, develop, deploy, assess, distribute. The reforms invested almost entirely in the middle two, develop and deploy. Nobody persistently monitors how the threat evolves at the tactical edge. Nobody scopes each unit’s problem with enough precision to drive useful solutions. Nobody measures whether fielded systems actually work against an adversary who adapts after every engagement. And nobody moves what one unit learns to every other unit facing the same threat at operational speed. Three of the six phases have no organizational owner.

The department built a faster engine. Nobody built the steering — the mechanism that decides which problems the engine should be pointed at, whether the solutions worked, and who else needs to know.

Industry’s new role

That gap is the industry's opportunity — and its obligation. The DoW can’t solve this problem by itself. Companies that want to matter in this market need to do their part. They should start by doing three things differently.

First, invest in problem discovery, not product pitches. Requirements still originate in headquarters, not from soldiers watching the problem in context. The companies that win the next decade will be the ones that put engineers and business developers forward with operational units to understand problems before proposing solutions. The quality of your solution is determined by the quality of the problem you choose to solve. Einstein’s formula applies: 55 minutes on the problem, five on the solution. Most of industry has that ratio inverted.

Second, build for adaptation, not for the requirement. If your product cannot change in weeks — modular hardware, software-defined behavior, upgrades at firmware speed — it is obsolete on delivery. The adversary’s development cycle runs in days. A requirement frozen at contract award is a snapshot of a threat that no longer exists.

Third, plug into the new portfolio structure as a sensor, not just a supplier. Industry keeps asking the department for a clearer demand signal, and fairly so. But the demand signal has to come from somewhere, and the fusion cells that Portfolio Acquisition Executives need — nodes that merge ground truth from the field with what industry and the labs know is possible — cannot function without industry feeding data in and absorbing assessment data out. Companies that operate at that tempo will define the portfolios. Companies that wait for RFPs will trail them.

Doing these three things means stopping three others. Stop building to frozen requirements and calling it responsiveness. Stop treating a prototype contract or a demo-day win as the finish line — it is the starting line of the assessment the department never runs. And stop spending capture budgets decoding what headquarters wants instead of discovering what the warfighter needs. The hours are the same; the direction is not.

New authorities need new operators

None of this works without people, and people are where the reform agenda is thinnest. The department is converting the Defense Acquisition University into a Warfighting Acquisition University, trading compliance training for scenario-based judgment. That is the right instinct. But this year’s defense authorization offered little else on workforce, which means the authorities changed faster than the people who must wield them.

We know what works: experiential, problem-first education. Hacking for Defense has spent a decade putting university students to work on real national security problems alongside the people who own them. It has produced a generation of founders and public servants who know how to interrogate a problem before building a solution. That model needs to scale — into the department’s schoolhouses, into two-way exchanges between government and industry, and into industry’s own training pipelines, which today produce engineers who have never seen the field and capture teams fluent in the FAR but not in the mission.

The department has reformed how it acquires. It has not yet reformed what it acquires, whether it worked, or who else needs to know. Industry can wait – and hope – the government will close that gap, or it can help close it — by discovering problems & opportunities at the edge, building for adaptation, and educating a workforce trained to out-cycle an adversary rather than out-comply a regulation.

In this fight, the adversary does not need to out-technology us. He only needs to out-cycle us. We have already paid $75 billion to learn where that leads.

Pete Newell is a retired U.S. Army colonel, former director of the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force, and CEO of BMNT. He co-created Hacking for Defense with Steve Blank and is the author of “The Innovation Targeting Cycle.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

It was with alarm that I read the recent New York Times article reporting the regurgitation of a truly terrible idea that, like a bad meal, continues to come up every several years.

The Times reports that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

is demanding that American intelligence officials turn over the names of all foreign espionage targets, including suspected spies and potential recruits, to create a master list, to avoid inadvertent conflicts between agencies and to better track foreign intelligence threats in real time.

A primary task of any corporate security department or Federal counterintelligence activity is to prevent, deter, and detect human and technical compromises of sensitive information. Even innocent errors can result in massive damage when they reveal sensitive information. Nor is it a secret that any large organization, no matter how carefully it screens its people, may have persons in its ranks who would betray their colleagues and their country. And of course, malign foreign actors routinely seek to access U.S. information systems and classified computing resources.

Just as a comprehensive list of CIA employees, including covert officers serving in dangerous locations, would be of great value to any number of foreign adversaries, so too would the proposed list of espionage targets, suspected spies, and potential recruits. And the drawbacks associated with creating such a list are significant - and potentially catastrophic.

The mere process of assembling the relevant data from within separate departments and agencies would require the assembling of multiple intermediate lists -for example, all subjects of interest from multiple operating components of the FBI, CIA, and additional agencies, each one of which would pose a separate significant and potentially catastrophic counterintelligence vulnerability. Compiled into a single comprehensive set, the theft or leak of the combined list would work incalculable damage to the United States.

