Artem Stryzhak was sentenced to 70 months in prison after pleading guilty to using Nefilim ransomware in attacks.
The post Ukrainian Hive and Nefilim Ransomware Affiliate Gets 70 Months in US Prison appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Japan’s GMO Internet Group urged Onamae.com Desktop Cloud customers to back up their data, disconnect computers from networks, shut them down, and unplug connected cables after suspected attackers threatened to publish customer information and launch ransomware at noon on October 27. The emergency instructions followed unauthorized access to the company’s cloud desktop service and an […]
The post Japan’s GMO Internet Warns Customers to Unplug PCs as Hackers Threaten Ransomware appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
See what you missed in Daily Tech Insider from Oct. 19–23.
The post This Week in Tech: AI Agents Clock In as Apple Buyers Wait and IT Scrambles appeared first on TechRepublic.
See what you missed in Daily Tech Insider from Oct. 19–23.
The post This Week in Tech: AI Agents Clock In as Apple Buyers Wait and IT Scrambles appeared first on TechRepublic.
It’s no longer a proper month without Microsoft breaking its own record for security fixes, and October’s Patch Tuesday was no exception. Brian Krebs brings the roundup: more than 1,400 vulnerabilities fixed in a single batch, dwarfing September’s record of nearly 1,000, which itself was about ten times the normal monthly load. According to Tenable, Microsoft has now passed 4,000 CVEs for the year with two months still to go.
Only one of the fixes is for a vulnerability already being exploited in the wild: CVE-2026-96951, a security feature bypass in the Windows Shell affecting Windows 10, 11, and some Server versions. A .NET Framework bypass, CVE-2026-108398, was publicly disclosed before the patch, giving attackers a head start, and with modern AI tooling, it seems like not much of a head start is needed. At least 78 of the bugs are rated critical, and most of those allow remote code execution with little or no user interaction. Windows 10 holdouts can relax a little: Microsoft quietly extended free updates through October 2027. Given the pace of exploitation, this is probably the only way to prevent an Internet-scale meltdown.
Microsoft credits LLM-driven bug hunting for the volume, which leaves the poor admins who have to test and deploy all of this in an unenviable spot. Fortra’s analysis shows that only 26 Microsoft vulnerabilities have landed in the CISA KEV catalog of actively exploited bugs so far this year, so start there. For the rest, the SANS Internet Storm Center and Cisco Talos have the usual breakdowns by severity. Or, you know, just patch everything and hope for the best, which is roughly what everyone does anyhow.
Originally I was calling this the “big one” for the week, but this week that just keeps on giving. The private keys for eight eMudhra intermediate certificates have been compromised, and the way they were compromised is going to be a security talk punchline for years. Remember the Debian SSL and SSH key debacle? Of that scale.
Some background first. When your browser connects to a website over HTTPS, the site presents a certificate saying “I am example.com”, signed by a Certificate Authority (CA). Your browser and OS ship with a list of trusted root CAs, but roots are too valuable to use day to day, so they sign intermediate certificates, and the intermediates sign the actual website certificates. Whoever holds an intermediate’s private key can mint a certificate for any website, and every client that trusts the root will believe it. The whole system depends on those keys staying secret, and on them being generated properly in the first place.
eMudhra, an Indian CA which sells certificates under the emSign brand, had six TLS intermediates and two code-signing intermediates chaining to the emSign ECC Root CA – G3, which is trusted by Chrome and Apple, and Mozilla. A researcher identified only as Wayne proved the keys were compromised by signing the message “We have a problem here – Wayne” with each of them and sending it to the root programs.
How did Wayne get the keys? Flüpke posted one on Mastodon, and the secret value for the “EM OV TLS CA – G3C” key is… 4. Not four followed by 380 bits of randomness: the integer four. A reply quickly brute-forced the rest, and they’re all equally tiny: 56, 230, 237, 115, 155, 156, and 66. The keys were “incorrectly generated by the CA”, and anyone could recover them from the public certificates, which has been true since they were created in April 2025.
The browsers moved fast. According to The Hacker News, Chrome pushed a block within two hours of the report, and Mozilla blocked the certificates in under three, pulled the root from NSS, and shipped Firefox updates (CVE-2026-113470) for anyone with automatic updates disabled. There are no Certificate Transparency logs of rogue certificates, so modern browsers were never at risk. Everything that isn’t a browser is going to be the real problem and the extremely long tail of this fault: plenty of software never checks for revoked certificates and keeps trusting these keys until its bundled root list is updated.
