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Before yesterdayHacking and InfoSec

Digital Forensics: AnyDesk – Favorite Tool of APTs

14 August 2026 at 04:28

Welcome back, digital investigators!

AnyDesk was first introduced around 2014, and it very quickly became a popular RMM tool. It’s lightweight and easy to deploy. Those same qualities also made it attractive to hackers and APTs. Over the last several years, it’s become one of the preferred tools for maintaining persistent access to compromised systems.

Given that many admins use it legitimately, it’s common to find on corporate machines. All the hacker needs to do is gain access to the endpoint, change the AnyDesk password or configure a new access profile. This persistence often goes unnoticed for weeks or months. During that time the hacker can come and go as they please. Many organizations don’t monitor RMM logs at all, even when they have a mature SOC in place. We’ve seen companies with large infrastructures and centralized logging completely ignore AnyDesk connections. That gives hackers time to get ready for a ransomware attack.

We also see hackers modifying registry settings so the accessibility button at the Windows login screen opens a CMD prompt with the highest privileges. We showed this in our “PowerShell for Hackers – Basics” article. 

If you want to see how widespread this abuse is, look at recent reports on Russia.

Kaspersky has documented incidents where AnyDesk was used by hacktivists and ransomware groups during their operations. In the ICS-CERT reporting for Q4 2024, for example, Crypt Ghouls relied on Mimikatz, PingCastle, Resocks, AnyDesk, and PsExec. In Q3 2024, BlackJack used AnyDesk, Radmin, PuTTY and tunneling with ngrok for persistence across Russian government, telecom and ICS. And that’s just a glimpse of it.

With that in mind, we want to show you how to investigate a computer that was compromised through AnyDesk.

Log Files

Today we’ll focus on log files that can help you determine whether there’s been unauthorized access. These logs can show the hacker’s AnyDesk ID, their display name, their OS and IP address. The logs can also show whether there were attempts to upload files or exfiltrate them.

During incident response this insight is already valuable. On top of that, collecting these logs and ingesting them into your SIEM can help you generate alerts on night-time access.

Here are the log files and full paths that you will need for this analysis:

C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\ad.trace
C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\connection_trace.txt
C:\ProgramData\AnyDesk\ad_svc.trace
C:\ProgramData\AnyDesk\connection_trace.txt

AnyDesk can be used in two distinct ways. The first is as a portable executable. In that case, the user runs the program directly without installing it. When used this way, the logs are stored under the user’s AppData directory. The second way is to install AnyDesk as a service. When AnyDesk runs as a service, ProgramData will contain trace files. The AppData folder will still hold the ad.trace file. Together these files form the basis for your investigation.

Connection Log Timestamps

The connection_trace.txt logs are readable and give you a record of successful AnyDesk connections. Here is an example with a randomized AnyDesk ID:

Incoming 2025-07-25, 12:10 User 568936153 568936153
reading connection_trace.txt anydesk log file

The real AnyDesk ID has been redacted. The log shows there was a successful inbound connection on 2025-07-25 at 12:10 UTC from the AnyDesk ID. This only confirms that remote access happened, but we can dig deeper using the other logs.

Finding Information About the Hacker

Now we can try to understand who the hacker might be. Although names, IDs and OS can be changed by the attacker at any time, patterns still exist. Most don’t constantly change their display name unless they are extremely paranoid. Even then, the timestamps do not lie. Remote logins occurring repeatedly in the middle of the night are a strong indicator of unauthorized access.

We will work primarily with the ad.trace and ad_svc.trace files. These logs are noisy, so it’s better to search for specific keywords:

PS > get-content .\ad.trace | select-string -list 'Remote OS', 'Incoming session', 'app.prepare_task', 'anynet.relay', 'anynet.any_socket', 'files', 'text offers' | tee adtrace.log
parsing ad.trace anydesk log file

PS > get-content .\ad_svc.trace | select-string -list 'Remote OS', 'Incoming session', 'app.prepare_task', 'anynet.relay', 'anynet.any_socket', 'files', 'text offers' | tee adsvc.log
parsing ad_svc.trace anydesk file

We filtered out only the most interesting lines and saved them into adtrace.log and adsvc.log

IP Address

In many cases, the ad_svc.trace log contains the external IP address from which the hacker connected. “Logged in from” has the IP next to it, while “Accepting from” has the AnyDesk ID. These values were redacted.

anydesk ad_svc.trace log file contains the ip adress of the user accessing the machine via anydesk

Once you have the IP, you can block it and remove the app from the host if it’s not necessary. Many of these unauthorized connections originate from VPN servers, of course. 

Name & OS Information

Inside ad.trace you will find the hacker’s display name after “Incoming session request”. Right next to that field you will see their AnyDesk ID. You may also see references to the hacker’s operating system.

anydesk ad.trace log contains the name of the anydesk user and their anydesk id

Here the connection came from a Linux machine and they’d set their display name to “IT Dep” in an attempt to look legitimate.