Similar proposals have been made for decades. At the very best, they are a solution in search of a problem; for every time two or more agencies trip over one another in the pursuit of intelligence opportunities, there are literally hundreds more occasions in which the existing deconfliction arrangements work exactly as they should.

I spent several years in an ODNI policy position when the Office was first created. From time to time I encountered colleagues from one or another part of the Government, or from outside the Government completely, who sought to establish policies and procedures to address some obscure, long-since resolved, or simply imagined pet peeve. While some concerns truly reflect structural obstacles and warrant serious consideration, sometimes the most responsible thing to do is simply draw the line and withdraw a truly bad proposal. This is one of those times.

Jonathan M. Fredman is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Princeton University School of Public and International Affairs. He spent 36 years in legal and policy positions at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Agent 711 was one of the most effective and least known spies in our nation's history. He used dead drops to communicate about enemy plans. He used secret chemical processes to create new forms of invisible ink. He spread disinformation to disguise his own troops' movements and confuse the enemy. The year was 1778. Agent 711 was George Washington. He was our nation's first spymaster, and his network of informants was the Culper spy ring. It was one of several that he ran through the war and also during his time as president. Washington's army was undermanned, underfunded, frequently on the run. He knew he needed an edge, and he found it with intelligence. A British intelligence officer later said Washington did not really outfight the British — he simply outspied us.

At the same time, as a young nation was leaning heavily into its very first intelligence community, Thomas Paine was inspiring a nation to democracy. He had ideas about equality, rights, and the limits of government — revolutionary ideas for the time. He had ideas about power: it was not a divine right handed down to a monarch, but power rested in the hands of the people. Government borrows that power for a time, within limits. The representatives of that government are meant to be of the people and return to lives among the people, not to be separate or above or disconnected from what's going on among them.

Thus, our nation was born, not out of a tension between intelligence and democracy, but as an alchemical mix of both. We carry these ideas forward into a modern context. Power rests with the people. They loan it to the government. We trade some of our liberty for things that no one person can provide — roads, the power grid, police, submarines, national security. In exchange, we demand things of our government: accountability, adjustments, change, transparency. But we also demand security, and we demand economic prosperity. That's the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness part.

It's easy to forget that there are still those in the world who wish to take these things away from us. It's also in part generational — today’s college graduates were not alive during 9/11 or had maybe just been born. There are still terrorists and cartels who wish to take life. China seeks to take liberty — they want to subjugate people to their will, as they've done in Tibet, in Hong Kong, as they're attempting to do in Taiwan. Russia wants to end the pursuit of happiness. Some men truly do just want to watch the whole world burn to make themselves feel better, and Putin is one of those. Rather, they want happiness on their terms. This looks like power for the elite few oligarchs around Vladimir Putin, while he sends the poor to fight his war in Ukraine. It looks like the ruling elite of the CCP and their little princelings. They want order. They want to take liberty to hold power. The state has shown, in their case, security, but only for the few.

Why? Because liberty is messy. It is a struggle. It's making our own way while everyone else does the same. It's making space for ourselves and for each other, and when those spaces conflict, we figure it out. Thomas Paine wrote that “when we speak of rights, we ought always to unite them with the idea of duties — rights become duties by reciprocity: the right which I enjoy becomes my duty to guarantee to others, and he to me.” So today we are the guarantors of each other's rights. In Paine's time that looked like representative democracy and a little bit of revolution. Today, specifically with regard to spy work, it is a hard concept to wrap your head around — it's actually protection of rights by proxy.

In my pocket I carry a coin — the first one made for the Senate Intelligence Committee, on which I served for six years. On one side is Washington's seal, to represent our very first spymaster and to honor the intelligence officers who were so instrumental to the birth of this nation. But there are also two sets of stars on this coin. There's a set of 15 around the outside that represents the 15 members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who represent the entirety of the Senate. And then on the other side there are a hundred stars representing the Senate as a whole.

Why are there two layers? The 100 senators represent the entire country. The 15 members of the committee represent the Senate. Just as Washington went to great pains to encode secret messages and hide what he knew from the British army, secrets today must stay secret — the more people who know a thing, the less likely something is to stay secret. The intel committees are there to be the eyes and ears of the entire Senate or the House, and by extension the nation. These committees were designed to bring things back into balance.

During the 1960s and 1970s, another time of intense national upheaval, the IC got way out of hand — spying on political figures like Martin Luther King, attempting assassinations of foreign leaders, and engaging in massive propaganda campaigns. The Church and Pike committees united to investigate and create both the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee, to provide permanent, comprehensive oversight to keep this balance.