Go hard-coded the eight bad keys into its standard library (CVE-2026-111943), but as Penligent points out, that only protects Go programs once they’re rebuilt with the new release. Python, Rust, Java, Node.js, curl, and most Linux distributions have updated root bundles, and the we-have-a-problem.com site has a full list, a checker, and manual workarounds for macOS, whose built-in curl and git don’t check revocation. There are also fixes for Linux, Windows, and the BSDs. Update everything, then go rebuild everything you compiled yourself. And then wonder how you’re going to update appliances, IoT devices, cameras, and everything else that fetches code over HTTPS or SSL.
PHP, the language behind a significant percentage of the web had a rough week. WordPress, Drupal, Magento, phpMyAdmin, and just about every hosting control panel, major ecommerce sites, home project blogs, and even Hackaday itself was potentially impacted. Details of two critical vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, leaked onto Hacker News a day ahead of the embargo, and Huntress covers the scramble that followed as PHP rushed its release out early. Now that patches are available, Ryan Austin of Calif has published the full writeup, demonstrating pre-authentication remote code execution against important apps on default configurations, in PHP versions back to 5.4.0. That’s over a decade of PHP.
The trick is an old one, first found by Stefan Esser back in 2004. PHP enforces a memory limit for each request, and when a request exceeds it, PHP stops immediately with a fatal error. If that happens in the middle of native code updating some internal structure, the structure is left half-built, and the cleanup code that runs afterward trusts it anyhow. That’s a classic “use-after-free” style bug, where the program uses memory that’s already been released or was never properly set up, and those are frequently exploitable. Calif found ways to reliably push a request over the memory limit at exactly the right moment (deeply nested empty file uploads turn out to balloon into hundreds of megabytes of internal tables, while staying under PHP’s upload size limits), and three different places where the interruption leaves a dangerous mess. Austin found the first bug with a generally available LLM, but only because he knew PHP’s twenty-year history of memory-limit bugs well enough to point it in the right direction.
Amazon reports that its honeypots caught a php2shell exploitation attempt on October 17th, four days before the embargo lifted, and that it’s now being broadly exploited. Their advice is worth repeating: for critical bugs on internet-facing systems, measure your patch window in hours, not weeks, and start investigating from the earliest exploitation date, not the disclosure date. If you can’t patch right now, Calif suggests disabling session.upload_progress and removing the memory limit, which comes with its own obvious problems.
One word of caution: alongside the legitimate writeups, there are many self-published “corrected findings” and “proof-of-concept” posts that can’t seem to decide whether their own exploit works, while offering a downloadable “weaponized” bundle. A leaked-bug panic is the perfect time to hand anxious admins a zip file. Read the real advisories, and don’t run random proof-of-concept bundles.
Quentin Kaiser has the long-form writeup of his Hexacon talk on a bug in Broadcom’s WiFi stack, present since at least 2010, which gives an attacker a root shell on a router from across the street. So called “parking lot” attacks that can happen from someone not even on your property have long been the boogeymen of WiFi security, and it’s been a little bit since we’ve gotten a new one.
The bug lives in WPS, WiFi Protected Setup: the “push the button on your router and then on your printer” pairing system that was supposed to save people from typing long WiFi passwords. WPS has a long and spotty security history, and this bug can be triggered over the air without knowing the network password, and without completing a WPS pairing. Kaiser’s demos show him pulling the WiFi password straight out of a router’s settings and sending it back over WiFi, and getting a fully interactive remote shell carried entirely over WiFi frames. No Internet connection required.
The really grim part is the patch history. Broadcom quietly released an incomplete fix in 2018, then suggested vendors switch to the open-source hostapd instead. For the older eCos-based chipsets that’s effectively never going to happen, which makes it a permanent “forever-day”. Broadcom refused to assign a CVE, and because Broadcom is its own CVE authority, CERT/CC closed Kaiser’s case the same day it was opened.
As of disclosure, the cable and DSL gateways he tested from three of Belgium’s four major ISPs were still vulnerable, and his napkin math puts it at over a million and a half devices in Belgium alone. Broadcom chips are, of course, sold everywhere. If you’re running ISP-provided hardware, there isn’t much you can do about the firmware. Turning off WPS can’t hurt if your router allows it, although Kaiser doesn’t say whether that blocks the attack. Disabling the gateway’s own WiFi and running your own access point that you can actually update is the safer bet.
GitLab has released fixes for CVE-2026-110264, a maximum-severity CVSS 10.0 bug allowing unauthenticated attackers to run code on self-hosted GitLab servers. The flaw is an integer overflow when compiling a specially crafted regular expression in Onigmo, the Ruby regex engine which GitLab bundles into its own packages, so it affects every version back to GitLab 7.0 in 2014.