Data Exfiltration

AnyDesk also supports file transfer both ways. Hackers can upload malware or exfiltrate sensitive company data directly through the session. In the ad.trace logs you will sometimes see references such as “Preparing files in …” which indicate file operations were taking place.

This line alone does not always tell you what exact files were transferred, especially if the hacker worked out of temporary directories. However, correlating those timestamps with Windows forensic artifacts can show exactly what the hacker copied.

anydesk ad.trace log contains the evidence of data exfiltration

In our case, files stored in the Documents folder were exfiltrated.

Summary

Given how widespread AnyDesk is, you should always treat its logs as high priority artifacts. AnyDesk is one RMM tool, and there are plenty more out there being actively abused for persistence. Make sure their logs are consistently collected and ingested into your SIEM so you can spot suspicious activity outside business hours.

If you’re interested in digital forensics, we recommend our training for both beginners and those looking to advance their forensic skills.

Our team also provides digital forensics services. If you need any support during an investigation, we’re always happy to help. Contact us at hackers-arise@protonmail.com

The post Digital Forensics: AnyDesk – Favorite Tool of APTs first appeared on Hackers Arise.

Mobile Forensics: Extracting Data from WhatsApp

10 August 2026 at 11:51

Welcome back, digital investigators!

Many of our messengers sit somewhere between privacy and routine. People treat chats like a private conversation and because it feels comfortable, they often share things they wouldn’t say on social media. The data stored in those apps is valuable for forensics. It may have chats, media and group membership with timestamps. Using this data we can reconstruct events. 

We’re going to take a close look at WhatsApp forensics today and show you the artifacts you can find on Android and iOS. It’ll be a deep dive on how WhatsApp keeps its data and what those files contain. All of it in plain language.

At Hackers-Arise we assist people with forensic investigations to uncover cybercrime and help with incident response. WhatsApp is part of that.

WhatsApp Artifacts on Android Devices

On Android, WhatsApp stores its private app data inside the device’s user data area. You will find the app’s files under /data/data/com.whatsapp/ or equivalently /data/user/0/com.whatsapp/ on many devices. These directories are not accessible without root, so to read them directly you need a physical dump of the file system or root. If you do not have root or a physical image, your options are restricted to logical backups.

whatsapp files
Source: Group-IB

There are two important files here: wa.db and msgstore.db. Both are SQLite databases and together they form the core of WhatsApp evidence.

analyzing wa.db file whatsapp
Source: Group-IB

wa.db is the contacts database. It has the WhatsApp user’s contacts with phone numbers, display names, status, timestamps for when contacts were created or changed. You can open the file with a SQLite browser to see its tables. The interesting tables here are those that store contact records (wa_contacts or similar), sqlite_sequence that has auto-increment counts and android_metadata with app language.

reading contact names
Source: Group-IB

Wa.db is basically the address book for WhatsApp. It has names, numbers and a little context for each contact.

msgsore.db file whatsapp
Source: Group-IB

msgstore.db is the message store. This database has sent and received messages, timestamps, message status, senders and receivers and references to media files. In many WhatsApp versions you will find tables that include a general information table (sqlite_sequence), a full text index table for message content (message_fts_content or similar), the main messages table which usually contains the message body and metadata, messages_thumbnails which has images and their timestamps, and a chat_list table that stores chat entries. 

Be aware that WhatsApp changes its structure and field names may change between versions. Newer schema versions may include extra fields such as media_enc_hash, edit_version, or payment_transaction_id. So you need to inspect the schema first.

finding messages on whatsapp
reading whatsapp texts
Source: Group-IB

On many Android devices WhatsApp also keeps encrypted backups in a public storage location that you can find under /data/media/0/WhatsApp/Databases/ (the virtual SD card)

or /mnt/sdcard/WhatsApp/Databases/ for physical SD cards. Those backup files look like msgstore.db.cryptXX, where XX shows the cryptographic scheme version. 

encrypted whatsapp files
Source: Group-IB

The msgstore.db.cryptXX files are an encrypted copy of msgstore.db intended for device backups. To decrypt them you need a cryptographic key that WhatsApp stores privately on the device. The key can usually be found here: /data/data/com.whatsapp/files/. Without that key those encrypted backups are not readable.

Other important Android files and directories to examine include the preferences and registration XMLs in /data/data/com.whatsapp/shared_prefs/. The file com.whatsapp_preferences.xml often contains profile details and configuration. A fragment of such a file may show the phone number associated with the account, the app version, a profile message such as “Hey there! I am using WhatsApp” and the account display name. The registration.RegisterPhone.xml file typically has registration metadata like the phone number and regional format. 