People who don't know intelligence work think that it's all-powerful and full of abuse. They see the spy thrillers that are in the movies. They think the 1970s continue today. But people who do know it, know it's a microcosm of liberty. It's messy. It's flawed. But it's also full of checks, balances, and people doing the right thing. These are my friends and former colleagues. They look like me. They look like you. They miss dinners with families. They put themselves in harm's way. They don't get parades. They don't get early boarding on flights. They don't get military discounts. They just do the work.

For us as a country, I fear there are rough seas ahead. We face two revisionist powers that, like King George III, believed that one person should be in charge through might alone. These people want to set up a false choice: freedom or security, not both. But the truth is that freedom and security are deeply intertwined. It is fear that leads to that false choice. On the one hand, dictators fear chaos — they think that people will come to understand that their oppressive dear leader does not, in fact, have their interests at heart. The supposed strongman is actually terrified. He's desperate to hold on to power. On the other hand, amongst some, there is fear the security mission will take over and become too big, too powerful, lodged in the hands of someone who is too power-hungry. But the goal is balance. We need Washington's spy ring. We also need Paine's ideals. And we need them working together.

One further reflection on that Paine quote: the rights I enjoy, I also guarantee to others. This is perhaps most true for those who operate in the shadows. They guarantee the rights of fellow citizens day in and day out, with a million small decisions, even when no one is watching. Democracy enables good spy work — only in a democracy can you walk into the Oval Office and deliver truly terrible news to power, tell the president things have gone sideways, and work together to fix it.

Spy work also makes democracy possible. I look forward to a day where there are no enemies; no one who seeks to assert ultimate power over others. That day I will have happily worked myself out of a job. But it is not today. Today I am fully employed attempting to create deterrence, know our adversaries, create a future of peace through strength. I have sworn an oath to support and defend the Constitution four times in my life, and hopefully one day I'll do it a fifth, but inside government or out, trying to work for democracy, for freedom, for a secure America and a secure world is the mission.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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“In addition to supporting OEF (Operation Epic Fury, the Iran War) costs incurred by DOW (Department of War), the [$87.6 billion Fiscal Year FY 2026 Supplemental Trump administration] request provides $768 million to the Department of Energy to support nuclear and other energy security requirements, primarily for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for OEF-related activities.”

I was intrigued by that segment, from a June 24 letter to House Speaker Rep. Mike Johnson (R-La.) from Trump’s Office of Management and Budget Director Russell T. Vought, because I could not imagine what costly “nuclear and other energy security requirements” NNSA – the U.S. nuclear weapons complex – could be playing in the Iran War.

However, a chart attached to Vought’s letter said that $672 million was for NNSA to fund “activities for complete and verifiable termination of Iran’s ability to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon, including the disposition of proliferation sensitive material, technology, equipment, and infrastructure.”

Another $95.5 million, destined for the Department of Energy’s Environmental and Other Defense Activities elements, was listed for “support of Operation Epic Fury and other classified purposes.”

Perhaps members of the Senate Armed Services Committee can find out about the plans behind this $782 million package for NNSA and Energy this morning [July 14], when they question Jules W. Hurst III, who is up for confirmation as Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

By the way, when was the last time a U.S. President went to war and added a tax to help pay for it? As an old-timer I remember – it was 1968, when then-President Lyndon Johnson got Congress to pass a nine-month, 10 percent surcharge on individual and corporate taxpayers to help pay for the Vietnam War. Low-income individual taxpayers were entirely exempt from the surcharge.

Since then, both Republican and Democratic Presidents used deficit spending and borrowing to pay for military conflicts. So far this year, the nation’s total deficit has increased through May 2026 by $1.25 trillion, according to the Treasury Department, with Defense Department spending running $20 billion more through May 2026, than it was last year.

But I remind you, Congress now has three defense funding requests before it: a $1.1 trillion FY 2027 base budget request; an additional $350 billion request to be placed in a 2026 reconciliation package; and now the new FY 2026 supplemental request, which has $67 billion for the Defense Department.

No one can say for sure how Congress will deal with these requests that total over $1.5 trillion.

For comparison, I point out that according to a December 8, 2014, Congressional Research Service study, Congress, over the prior 13 years, approved total appropriations of $1.6 trillion for Afghan and Iraq “military operations, base support, weapons maintenance, training of Afghan and Iraq security forces, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the war operations initiated since the 9/11[2001] attacks.”

What the Vought chart also shows is that almost 23 percent of the funds in what has been described as the Iran War supplemental, went for different and, in some cases, totally unrelated purposes that I will describe below.