This is the fourth regex engine code execution bug from the same researcher in about a month (after CVE-2026-97229, CVE-2026-93577, and CVE-2026-89078), and comes with a nasty gotcha: the new fixed versions are one release past the October 12th fix, so if you diligently patched nine days ago, you’re vulnerable again. GitLab hasn’t said what’s needed to trigger the bug, so there’s no configuration workaround. If you’re running GitLab at home or in the shop, patch, and budget for some downtime while the database migrations run.
Node.js shipped security updates for the 22, 24, and 26 branches, headlined by CVE-2026-111497, an out-of-bounds write in the bundled Brotli decompression library. Vercel’s advisory notes that researchers have demonstrated both memory leaks and command execution.
Node doesn’t decompress Brotli data on its own, but plenty of applications and libraries do, whether on incoming requests or on responses fetched from other servers. Vercel deployed firewall rules for traffic coming into its own platform, but no firewall can protect your code from a malicious response it goes and fetches itself. Node 20 is end-of-life and won’t be fixed. As a bonus, the same releases carry the eMudhra certificate distrust, so that’s two reasons to go update.
HTTP/3 is the newest version of the protocol behind the web, running over QUIC (a UDP-based transport) instead of TCP. To save bandwidth, it compresses request headers using a scheme called QPACK: common headers can be sent as a one-byte reference into a table instead of the full text. Compression is great for bandwidth, but any time a small input can turn into a big output, there’s a risk of a “decompression bomb”. Similar tricks resulted in “zip bombs” in the 2000s, and what’s old is new again.
FoxIO found exactly that in seven of the ten HTTP/3 implementations they tested. One approach packs about 160,000 unique short headers into a single 1MB request; another stores one 4KB header and then references it thousands of times, a 4000-to-1 amplification. The HTTP/3 spec already says how to limit the decoded size, but implementations got it wrong in every possible way: checking only the compressed size, decompressing everything before checking, ignoring the per-header overhead, or reading the limit setting and then never enforcing it.
Fixed so far are quic-go (CVE-2025-64702), which is used by Caddy, Traefik, and Cloudflare’s tunnels; Cloudflare’s quiche (CVE-2026-12523); lsquic 4.9.0; and even Wireshark (CVE-2025-13945), whose QPACK decoder crashed during testing. Bun, the hyperium h3 Rust crate, and aioquic/mitmproxy remain unpatched. Bun gets special mention for an integer overflow that turns a single 516KB request into a permanent 100% CPU infinite loop. The lesson applies to any compression format: limit the decompressed size as you go, not just the bytes on the wire.
Patrick Wardle of Objective-See digs into Heartbreaker, macOS ransomware written in Rust that has sat on VirusTotal since May 2025, undetected by every antivirus engine.
Most antivirus detection relies on signatures: a hash or byte pattern identifying a known-bad file. Metamorphic malware tries to dodge signatures by rewriting itself so every copy looks different while behaving the same. Heartbreaker takes a delightfully brute-force approach: it carries its own Rust source code inside the binary, and after running, it shuffles variable names, adds junk functions, installs a Rust compiler if one isn’t present, recompiles itself, and replaces itself with the new build. It is about as subtle as a brick through a window.
As ransomware it’s not very scary. It only encrypts the Downloads folder, and uses the same hard-coded key for every victim, so Wardle simply wrote a decryptor. The rebuilding also depends on a GitHub library which has since disappeared, so it mostly fails anyhow. Wardle uses it to demonstrate his free RansomWhere? tool, which ignores signatures completely and instead watches for an untrusted process rapidly writing files that look encrypted (using a bit of entropy math). The malware can change its hash all day long, but to ransom anything it still has to encrypt the files, and that’s much harder to disguise.
TeamUpdraft, the company behind the very popular UpdraftPlus WordPress backup plugin, disclosed a breach of their customer database over the weekend. Names, emails, addresses, hashed passwords, and two-factor authentication settings were taken, and more worryingly, the connection keys for UpdraftCentral, their cloud dashboard for managing many WordPress sites at once. UpdraftPlus previously made an appearance back in June, when a vulnerability in the plugin was used in the Awesome Motive supply chain attack.
Those UpdraftCentral keys can send commands to every connected site, which turns one vendor breach into a remote control for potentially thousands of customer websites. TeamUpdraft has released UpdraftPlus 1.26.12 and 2.26.12, which automatically disconnect the old keys. If you or anyone you know manages WordPress sites through UpdraftCentral, log in to each site directly, update the plugin, and check for unexpected admin accounts and plugins (including the easy-to-miss “Must-Use” plugins tab).