The axolotl.db file in /data/data/com.whatsapp/databases/ holds cryptographic keys (used in the Signal/Double Ratchet protocol implementation) and account identification data. chatsettings.db has app settings. Logs are kept under /data/data/com.whatsapp/files/Logs/ and may include whatsapp.log as well as compressed rotated backups looking like whatsapp-YYYY-MM-DD.1.log.gz. They show app activity and errors.

whatsapp logs
Source: Group-IB

Media is often stored in the media tree on internal or external storage:

/data/media/0/WhatsApp/Media/WhatsApp Images/ for images,

/data/media/0/WhatsApp/Media/WhatsApp Voice Notes/ for voice messages (usually Opus format), WhatsApp Audio, WhatsApp Video, and WhatsApp Profile Photos.

whatsapp data stored externally
Source: Group-IB

Within the app’s private area you may also find cached profile pictures under /data/data/com.whatsapp/cache/Profile Pictures/ and avatar thumbnails under /data/data/com.whatsapp/files/Avatars/. Some avatar thumbnails use a .j extension, but those are just JPEG files.

If the device uses an SD card, a WhatsApp directory at the card’s root may store copies of shared files (/mnt/sdcard/WhatsApp/.Share/), a trash folder for deleted content (/mnt/sdcard/WhatsApp/.trash/), and the Databases subdirectory with encrypted backups and media subfolders mirroring those on internal storage. Deleted files in .trash folders can be used to recover media.

Keep in mind, some vendors may add features that change where app data is stored. For example, certain Xiaomi phones implement a “Second Space” feature that creates a second user workspace. WhatsApp in the second workspace stores its data under a different user ID path. That means it may be under /data/user/10/com.whatsapp/databases/wa.db rather than the usual /data/user/0/com.whatsapp/databases/wa.db

WhatsApp Artifacts on iOS Devices

On iOS, WhatsApp centralizes its data into a few places and all that data is commonly accessible via device backups. The main application database is often ChatStorage.sqlite located under /private/var/mobile/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/ but some forensic tools may display this as AppDomainGroup-group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared

chatsorage.sqlite file whatsapp ios
Source: Group-IB

Within ChatStorage.sqlite the interesting tables are ZWAMESSAGE and ZWAMEDIAITEM. The first one stores message records and the other one has metadata for attachments and media items. ZWAPROFILEPUSHNAME and ZWAPROFILEPICTUREITEM map WhatsApp identifiers to display names and avatars. The table Z_PRIMARYKEY may have general database metadata such as record counts.

extracting texts from ios whatsapp backups
Source: Group-IB

iOS also places supporting files in the group container. BackedUpKeyValue.sqlite can contain cryptographic keys and data for identifying account ownership. ContactsV2.sqlite stores contact details which include names, phone numbers, profile statuses and WhatsApp IDs. The consumer_version file holds the app version and current_wallpaper.jpg (or wallpaper in older versions) has the background image used in WhatsApp chats. The blockedcontacts.dat file lists blocked numbers, and pw.dat can hold an encrypted password. net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.plist or group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared.plist store profile settings.

contact info and preferences whatsapp ios
Source: Group-IB

Thumbnails, avatars and media are stored under /private/var/mobile/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/Media/Profile/ and /private/var/mobile/Applications/group.net.whatsapp.WhatsApp.shared/Message/Media/. WhatsApp logs (calls.log and calls.backup.log) can be found in the Documents or Library/Logs folders and will have information on call activity.

iOS devices are often backed up through iTunes or Finder, so you can extract WhatsApp artifacts from a device backup without a full file system image. If the backup is unencrypted it may include the ChatStorage.sqlite file and associated media. If the backup is encrypted you will need the backup password or legal access methods to decrypt it. Many investigators create a forensic backup and then examine the WhatsApp databases with a SQLite viewer and other forensic tools (Belkasoft) that understands this WhatsApp schema differences across versions.

Summary

Plainly speaking, WhatsApp forensics can help us understand who a suspect interacted with by viewing chat histories with timestamps, media files, message status (sent, delivered, read), groups, profile names and avatars and more. We understand this data can be accessed without authorization, violating people’s privacy, so part of our goal here was to show just how much data is actually stored on your phone. If you’re part of a sensitive group, look for other secure alternatives to WhatsApp and make sure your chats get deleted regularly to prevent unauthorized access to them. Disable cloud backups and try not to store those backups locally either. Even encrypted ones be cracked open by brute forcing the password.

If you’re interested in mobile forensics, you can join our training. We will walk you through the essentials of Android and iOS, explaining how evidence is stored on these devices. You will learn how investigators extract and analyze data, work with labs that involve finding hidden apps, working with encrypted chats and more.

The post Mobile Forensics: Extracting Data from WhatsApp first appeared on Hackers Arise.

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