As for the NNSA money, a FoxNews story June 24, said, “The funding would support the removal and elimination of Iranian nuclear materials, including uranium hexafluoride (UF6), uranium in various forms and research reactor fuel, including highly-enriched uranium, according to details shared by a White House official.”

FoxNews also said, “The request also would fund U.S. verification activities inside Iran, support inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, strengthen nuclear-smuggling detection efforts and expand Nuclear Emergency Support Team operations across the Middle East.”

In short, Trump is asking for funds to deal with Iran’s enriched uranium before he has any agreement with Tehran that gives the U.S. access to that material.

Perhaps Trump thinks in the end he will have immediate success with Tehran as in he did in Venezuela. There, after the U.S. seized President Nicolas Maduro in January 2026, and four months later, in May, NNSA removed from Venezuela 13.54 kilograms – approximately 30 pounds – of highly-enriched uranium from a legacy research reactor in that country which had been shut down since the early 1990s.

The supplemental request also contains $1.5 billion for the State Department’s of which $850 million is for the Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems program at high-risk diplomatic posts overseas along with security upgrades and equipment replacement. Another $300 million for Embassy construction and maintenance would be used to address needs following the start of the Iran war in Bahrain, Dubai, Karachi, Lahore and Riyadh, according to the Vought chart.

The State request also includes $100 million for the Diplomatic and Consular Service account to meet unanticipated needs related to the Middle East situation including departure assistance to U.S. citizens seeking to leave the region with their families. Transfer authority and an increase in repatriation loan level is also being requested to meet the needs of destitute U.S. citizens.

Another $1.35 billion for the State Department is sought to deal with the Ebola Virus, or as Vought put it in his letter to Speaker Johnson, “These funds would be used to limit the spread of Ebola beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda to other vulnerable nations and ensure the virus does not reach U.S. shores.”

Some $800 million for State is proposed for the International Humanitarian Assistance account, formerly managed by USAID, and another $550 million for Global Health Security, which funds “would support contact tracing, personal protective equipment and commodity procurement, disease surveillance, laboratory capacity, and cross-border coordination,” according to the Vought chart.

There is another $2 billion for the U.S. Coast Guard to support OEF where Pentagon “assets are not available to support Western Hemisphere operations. This includes funding for operations at the Southern Border, ” according to the Vought chart.

Meanwhile, the largest amount, other than for OEF in the supplemental, is $11.1 billion for the Agriculture Department, the bulk of which, $10 billion, would be for American farmers as “temporary economic assistance for row and specialty crops planted in crop year 2026,” according to the Vought chart. An additional $1.1 billion is being requested specifically for farmers in Florida “to rebound from devastating losses that were the result of crippling storms this past winter.”

I believe that money has political implications because rural Americans are pulling away from the President. As Brookings Institution polling recently showed, “Only 24% of white rural voters think that the condition of the economy is excellent or good, while 77% rate it as fair or poor. Just 16% say their family’s financial situation is better than it was two years ago (near the end of the Biden administration), compared to 49% who say they are worse off.”

Then there is $1 billion in the war supplemental to assist in the final design and construction for renovation of New York City’s Penn Station. In a New York Times op-ed last Friday, Rep. Jerold Nadler (D-N.Y.) said that the White House last year took control of the $8 billion Penn Station project from the [New York] Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

Rep. Nadler wrote, “Behind closed doors, Mr. Trump has already attempted a quid-pro-quo, offering federal funding for New York’s transit needs only if Penn Station and [Virginia’s] Dulles Airport are renamed for him.”

However, Nadler also noted, “It’s still $7 billion short, and with top appropriators already opposing the supplemental funding request, it’s unlikely to be approved anyway.”

Another $1 billion in the war supplemental, according to the Vought chart, is for the Labor Department’s Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation “to increase the benefit levels for participants of certain pension plans that were sponsored by Delphi Corporation and terminated as a result of General Motors ' bankruptcy in 2009.”

The money would reverse pension reductions for some 20,000 retirees that have spent years arguing their pensions were unfairly reduced after the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation assumed responsibility for the company’s pension plans during GM’s 2009 financial crisis.

According to the Detroit Free Press, “Various legislative efforts to restore the benefits have failed or stalled, despite bipartisan support. Perhaps knowing it's a potentially powerful issue in the Midwest, Trump (and President Joe Biden before him) has signaled his support of the workers in politically sensitive moments such as just before the 2020 election.”

Then there is $500 million for the National Park Service in Washington, D.C. for, as the Vought chart explains, improvements to the World War II Memorial on the Mall and restoration and construction for the Tidal Basin Seawall along West Potomac Park to include the planting of hundreds of new cherry trees and stabilizing the surrounding grounds.

Last Friday, the conservative group Americans for Prosperity pointed out that even the supplemental’s defense and Iran-related spending “deserve further scrutiny,” noting that $15.6 billion for the Pentagon are justified by Vought simply as “Administration priorities,” “Readiness,” and “Classified Programs.”