Citizen Lab has published research showing that the Israeli ad-tech company Discover-Tech helped deliver spyware through ordinary online ads, targeting at least 45 devices at the news outlet Al Jazeera in 2024 and 2025. Citizen Lab attributes the spyware to Candiru, a commercial spyware vendor.
When you load a web page with ads, the ad slot is typically auctioned off in real time to the highest bidder, based on a profile of who you seem to be. This “programmatic advertising” system is, by design, a mechanism for running third-party content on a very specific person’s device. It’s easy to see why that’s attractive to a spyware vendor. According to Citizen Lab, Discover-Tech’s platform could profile users and infect a device just by displaying an ad, no click required. CPJ reports that the company’s ads reached nearly 200,000 websites and apps, and researchers at Confiant found them on government networks including the US Department of Defense, NATO, and the UN.
Malicious ads are nothing new, but this is the first public evidence of an ad platform being used for targeted, zero-click spyware delivery. “Don’t click on ads” has always been good advice. An ad blocker isn’t just a quality-of-life improvement; it’s attack surface reduction.
Last week we covered a ransomware “recovery” CEO charged with secretly paying ransoms while billing customers for decryption. This week, Brian Krebs reports that investigators chasing ShinyHunters (the group behind the FBI hack) have identified executives at two ransomware negotiation firms with unusually friendly relationships with the gang. Chats seized when Dutch police arrested a suspected ShinyHunters member reportedly show negotiators who knew about new victims before the victims themselves did. One Canadian executive has already been arrested, and investigators believe an executive at an unnamed, prestigious US consulting firm helped run the gang’s extortion website.
It’s not the first time: the DOJ sentenced Florida negotiator Angelo Martino to 70 months in July for feeding his own clients’ negotiating positions to the BlackCat ransomware gang, and for helping deploy ransomware against even more victims. The government seized $10 million in assets from him, including a luxury fishing boat and, for reasons unknown, a food truck.
Part of the problem is structural. Some negotiation firms charge a percentage of the ransom paid, which gives the “negotiator” every incentive to pay, and pay big. Firms which refuse to facilitate payments often just get swapped out by the insurance company for ones that will. Meanwhile, ShinyHunters is reportedly furious with Coveware, an incident response firm, for telling victims not to pay, which is probably the best endorsement Coveware could ask for.
The Verge reports that security firm Norforge found an attacker using a swarm of mostly autonomous AI agents to break into more than 100 websites, including sites belonging to John Deere, SharkNinja, and Cummins. The agents ran on Cairn, an open-source “general-purpose problem-solving engine”: you give it a starting point and a goal, and the agents work toward it while documenting their progress. That documentation is how they were caught: the attacker’s Cairn instance was exposed to the Internet, along with about 20 others that appear malicious.
According to Reuters, the attacker described their preferred intrusion tactics in fewer than 100 Chinese characters, and each successful breach took about 23 hours. The victims say the impacted sites were standalone support pages, and Cairn’s author insists it was “never a ‘hacking tool'”. Many tools can be double-edged, but the effort balance here is hard to ignore: a short prompt and a day of waiting on one side, and defenders who have to close every hole on the other.
404 Media pieced together, from an unsealed search warrant, that a Chinese organized crime ring hacked Staples in 2023 and issued more than 15,000 gift cards worth over $5 million. Staples’ internal customer support system was supposed to be reachable only from inside the company, but wasn’t. The attackers requested “heap dumps”, a debugging feature which captures everything an application has in memory, and pulled out the active login sessions of customer service reps. With those, they simply logged in as the reps and issued gift cards. A similar trick was used in a hack of payment data from Target years ago, where attackers leveraged access through the air conditioner control network into the cash register network, and then dumped credit cards directly from RAM as they were processed.
If you’ve ever wondered why debugging endpoints left exposed in production show up in every penetration test report, this is why. The gift cards were then laundered the old-fashioned way: crews of shoppers hitting Target stores with phones full of gift cards, buying Apple and Bose gear by the cartload (about $141,000 across 85 Target stores in 18 states in two days), with the goods shipped back to China. The larger ring this fed into reportedly moved over $100 million in gift cards.
An extortion group calling itself FulcrumSec has posted a leak site claiming a massive breach of PingCAP, makers of the TiDB Cloud managed database service. The group claims it found cloud credentials committed to PingCAP’s own source code repositories, and used them to set up a replication feed of PingCAP’s production control database that re-exported everything to the attackers every six hours for 22 days, without being noticed.