In fact, I think the whole package needs congressional oversight, and from the reactions of some key Senate and House leaders, that’s what it’s going to get.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Military power is meaningless if it cannot move.

Every American war plan, from deterring aggression in Europe to prevailing in the Indo-Pacific, depends on our ability to maneuver people, equipment, fuel, information and combat power faster than any adversary can react. We invest billions in advanced aircraft, ships, satellites and weapons systems, yet every one of these assets depends on transportation and communications networks that the Department of Defense does not own. Washington needs to invest in the cybersecurity of these assets otherwise we risk having troops and materiel that can’t get off the base to the front line.

A tank leaving Fort Cavazos does not magically appear in Europe. An Air Force squadron deploying to the Pacific does not simply launch into combat. Every deployment begins on commercial railroads, moves through civilian ports and airports, depends on privately owned communications networks and increasingly relies on digital logistics systems that connect government and commercial partners.

That is America’s strategic advantage. It is also one of our greatest vulnerabilities.

China does not need to destroy American combat power to gain an advantage. It simply needs to delay it. Every day that equipment sits in a rail yard, every hour a port is offline, every aircraft waylaid by corrupted logistics data or disrupted communications creates exactly the kind of friction an adversary seeks during the opening days of a conflict.

This is not theoretical.

For more than two years, top U.S. intelligence officials have warned that Chinese cyber operators are compromising hundreds of American transportation, communications, energy and logistics systems. They gain persistent access, so that Beijing can disrupt and destroy system at the time of its choosing.

Russia’s cyberattacks against Ukraine’s transportation, energy, and communications infrastructure reveal what this looks like in practice: modern wars are fought as much against the systems that sustain military power as the military itself.

Today’s military power is no longer built solely on concrete, steel and fuel. It is built on networks and connectivity.

Ports rely on automated cranes and digital cargo management systems. Railroads depend on computerized dispatching and signaling. Airports operate through integrated flight planning, air traffic management and logistics software. Fuel distribution, maintenance scheduling, cargo visibility and command and control all depend on data moving securely across interconnected networks.

Imagine a deployment where cargo manifests are corrupted, rail dispatch systems slow movement, satellite communications are degraded and fuel deliveries are redirected through manipulated logistics data. Aircraft still exist. Ships still sail. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Guardians remain ready to fight. But when the Joint Force begins arriving late and incomplete, the operational tempo required to seize the initiative is lost.

History reminds us why speed matters.

During humanitarian operations following Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, the systems underpinning military mobility were the lifeline connecting isolated communities to food, water and medical care. Every hour mattered. Delays translated directly into human suffering.

Combat operations are no different. Time is often the most valuable resource a commander possesses. The same lesson applies in deterrence. The faster America can generate and maneuver combat power, the less likely an adversary is to miscalculate.

Military and commercial networks need to work together to dynamically reroute forces around cyberattacks, infrastructure failures or contested logistics. Decision advantage will increasingly come not from owning more platforms, but from orchestrating movement better than our adversaries can disrupt it.

The problem is that military planners have spent decades assuming that civilian infrastructure will simply be available when mobilization orders are issued. That assumption deserves renewed scrutiny.

The Defense Department has publicly identified which ports, rail corridors and airports are “strategic” and indispensable to national defense. The Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard and transportation agencies have been tasked to understand the infrastructure. Commercial operators understand their own networks better than anyone. But somehow the needed public private collaboration to protect these national assets has not occurred and, as a result, many of these communities will come together for the first time during a national emergency.

Congress and the executive branch should establish and harmonize cybersecurity standards across transportation sectors so operators spend more time improving security than satisfying overlapping regulations.

Infrastructure directly supporting military mobility deserves dedicated cybersecurity investment. Smaller ports, airports and rail operators cannot reasonably defend themselves against nation-state adversaries without federal partnership. Congress should provide cybersecurity grant programs for the under-resourced transportation infrastructure operators to address identified vulnerabilities.

Most importantly, America must begin exercising the way it expects to fight.

National, regional and local exercises should assume degraded communications, cyberattacks against transportation systems, corrupted logistics data and contested movement inside the United States. We should practice fighting through disruption instead of assuming perfect connectivity.

There is an old military saying: amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.

The next war demands we take one step further.

Victors study maneuver.

America’s adversaries already understand that mobility is our greatest strategic advantage. That is precisely why they are targeting the networks that make it possible.

If America cannot connect, America cannot maneuver. If America cannot move, America cannot fight.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Author’s Note: This article is not about ‘endless wars’ as a critique of U.S. military interventions — that debate belongs elsewhere. It examines a distinct and increasingly visible pattern: how U.S. adversaries wage continuous, long-term conflict against the United States across peace and war, both below and above the threshold of open conflict. The aim is to clarify the nature of the competition we are already in.

Countering Endless Warfare and its Networks

The United States is not at peace. As I argued in Part I, the United States is already in a continuous, long-term conflict with determined adversaries who are waging warfare without crossing the threshold into open conflict. Endless Warfare is a framework for understanding how those adversaries pursue an enduring approach to erode and supplant U.S. power, influence, and global leadership over time.

Endless Warfare is not simply another label for the gray zone or cognitive warfare. Both are important elements and merit their own approaches, but Endless Warfare describes the adversary’s persistent, long-term strategy, not just the elements that enable it.

Given this operating environment, this is about far more than terminology. It is about how we understand conflict, how we achieve deterrence, how we protect decision autonomy, how we retain leverage, and, most importantly, how we disrupt the networks that fuel Endless Warfare.

What are the essential next steps?

Endless Warfare Requires a Different Strategic Mindset

Militaries are often criticized for planning to fight the last war. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was undermined by Russia’s underestimation of how much warfare had evolved since Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. The United States potentially faces that same risk today. It is important that we are prepared to fight and win the next conventional war, but there are risks in a focus on only that strategy. We must also prepare to fight and win—with the appropriate instruments of national power—the Endless Warfare being waged on the United States by its adversaries; warfare that incorporates gray zone activity, cognitive warfare, weaponized negotiations, proxies and surrogates, and other subversive networks.

This change in strategic mindset is not because of a lack of capability. The United States has considerable experience, resources, and capabilities in this space. Endless Warfare is conceptually different from conventional war—particularly given the ambiguous nature of gray-zone activity and cognitive warfare—and therefore demands a different approach.

Yet because it is a continuous state of conflict, it also requires the same level of national leadership and vision, organization, critical thinking, sense of urgency, and collaboration with allies that we apply to conventional conflict. This is achievable but will take some effort. It may require a senior White House official, such as a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Competition, to integrate interagency action and coordinate a sustained national response to this threat.

That Deputy National Security Advisor would not replace existing responsibilities of Departments and Agencies. The role would be to ensure that strategic deterrence in the gray zone, cognitive advantage, conflict negotiations when adversaries seek to extend rather than resolve conflict, and network disruptions are integrated into a coherent and sustained national response to the threat of Endless Warfare against the United States.

Strategic Deterrence in the Gray Zone

Strategic deterrence is one component of a broader approach to countering Endless Warfare. Gray zone activity is a powerful enabler of Endless Warfare because it gives our adversaries a space to undermine the United States while avoiding armed conflict.

Our adversaries have calculated that there are more gains than risks in the gray zone and that any risks they do face are acceptable. Actions that seek to counter or defend against gray zone activity but that do not impose meaningful costs or create credible deterrence may simply reward gray zone activity.

An effective strategy for achieving strategic deterrence in the gray zone rests on deliberate preparation, clear communication, a national approach, and the resolve to change the risk calculus of our adversaries.

Deliberate preparation means collecting and analyzing information on adversary gray zone trends, capabilities, and intent before they act; routinely coordinating at the national level so roles, responsibilities, and decision paths are clear; and reorienting institutions and the interagency to maintain effective balanced capability in both conventional and gray domains.

We also must communicate clearly domestically, to our allies, and particularly to our adversaries. A simple but clear message for our adversaries: “We will see what you’re doing, we will publicly attribute it to you, and we will impose costs that exceed your gains.”

This message is credible only if it is backed by action over time. The United States must convincingly demonstrate its resolve to proactively and persistently employ national capabilities to change the risk calculus and behavior of our adversaries.

This range of national capabilities includes coordinated diplomatic and allied action, economic sanctions and restrictions, cyber operations, legal and financial disruption, public attribution, denying access to critical technologies, cognitive measures, military posture and partner capability-building and—when necessary—kinetic responses. Recent examples illustrate that imposing costs is possible.

In 2021, the United States publicly attributed the SolarWinds supply-chain compromise to Russia, expelled Russian Intelligence Officers, and imposed broad financial penalties under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

In early 2025, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Company and associated individuals for their role in Salt Typhoon for attacks on network infrastructure of multiple major U.S. telecommunication and internet service providers.

These were hard-earned wins for U.S. Departments and Agencies involved, but Russia and China appear to have absorbed the costs and continued their operations. Achieving strategic deterrence means that actions like these must become the norm, not the exception.

The goal of strategic deterrence in the gray zone is to shape adversary decision-making before action is taken. It means proactively shaping the environment so adversaries hesitate before they act—a critical step in disrupting the cycle of Endless Warfare.