The claims haven’t been independently verified, but they’re very specific: 10.6TB of data, 115,000 customer API keys stored in plaintext, 20 million customer SQL queries, four years of connection logs with customer IP addresses, and 413 private source repositories. The attackers quote a 2022 internal security ticket noting that any member of a customer organization, even a billing-only account, could reset the root password on every database in that organization. Perhaps most damaging, support engineers allegedly pasted live customer credentials into support tickets, including cloud keys with admin access to other companies’ storage. If you’re a TiDB Cloud customer, assume your API keys, connection strings, and anything ever pasted into a support ticket are burned, and rotate accordingly.
Android Authority found a fake WhatsApp app on Google Play with over half a million downloads, a week after a fake Chrome app racked up over 100,000. The fake copied the real listing’s screenshots and description word for word, and in some cases appeared as a sponsored result when searching for the real app.
The trick that let it linger is Google Play’s “Early Access” program, which disables public reviews. Normally a fake app gets buried in one-star “THIS IS A SCAM” reviews; in Early Access, nobody can see them. As of publication it was still available. “Only install from the official store” is still good advice for family members, but it’s a little less reassuring when the official store is selling ad placement to the fake.
Back in September, we covered a serious vulnerability in Muse, Meta’s extremely privileged AI agent. This week, Meta suspended Muse’s chat sharing feature after researchers at Claroc found they could find and read thousands of shared conversations.
Each shared chat got its own web address, with the conversation title as part of the hostname. Hostnames get looked up in DNS, and many DNS lookups are recorded by “passive DNS” services, essentially a giant searchable history of which names have been resolved. One search returned a ready-made table of contents of shared chats. Claroc found 6,800 of them, including a small business loan application, a bank fraud alert with partial account details, and internal company documents. “Secret URL” sharing only works if the URL stays secret, and putting the secret in a DNS hostname is roughly the opposite of that.
The UK Information Commissioner’s Office reprimanded IT provider Ogi Networks and the Welsh public sector data organization Data Cymru over a 2024 ransomware attack which exposed data on 3,300 people, most of them children. The way in? A test account named “Test2”, created in 2012, never reviewed, and protected with the password “Password1”. The local administrator accounts on three systems also shared a single password for the same twelve years.
There’s nothing exotic here, sadly. Old accounts nobody remembers, passwords that would fall to the first guess of any automated tool, and an outsourcing arrangement where each side assumed the other was handling security. None of it makes for exciting headlines, but these are the things that keep causing very real breaches.
As a follow-up to last week’s coverage of hardware implants in Ledger crypto wallets, Kim Zetter reports that Trezor’s claim of “not a single piece of evidence” that its devices were compromised doesn’t quite line up with reality. Joe Grand found implants in two Trezor wallets, bought through Facebook Marketplace and a TikTok shop, and reported them to Trezor in August.
The Trezor attack is different from the Ledger implant. Instead of adding a radio to spy on the screen, the attackers replaced the main microcontroller with one running modified (open source) firmware. The firmware “randomly” generates one of a dozen recovery phrases the attackers already know. To pass Trezor’s integrity checks, it presents a copy of the legitimate firmware for verification before switching to the malicious code. The takeaway hasn’t changed from last week: buy only directly from the vendor, and if you’re holding enough crypto to make this worth someone’s while, consider whether you can really trust any single device.
F5 has released out-of-band (meaning outside their normal patch schedule) updates for three critical vulnerabilities in NGINX, the web server and reverse proxy that sits in front of a huge chunk of the Internet, and quite possibly in front of the services on your home lab. The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore has a summary: all three are rated CVSS 9.2, can be triggered remotely without authentication, and can crash worker processes or, under the right conditions, allow remote code execution.
The bugs are CVE-2026-15176, a heap overflow in the “alias” and “rewrite” directives; CVE-2026-97205, a use-after-free in asynchronous file I/O combined with Server Side Includes; and CVE-2026-93479, a heap overflow in the “map” directive. Code execution requires the vulnerable configuration to be in use, and requires bypassing ASLR (the randomization of memory layout which makes exploits harder to aim). Affected versions include NGINX Open Source 1.30.5 and below and 1.31.6 and below, NGINX Plus R33 through R37, and a long list of F5’s NGINX-based products, including the Kubernetes Ingress Controller.
Back in May we covered “nginx-poolslip”, where the suggested mitigation was to avoid unnamed regex capture groups in rewrite rules. The mitigation for the “map” bug this time? Use named captures instead of unnamed captures. If you’ve been putting off cleaning up those “$1” references in your config, now’s the time. For the other two, avoid “alias” inside “location” blocks (and the “$request_filename” variable), or disable AIO or SSI, until you can update.