Gaining a Cognitive Advantage

Countering the impacts of cognitive warfare is essential to countering Endless Warfare. My colleague, Austin Branch, and I argued in The Cipher Brief that it was possible—and necessary—for the U.S. to seize a 21st-century cognitive advantage.

That argument is even more urgent today given the central role of cognitive warfare in our adversaries’ strategies of Endless Warfare. Cognitive Security, at its core, is the protection of human cognition and decision autonomy—our individual and collective ability to accurately perceive global events, to trust the knowledge we have and the information we receive, and to make confident, independent decisions free from external manipulation, influence, or coercion.

Cognitive Security is also about offense—outthinking, outpacing, and outmaneuvering our adversaries in the cognitive domain.

Our adversaries should understand that their leaders, institutions, networks, proxies—and decision-making—are vulnerable to cognitive pressure and influence. The goal is to force them—not the United States—to confront the uncertainties and risks of cognitive warfare and to weaken their ability to wage Endless Warfare.

There are some positive steps at the national level.

We now have a first-ever NSC Cognitive Advantage Director, and the FY26 NDAA directs the Secretary of Defense to formally define cognitive warfare for the Department. The Department’s Strategic Capabilities Office recently launched a Cognitive Warfare Project to advance the military’s cognitive warfare capabilities. There is clearly opportunity here.

Yet, these early steps remain fragmented. In contrast, China’s United Front Work Department, Russia’s Active Measures networks, and Iran’s diverse network of surrogates reflect centralized national direction and a long-term horizon as elements of a national strategy.

In this vital process, America’s approach has to be equally well-coordinated and strategic. It is essential that these new efforts avoid bureaucratic hurdles, over-prescription that may stifle innovation, and creating silos. Our adversaries will not wait for us to catch up.

Our national narrative—America’s Story—also plays an important role. As Branch and I argued in the Cipher Brief, our national narrative is both sword and shield. It projects power, influence, and advances our interests. It tells the story of our values, history, aspirations, and view of the world. It supports confidence in our actions, our institutions, and our global commitments.

Importantly, America’s Story counters adversary narratives and actions that seek to undermine America at home and abroad. It can serve as a powerful antidote to adversary campaigns that use cognitive warfare to sustain prolonged conflict. America’s Story was built at a time when much of the world saw America as liberator, peacemaker, builder, global diplomat, and above all, a powerful symbol of sacrifice, freedom, and self-determination. The long arc of America’s Story is its strength.

The United States cannot let this national narrative get lost in episodic political turbulence—its role in countering our adversaries is too vital.

Countering Weaponized Negotiations

In the era of Endless Warfare, adversaries often use negotiations as a continuation of conflict by other means—not as instruments of resolution. Negotiations can play an outsized role in Endless Warfare even though they only occur periodically. The central challenge is distinguishing when talks aim to legitimately resolve a conflict versus when they are designed to shape its next phase.

Today, drawing lessons directly from Russia’s behavior—from Georgia to Ukraine—and from Iran, several principles emerge that can strengthen our negotiating posture when facing adversaries that practice weaponized negotiations.

Those key principles include:

No upfront concessions. Make no upfront concessions to get an adversary to the negotiating table. Such actions erode diplomatic, economic, and military leverage and can shape the entire negotiations on unfavorable terms.

Establish clear overarching objectives and non-negotiable redlines early. This preserves decision autonomy, provides a framework for decision-making, and prevents adversaries from reshaping objectives to their advantage.

Proactively counter narratives. During negotiations over Ukraine, Russia repeatedly pushed narratives, such as “Ukraine can never win” and “territory concessions are inevitable,” to shape Western perceptions of what constituted a realistic outcome. Anticipating and countering false narratives ensures negotiations are not manipulated.

Concessions must be conditions-based. Any concessions given during negotiations must be based on measurable, verifiable actions with automatic snap-back mechanisms if commitments are violated.

Be willing to walk away. The desire for any agreement should never outweigh core national security interests. Suspending or ending talks is better than enabling or accepting a settlement that resets the conflict in an adversary’s favor.

Chester Karrass put it plainly, in life you don’t get what you deserve, you get what you negotiate. This is a powerful counter to American assumptions that raw power or battlefield success will carry the day at the negotiating table.

Countering Endless Warfare Networks

These measures—deterrence, cognitive advantage, and managing weaponized negotiations—greatly improve America’s posture, but they do not by themselves disrupt Endless Warfare networks.

The ultimate goal is systematically confronting the adversary networks that pose an enduring threat to the U.S. These networks fall into two broad categories: state institutional structures and more ambiguous structures that blur the line between state and non-state activity.