Normally, security bugs in the Linux kernel are reported privately to the kernel security team, which coordinates a fix before details go public. This is “coordinated disclosure”: the bug and fix are published together, ideally giving admins a chance to patch before attackers can start writing exploits. The Linux Kernel Mailing List (LKML), on the other hand, is about as public as it gets.
Phoronix reports that Trend Micro’s Zero Day Initiative, seemingly by accident, sent a batch of unpatched vulnerability reports straight to LKML. Greg Kroah-Hartman replied to each report asking about the choice of mailing list, which I can only imagine was done with remarkable restraint. The most serious two are both CVSS 9.0 remote code execution bugs in ksmbd, the kernel’s built-in SMB (Windows file sharing) server: an integer underflow in SMB Direct, and a race condition. The rest include local privilege escalation bugs in the networking code, the VMware graphics driver (an out-of-bounds write), and a stack overflow in search-domain TCP query handling, plus an information leak in the NVMe-over-fabrics target code.
Some of the bugs already have patches being tested or queued for future kernel releases, and those will presumably be expedited now. Most systems don’t run ksmbd (the userspace Samba server is far more common), but if you’ve enabled it on a NAS or a home server, it’s worth disabling until patched kernels land. As Phoronix puts it: “the bug and security reports keep on coming in the AI fueled world.”
The Everest ransomware group has reportedly stolen around 590GB of data linked to PwC, one of the Big Four professional services firms. The claim concerns internal human resources and learning systems, but it remains unverified, as no independent reports have confirmed it. A post shared by Crypto India states that the alleged theft includes 108,426 […]
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The third quarter of 2026 saw the highest number of ransomware attacks to date, with 2,627 total attacks, according to a new report from Comparitech.
Rapid7’s Q3 analysis finds high-severity flaws exploited within three days on average, while AI appeared in just 8% of tracked incidents.
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The Gentlemen ransomware operation is abusing legitimate Lenovo and Safetica kernel drivers to terminate security software, weakening endpoint defenses before encryption. Acronis Threat Research Unit researchers identified two custom dropper samples during a recent incident, exposing how the group weaponizes vulnerable drivers rather than relying exclusively on conventional process termination commands The technique, known as […]
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CISA has warned that SafePay ransomware actors have compromised at least 600 organizations across multiple critical infrastructure sectors, combining data theft and encryption with deliberate attacks on backup systems to obstruct recovery. The October 20, 2026, joint advisory describes operations spanning North America, South America, Europe, and Australia since August 2024. Published with the FBI, […]
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Ransomware affiliates associated with INC and The Gentlemen exposed an intrusion ecosystem after leaving operational servers publicly accessible. The investigation began in late September 2026 with open directories on 45.227.254[.]43. Configuration files and credentials led researchers to six additional adversary servers, exposing development infrastructure, command infrastructure and ransomware staging systems. The findings describe an active […]
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Ransomware operators are using generative AI to sharpen phishing campaigns, speed up reconnaissance, and identify sensitive corporate information to steal. Zscaler ThreatLabz describes a shift toward faster, more selective extortion, where attackers prioritize damaging disclosures rather than relying exclusively on file encryption. That represents a 275.8% annual increase. These figures establish the scale of theft, […]
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Critical Internet keys changed this week. Did you notice? The keys behind DNSSEC, the system for cryptographically validating DNS responses, rolled over on October 11 2026. This is the second time the DNSSEC keys have rotated since the system was implemented, and the first time in 2018 didn’t exactly go entirely smoothly.
DNS is what resolves a host name and turns it into an IP address. It underpins web browsing, email, and just about every other connection. It’s also a very early Internet protocol, written in both a simpler, less paranoid era, and an era where encryption was computationally expensive and legally problematic. DNS offers little protection against malicious actors spoofing responses, and the impacts range from phishing to redirecting email to just about any other manipulation of connections you can image.
DNSSEC addresses this by creating a chain of trust between DNS resolvers — the servers that forward the DNS query into the DNS infrastructure and return the results — and the global DNS servers. Part of this chain of trust is the root key that each resolver must have and trust, and this key is what changed this week. DNSSEC resolvers automatically watch for a new root of trust key, but the key must be signed by the previous root of trust, and is checked for at least 30 days before it is trusted. If someone were able to issue a bogus certificate, they would have to maintain control of the infrastructure for over a month before DNS resolvers would trust it.
The process of distributing the new key actually began more than a year ago, on January 11, 2025, to give DNSSEC resolvers time to get the new key. DNSSEC services should have had plenty of time to obtain and trust the new key, and unless DNS stopped working for you this week, they did their job.
The next major change for DNSSEC will require more profound changes to deploy a new signing algorithm that will be post-quantum secure.
BleepingComputer reports that the CEO of a company advertising services for recovering from ransomware attacks has been charged with fraud.
The company advertised that it could help with recovering from a ransomware attack by providing decryption services to unlock the ransomed files. Instead, the CEO of the company is accused of negotiating a ransom payment with the attackers and charging the victims a premium on top of the ransom.
In addition to fraudulent claims of decrypting the data without a ransom, this could fall foul of embargo laws against paying ransomware operators in some countries, or be against customer policy regarding payments.
The charges detail incidents in which the ransomware operators were paid $9,800, while the victims were charged $150,000 for “recovery”, and claim the company overall paid more than $8 million in ransom fees while charging customers $18 million.
Several weeks ago, commissaries operated by the United States military suffered a series of refrigeration failures. Units on multiple bases in multiple states and countries entered defrost mode, which activated heaters, spoiling food overnight. This week, hundreds of supermarkets in France have suffered the same issue, with units heating up and some even reportedly catching fire.
The attack started Sunday night, and not only triggers defrost mode, but seems to force the units to stay in defrost mode for a prolonged period. Losses are estimated to reach over $300,000. French prosecutors have called for investigations of the wide-spread attacks.
Clearly, a vulnerability has been found in the refrigeration controllers connected to the Internet, and fingers are being pointed at the Danfoss brand, which is also used by the US military bases. Researcher Kevin Beaumont points out that it may not even be a traditional vulnerability: Many of the units are directly connected to the Internet, with the username “admin”, and a password that changes daily. Unfortunately, the password changes to the current date. “Every single one is like this. You can just log in and change the temperature. Anybody can do it, easily.”
An OpenAI employee was charged with spying after being caught placing “sophisticated listening devices” in meeting rooms, hidden in toilet paper: the most sophisticated of camouflage.
Employees discovered the device approximately two days after it was placed, according to the report. Ironically, logs indicate the employee used OpenAI’s own chatbot to help design the device and identify locations for it. Photos of the device look like it a SEEED Studio ESP32 device, a dev board likely very familiar to readers.
The US supermarket chains Stop & Shop and Hannaford, which share a common owner, seem to have been hacked. There aren’t many details available yet, but multiple news sources in multiple states are reporting that the stores have taken their websites and online ordering completely offline, however stores remain open.
The company says it does not currently believe that customer payment details were part of the compromise.
Kim Zetter brings the report of crypto thefts via hardware implanted in Ledger wallets.
Hardware wallets are offered as the panacea every time another crypto heist or supply-chain stealer makes the rounds. The idea is simple: private keys stay on the device and never touch your daily-driver, which is surely contaminated with keyloggers and trojans. The crypto transaction is built on the host and hands it to the device, the wallet device then solves it with the private keys and returns the signature. The only user interface is typically a screen display, which is exactly where the physical supply chain hack against Ledger happened.
The implants, found mainly in Ledger Nano X devices so far, sit dormant until the owner sets up the wallet. When the device shows the new recovery seed on its screen, the implant reads each character and sends the seed out through its own LTE modem, antenna, and eSIM. The implant never touches the host computer or the users WiFi network. The secure storage inside the wallet is never compromised: the hardware implant spies directly on the LCD to read the recovery keys as displayed to the user.
Blockchain analytics firm Bitquery links about 315 drained accounts, roughly $102 million in Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tron and others, to devices sold by CryptoBilis: that’s Ledger’s authorized reseller for Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
[Joe Grand], a hardware hacker often featured here and the force behind many DEFCON conference badges, began looking in August 2025 after a Reddit post from someone who had bought a wallet on a Thai marketplace. [Joe] bought eight more Nano X units and found implants in four of them. This was reported to Ledger in March of 2026, but according to [Grand], Ledger didn’t follow up for months.
Then in September, Mark Karpelès, the former Mt. Gox CEO, published a teardown showing how the implants have evolved. The first generation used hand-soldered wires to the screen. The second used a transparent orange flex circuit laminated onto the board, with a smaller battery to make room. The third uses a black-coated flex with the part numbers scraped off and a custom antenna. A Japan-based researcher who examined ten Nano X and two Flex devices found five distinct implant designs. They traced the eSIM traffic to an Alibaba-managed data center in Hong Kong, with at least 90 implants reporting seeds there in June alone.
Ledger’s official position is that a “limited number” of devices came from a single seller. It says there is no sign that its own systems were compromised, and it has told resellers to buy only through authorized channels and “never to restock returned products. That last line points at a likely route: buy wallets, implant them, return them, and let them go back on the shelf.
Despite the claims of a single compromised seller, a user named [Johannes] found implants in two Nano X units bought at MediaMarkt stores in Europe, and MediaMarkt is a listed authorized reseller with around a thousand stores across ten countries. There are also reports of implanted Flex devices, and Stax reports that are still unverified. Trezor has started trimming its own authorized-seller list as a “preventive step.” Attribution is still unknown.
CryptoBilis changed ownership earlier this year under an NDA that only recently expired, which has raised eyebrows. Zetter is careful to note that there’s no evidence connecting CryptoBilis to the implants or the thefts.
The takeaway is uncomfortable for anyone who has told people to “just buy a hardware wallet”. The threat model always assumed the device itself was trustworthy, and “buy direct from the vendor” was advice for being extra careful. Now it’s the minimum. Tamper-evident packaging clearly isn’t enough against someone with a lamination process and a parts budget. The options get less fun from here: open the case and inspect the board, which voids the warranty, and good luck spotting a black flex on a black PCB, generate the seed somewhere you control and import it, or use multi-signing across vendors so one bad device can’t empty everything.
Crypto forces you to be your own security, and if you have enough money for someone to design an attack that would have only been expected of a nation-state a few years ago, your home-grown security has to be really, really good.
Forescout’s Vedere Labs has identified a previously undocumented malware delivery platform being used in ClickFix campaigns, alongside new delivery techniques associated with malware loaders linked to Vice Society ransomware activity.
The findings, published in two research blogs, examine what happens after victims fall for ClickFix lures. These attacks trick users into copying and running malicious commands, often under the pretence of fixing a technical problem or completing a verification step.
The investigations reveal how attackers deliver different malware families, conceal malicious files and establish access that could support further compromise.
During an incident investigation, Forescout researchers discovered a server hosting a panel called ROMULUS. Further analysis identified six IP addresses exposing the same authentication interface and revealed a platform capable of delivering multiple malware loaders.
One of those addresses had previously been identified by Huntress in a campaign that abused ChatGPT’s Custom GPTs to direct victims towards pages hosting ClickFix lures. Forescout independently observed the same malware package being delivered from another ROMULUS server.
Researchers analysed two delivery routes. One used a trojanised installer containing legitimate Stardock software to load malicious code. The other delivered LegionLoader, a malware loader active since 2019, through a series of encrypted archives.
In the LegionLoader route, an archive smaller than 1 MB expanded into an executable exceeding 880 MB. Most of the executable’s size came from artificial padding, which can push files beyond security scanners’ upload limits or sandbox analysis thresholds.
A ROMULUS statistics page also displayed installation and execution counts, a timeline and a breakdown by country, potentially allowing operators to monitor campaign performance.
Forescout said the platform’s operators remain unknown. Researchers could not determine whether ROMULUS is a private tool, a commercial criminal service, an affiliate framework or software shared between operators.
The second blog examines Lorem Ipsum and Axolotl, two malware loaders whose relationship had not previously been documented in public research.
The investigation followed a September incident in which attackers used ClickFix to deploy Lorem Ipsum Loader and a Python tunnel client. Forescout contained the incident before ransomware was deployed, although researchers believe ransomware delivery was the attackers’ intended goal.
The tradecraft has previously been attributed to Vice Society, a cybercriminal group associated with several ransomware families, including Rhysida.
Researchers analysed five Lorem Ipsum samples from the incident and 39 Axolotl samples. They identified an additional Lorem Ipsum delivery method using MSI installers and multi-stage PowerShell, as well as three Axolotl variants using different host programs.
The analysis also found overlapping infrastructure and similarities in the loaders’ command-and-control communications. Although their code is distinct, Forescout said the findings suggest Lorem Ipsum may be a later iteration of Axolotl. Researchers could not establish that relationship conclusively.
Forescout recommends monitoring suspicious PowerShell activity, silent installer execution and unexpected DLL loading, alongside educating users about ClickFix and related lures that direct victims to Windows Terminal or PowerShell.
The post Forescout uncovers ROMULUS malware delivery platform behind ClickFix attacks appeared first on IT Security Guru.
Artificial intelligence appeared in ransomware incidents affecting 84% of surveyed victims, while 87% reported attacks targeting or exploiting identity infrastructure. The findings connect accelerated criminal operations with weaknesses in the systems governing enterprise access. The study surveyed 1,200 IT and security professionals across nine countries and eight industry sectors. Crucially, it included only organizations that […]
The post AI Used in 84% of Ransomware Attacks as Identity Infrastructure Comes Under Fire. appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
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