Institutional networks include military organizations, intelligence services, party organizations, proxy structures, and state-directed organizations such as IRGC-QF, MSS, GRU, and FSB, as well as the specialized units responsible for assassinations and sabotage, influence operations, and cyber-attacks as a few examples.

Ambiguous networks include ghost fleets, shell and front companies, criminal organizations, illicit financial systems, logistics systems influence networks, cyber hacktivists, proxy militias, smuggling organizations, and other similar entities.

These networks are not abstract. Iran, Russia, and China employ different approaches to Endless Warfare, but each illustrates how adversaries develop and employ both institutional and ambiguous networks to achieve persistent strategic objectives over a long timeframe. Just as a few examples:

Iran’s network of proxies and surrogates, built over decades, allows Iran to project power, coerce and intimidate its neighbors, and get inside the decision space of its adversaries at relatively low cost. The IRGC is an enabler of Iran’s distributed networks with global reach.

Russia’s networks conduct cognitive warfare against the U.S. and the West and conduct sabotage, assassinations, and political coercion across Europe. Russia’s “ghost fleets” have allowed it to generate billions in revenue despite Western sanctions.

China’s Cyber networks probe and penetrate U.S. critical infrastructure to sustain access, collect information, and provide a disruption capability during a crisis. Its networks enable sophisticated influence operations inside the U.S. and the transfer of critical technologies that directly enhance its military capabilities.

Shared and overlapping networks in gray and ambiguous spaces play a critical role. Ghost fleets, front companies, terror networks, illicit financial organizations, and criminal enterprises allow adversaries to bypass sanctions, sustain operations, and reduce international pressure.

Some of these networks are visible and attributable, others are intentionally obscured and decentralized to complicate attribution and defy sovereignty, international law, and national laws, including those of the U.S. We should expect our adversaries to fiercely protect these resilient, adaptive, and self-recovering networks they have carefully developed over time, often over decades, to gain and sustain a strategic advantage.

The critical question is how the U.S. can systematically reduce the effectiveness of these networks.

To paraphrase H.L. Mencken, for every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. That is the dilemma facing the U.S. now. Overly simplistic approaches or single solutions that do not take into account the complexities of Endless Warfare and the commitment of our adversaries to that approach will consume time and resources but ultimately fail.

Countering Endless Warfare requires a sustained, network-centric strategy employing the instruments of national power—diplomatic, military, economic, technological, informational, cognitive, and kinetic—rather than a series of independent actions. This strategy consists of three mutually reinforcing lines of effort built on one foundational principle.

First, identify and prioritize the networks that pose the greatest long-term threat to the United States. There are no official estimates of this ecosystem of networks—and what constitutes a network has not been clearly defined—but Iran, Russia, and China, collectively direct or enable a very large number institutional, commercial, criminal, cyber, intelligence, influence, and proxy networks worldwide.

Second, sustain campaigns to daylight, degrade, disrupt, and impose costs on institutional networks that conduct and oversee attacks on the United States and our allies. It is unlikely that the U.S. can dismantle foreign institutional networks, but those networks can be degraded, constrained, and made costly and less effective.

Third, dismantle, disrupt, and prevent the regeneration of ambiguous networks by severing the financial, logistical, technological, and organizational systems that support them. This is not a one-time activity. Ambiguous networks are more vulnerable, but they are often adaptive and can regenerate or be replaced.

Cognitive Security and Cyber Defenses have a combined vital role to play. None of these efforts will succeed unless American citizens, business leaders, military commanders, and policy makers are less vulnerable to influence, manipulation, and coercion—preserving America’s decision autonomy—and unless governments, institutions, organizations, and critical infrastructure are less vulnerable to technological exploitation and disruption.

Summary

The concepts in this paper are difficult to neatly categorize because they describe a form of warfare that is not fully defined. As conventional warfare evolves, so do the more nuanced aspects of warfare that take place below and above the threshold of conflict and in the ambiguous space between peace and war. I offer four takeaways.

First, Endless Warfare is a distinct adversary strategy already underway by China, Russia, and Iran and should be treated as a current strategic threat—not just a future one.

Second, endless Warfare is sustained by sophisticated and interconnected networks that must become a primary target for U.S. and allied efforts.

Third, countering Endless Warfare requires a proactive, persistent, and network-centric approach backed by national-level leadership, a new framework for strategic planning, a sense of urgency, and coordinated interagency action. Is ittime to consider a senior White House official, such as a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Competition, to integrate interagency action and coordinate a sustained national response to this threat?

Fourth, strategic deterrence in the gray zone, cognitive advantage, disciplined negotiations, and network-focused disruption are core tools of that sustained national response to make Endless Warfare increasingly ineffective, costly, and ultimately unsustainable for China, Russia, and Iran.

Endless Warfare will not end because our adversaries choose peace. It will end when it is no longer effective.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief