A nonprofit organization called the Fermi Explorer Mission announced today that it intends to launch a spacecraft to our nearest star system by the end of 2029. 

It’s a hugely ambitious mission—if all goes well, the spacecraft could take up to 80,000 years to arrive at Alpha Centauri, which is 4.4 light-years away. And the spacecraft will follow a novel trajectory discovered by an AI system developed by Physical Superintelligence (PSI), an AI physics research lab. PSI is launching today with $58 million in funding led by Breakthrough Energy, a climate-focused investment group founded by Microsoft cofounder Bill Gates.

It’s not the first time this has been tried. In 2016, the billionaire tech investor Yuri Milner announced an interstellar mission called Breakthrough Starshot to launch humanity’s first spacecraft to Alpha Centauri. The plan was to use powerful lasers that would propel tiny probes to a fifth of the speed of light—fast enough to reach Alpha Centauri within 20 years. Milner pledged $100 million toward a proof of concept. But a decade later, nothing has launched.

“We didn’t want to do another Breakthrough Starshot,” says Philip Johnston, the cofounder and president of the Fermi Explorer Mission. “We’re dead set on something actually launching.”

To do that, “we are not constraining ourselves to doing it in a human lifetime,” says Johnston. “Let’s just figure out the way to get to another star.” 

The new mission, currently funded by individual private donors, is expected to cost just $15 million. The spacecraft will carry cargo weighing at least one kilogram. That will include artistic and scientific payloads, messages, and a copy of the Golden Record, a gold-plated disc of Earth’s sounds and images that NASA attached to its two Voyager probes in 1977 as a message to any civilization that might find them.

Engineering an interstellar journey is extremely difficult. Alpha Centauri is about 25 trillion miles away from Earth. One of the fastest objects that humans have ever launched, the Voyager 1 probe, has been flying since 1977 and has covered less than 1% percent of that distance. At its speed, the trip would take more than 70,000 years.

Johnston and his team spent a year trying, and failing, to find a way for a small, solar-powered spacecraft costing only $15 million to reach Alpha Centauri. They kept running into the knotty problem of how to give the spacecraft enough power without making it too heavy (and thus more fuel-guzzling). 

After the Fermi team struggled to find a workable route, Johnston mentioned the problem in a podcast hosted by Alex Wissner-Gross, a physicist who cofounded PSI. Wissner-Gross offered to run it through an AI system the lab developed, called Get Physics Done. It’s open-source software that takes a physics research question, breaks it into smaller tasks, and decides which simulations to run, using AI models including Anthropic’s Claude or OpenAI’s GPT.

A week later, the AI system turned up a novel trajectory, to Johnston’s surprise. It combined well-known orbital maneuvers in a way the Fermi team had not considered, according to a paper that has not been peer-reviewed. It suggested that the spacecraft could first slow down so its orbit swings in close to the sun—closer than Mercury. On each close pass, it would fire its engine so that the solar panels get four times the light, and a burst of thrust delivered at high speed would buy more energy than the same burst anywhere else. Because the engine would run only near the sun, the solar panels could stay small and the spacecraft light.

The system conducted the research mostly on its own for three days, running on a billion tokens, says Matt Pines, the cofounder and CEO of PSI. An astrophysicist on PSI’s staff steered it to follow the mission’s requirements, asked for a cost analysis and clearer charts, and checked the output for errors.

“The fact that it came up with an entirely different mission profile, one that was creative and not one [the Fermi team] had considered—that was the more surprising aspect,” says Pines. Still, the model lacks a human researcher’s judgment and taste, he says. It has no reliable sense of which problems are interesting or which approaches are worth pursuing, so it often gets stuck chasing dead ends or failing to explore different approaches. “I don’t think we’ve yet figured out how these models can internally represent something like that,” he says of research judgment.

Even if the Fermi probe launches, “we’re pretty confident that we will not be the first to arrive” at Alpha Centauri, says Johnston, since he expects spacecraft technology to improve. If an engine a thousand years from now is even 20% faster than today’s, a spacecraft launched then would still beat Fermi’s probe to Alpha Centauri by more than 10,000 years. 

But the Fermi project isn’t just an interstellar mission driven by engineering ambition. It’s also a quest to answer one of the oldest open questions in physics. In 1950, the physicist Enrico Fermi posed a puzzle: The galaxy has hundreds of billions of stars, most of them far older than our sun. Even a civilization traveling slowly between stars could spread across the whole galaxy in a few million years, which pales in comparison to how old the galaxy is. If there is intelligent life somewhere, we should have seen signs of its existence by now.

That means either reaching for another star is too difficult or other intelligent species simply haven’t bothered. But once the Fermi probe launches, we will become a civilization that can and wants to reach another star, meaning that neither explanation might be what’s keeping the galaxy unexplored. That could point us toward more unsettling possibilities, says Johnston. Maybe life like ours is almost unimaginably rare. Or maybe intelligent life is common but tends to die out before it can spread. 

If the latter is true, “one of those reasons could be that once you hit superintelligence, that for some reason is self-destructive,” says Johnston. “Maybe in the next 50 years, there’s some great filter that we do not pass through. That all intelligent civilizations, for some reason, do not pass through.”

The AI industry’s boldest promise right now is that AI will soon improve itself, with almost no need for human oversight. LLMs can already write code, generate synthetic data for training, and optimize the computer chips they run on. Forecasts of explosive AI progress predict that what researchers call recursive self-improvement is on the horizon. 

But a new study suggests that it might take a while for us to get there. The researchers behind it found that AI agents are not yet capable of conducting open-ended AI research—free-form investigations that have no clear-cut answers and require judgment and taste, which may be integral to building self-improving AI.

A multi-institution group of researchers, led by Peter Kirgis and Sayash Kapoor at Princeton University, found that AI agents could solve the engineering problems necessary to do AI research but lacked the judgment and creativity to produce original research at the caliber of  papers accepted by a top machine-learning conference. The gap suggests that some of the hyped-up timelines for automating AI research may be running ahead of the evidence.

Most existing research on how agents can automate AI research evaluates their ability to complete narrow tasks with checkable answers, such as solving engineering problems or post-training small language models against a benchmark. But making progress in AI research also requires open-ended thinking—choosing a set of hypotheses, deciding what evidence would settle a question, or knowing when to start over. 

To test agents on those kinds of skills, the researchers in the study proposed a new method of evaluation called “shadow evaluation,” which requires the AI to answer a research question from a high-quality unpublished paper. 

The researchers asked Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.8, running on open-source software called OpenClaw, to tackle such questions, in this case from two papers submitted to the prestigious machine-learning conference NeurIPS 2026. 

The first question was whether a large language model’s “personas,” which determine its behavior, can be controlled by editing the model’s weights (the billions of numbers that store everything it learns during training). The other asked how to design a detector that points out when a model that makes predictions based on spreadsheet data has become unreliable. Because the papers had not been made public, the agents could not memorize the answers from their training data or find them online. 

The agents were given six days, $3,000 in Anthropic API credits, a GPU budget to run the experiments, their own virtual computers, and access to the open web to produce a research paper worthy of publication at a top-tier AI conference. The papers’ original authors graded the agents’ papers as they would evaluate one submitted to a conference.

Those authors rejected both papers. 

The agents were capable of all the engineering required to conduct the research, the human scientists found. The agents reviewed the literature, ran hundreds of experiments, and compiled the results. 

“On the other hand, the agents were unambiguously bad at carrying out the research itself,” says Kapoor. They ran bizarre experiments (in some cases testing their hypotheses on tiny synthetic datasets), struggled to write intelligibly about their work, and made no novel contribution to their fields. “The papers were nowhere close to the mark when it came to being at the quality of a top AI conference,” he says. 

That’s because the agents struggled to muster the creativity and judgment necessary for conducting research. They didn’t do enough to explore different ideas, and they committed to unpromising approaches too quickly. Though the agents developed novel and ambitious hypotheses resembling those that the original authors themselves started with, they rejected them on the basis of very limited data. And they couldn’t backtrack from failing approaches. They could make small pivots but could not fundamentally rethink their approach or try new ones from scratch. 

The agents also failed to incorporate feedback from subagents or external AI reviewing tools. Instead of revising their methodology, the agents narrowed their claims and added caveats. They also couldn’t effectively use resources, such as tokens, compute, and time. And they couldn’t follow instructions about things like how much time to spend on different phases of the research or how long their paper could be.

For all their failures, the agents didn’t engage in the misbehavior that researchers call “reward hacking,” hiding or misrepresenting experiments or data. Although subagents, or helper AIs that the main agent spawns to handle pieces of the work, occasionally hallucinated or misrepresented the results, these were caught by the orchestrator agent, the lead AI supervising the project. 

The reason AI models are good at research engineering but not at open-ended research may come down to how they’re trained, says Kapoor. Models get good at whatever they can be drilled on in a training regime called reinforcement learning, which is easier to apply to tasks whose success can be checked automatically. “But it’s harder to create environments to train these models when the task itself is open-ended,” he says.

Kapoor says the team is now conducting the experiment with Mythos, Anthropic’s most advanced model, which launched in April. It was subsequently required by the Trump administration to meet various safety restrictions and is now available only to approved organizations. Anthropic did not respond to a request for comment.

There are some limitations to the study. It covered just two research papers, and the original authors knew the papers they were grading were generated by AI agents, which could have colored their evaluations. And the researchers had substantial discretion in designing and executing the study, meaning that their preexisting beliefs and biases could have slipped into the results. Evaluations of open-ended research trade some objectivity for a much richer test than any benchmarks can offer.

Still, the results may temper the claims that recursive self-improvement is on the horizon. In June, Anthropic published a blog post titled “When AI Builds Itself,” charting its progress toward models that speed up their own development. In July, OpenAI advertised the fact that its new model GPT-5.6 Sol had helped post-train a smaller model, saving researchers weeks of work.

The new finding may echo what AI companies are finding internally, regardless of their most optimistic public statements. Anthropic cofounder Jack Clark wrote in his newsletter Import AI that it rhymes with what the company found when it tried to automate some aspects of AI safety research. 

“There’s a certain absence of valuable, intuitive creativity in today’s AI systems, and though they’re extraordinarily capable engineers they seem to have a certain property of rote, formulaic thinking that might prevent them [from] being good researchers,” he wrote. He called AI systems’ lack of creativity a “bearish signal on short recursive self-improvement timelines.” 

AI companies do have every incentive to develop AI systems that can rapidly accelerate their own progress, just as they did to make the models better at coding. OpenAI has made building an automated AI researcher an explicit goal, and Anthropic identifies self-improving AI as the industry’s next milestone. 

“If there is investment and then conscious effort toward this direction, I feel like there would be interesting progress, even if it’s failing currently,” says Najoung Kim, a professor of linguistics and computer science at Boston University who researches how AI agents can automate AI research but did not work on the study. On the other hand, it’s possible that AI progress may be bifurcated. AI systems might race ahead on narrow tasks—the kind that can be scored—while advancing slowly on open-ended research. 

The big open question, then, is how crucial open-ended research is to recursive self-improvement—whether AI systems can grind their way there without it, simply by improving on the narrower tasks. “If we look back to the biggest advances in the field, the invention of transformers or the invention of big new architectures that allowed us to make a lot of AI progress—all of those did require creative leaps,” says Kapoor. 

“That said, others have this hypothesis that all of what we need for transformative AI, in particular for recursive self-improvement, is already there.” That would include making a model train faster and boosting its benchmark scores.

“That’s frankly the trillion-dollar question right now,” he says.

Lee, an engineer at Samsung’s semiconductor division, clocks out when his shift ends. He used to work longer hours, going the extra mile to excel at his projects. But lately, he’s been coming straight home to work on his job application for the chipmaker’s South Korean rival SK Hynix, sharing tips with his coworkers on how to draft a stellar personal statement. Even his boss encourages him to make the move.

“My team lead tells us all to jump ship to SK Hynix,” says Lee. He and his coworkers are feeling demoralized by the $476,000 bonus that SK Hynix is set to pay its employees, flush with record profits from making the high-bandwidth memory (HBM) chips that power Nvidia’s AI accelerators. The figure dwarfs what chip workers at Samsung are set to receive and is sparking an exodus.

As the AI boom heats up, the semiconductor titans are waging a fierce talent war with flashy bonuses, aggressive recruiting, and even a courtroom injunction. Who wins could tilt the race to dominate the next generation of the HBM chips at the heart of the AI boom.

“Except for our two team leads, my entire team [of 30 people] just applied to SK Hynix,” Lee says, referring to a job posting the company published in July. Lee, who has worked at Samsung for three years, even applied for an entry-level position at its rival. A coworker, who has worked at Samsung for eight years, applied for the same one. They both got rejected. But they’re hopeful that they’ll get a callback for a posting seeking a more experienced engineer.

All employees at Samsung and SK Hynix that MIT Technology Review spoke with asked to be identified by just their last name or a pseudonym because they feared retaliation from their employer. Samsung declined to comment, and SK Hynix did not respond to requests for comment.

After prolonged negotiations with its labor union, Samsung struck a deal in May to pay out 10.5% of the semiconductor division’s operating profits to employees as bonuses annually for 10 years, mostly in company stock that vests over three years. The move came after SK Hynix agreed last year to pay out 10% of operating profits to employees, which translates to $476,000 per employee this year—mostly in cash.  

But at Samsung, each division’s bonus is tied to its own bottom line. Chip workers in its memory division, which is also reaping a windfall from making HBM chips, are getting paid a bonus of roughly $400,000 per employee this year. But those who, like Lee, work in Samsung’s foundry division, which manufactures logic chips that companies like Tesla and Google design and has been operating at a loss, are getting a bonus of roughly $135,000. 

Employees told MIT Technology Review that Samsung said it can’t give as many bonuses to divisions that aren’t performing well. Lee, after watching the labor union wrestle with the company for months, says he has felt disappointed by what he ended up with: “Even if Samsung does well in the future, I don’t think any of it will trickle down to me.” 

The workers’ lagging bonuses are making SK Hynix suddenly look appealing. According to a survey by the Samsung labor union in June, 81.5% of employees in the company’s foundry division, and nearly half of employees in the semiconductor division as a whole, said they wanted to go to another company in the next two years. In April, Samsung labor union chief Choi Seung-ho said more than 200 members of the union had left for SK Hynix over the past four months. On Blind, an anonymous workplace forum, a chorus of disgruntled engineers at Samsung confess that they want to defect to SK Hynix for the bigger bonuses. 

For decades, SK Hynix lived in Samsung’s shadow. It was the smaller, scrappier memory maker that elite engineering students at universities looked past when applying for jobs. But in 2019, Samsung downsized its HBM team, betting the market would stay niche, while SK Hynix doubled down on the technology. Then the AI boom supercharged the demand for HBMs, which feed AI chips the enormous amounts of data they need at ultra-high speed, driving prices to unprecedented levels. SK Hynix now leads the global market for HBMs, while Samsung is playing catch-up. Both companies topped $1 trillion in market value in May, and SK Hynix briefly dethroned Samsung as South Korea’s most valuable company in June.

Predicting that demand for memory chips will continue to surge, the semiconductor titans are making aggressive investments to expand their business. Last month, the companies unveiled plans to invest more than $2 trillion by 2040, including a semiconductor “mega-cluster” in Yongin, a city south of Seoul. To staff the expansion, SK Hynix added 2,152 employees in the first half of 2026 alone and aims to double its manufacturing capacity in five years. Samsung plans to hire 60,000 employees over the next five years, especially for its semiconductor division. Even so, the pipeline will fall short: South Korea’s semiconductor industry will need about 304,000 workers by 2031 and faces a shortage of roughly 54,000, according to the Korea Semiconductor Industry Association.

Now the longtime rivals are showering workers with big bonuses to keep—and poach—talent. “[SK Hynix] seems to target Samsung engineers when hiring because it’s a rival,” says Baek, a manager at SK Hynix. “From what I heard internally, the big performance bonuses we got were aimed at luring away talent from our competitor.”

Courts are starting to weigh in. In July, Samsung won an injunction barring two former chip workers from working at SK Hynix for 18 months, on the grounds that chips are a national core technology deserving protection. “With competition in the semiconductor industry fierce, it’s necessary to establish a fair market order,” the court ruled.

The talent exodus threatens a crucial advantage that Samsung still holds in the HBM race. “Samsung is the only memory maker in the world that owns a foundry business,” says Park Jun-young, a semiconductor expert at the Industrial Anthropology Laboratory, a research institute, who worked at Samsung for a decade. 

With the latest generation of the technology, known as HBM4, the logic chip at the base of each memory stack must be manufactured with the kind of advanced process that only foundries run. Samsung can do this in-house, while SK Hynix outsources it to the Taiwanese foundry giant TSMC. “If Samsung keeps losing engineers in the foundry … the collaboration between memory division and foundry division could become difficult,” says Park. “SK Hynix, which used to have only a memory team and is now hiring foundry engineers, could do better research on HBMs.”

Choi, an engineer who has worked at Samsung for seven years, says he was once a star on his team, getting glowing performance reviews from his managers. But lately, he and his coworkers have been busy applying for every SK Hynix job posting they see. “We tell each other when the next SK Hynix job posting is up,” he says. “There’s always more work to do beyond our basic duties. But there’s no point in doing it.”

The next time you apply for a job, AI may screen your résumé before any human sees it. But there’s good reason to question whether AI will judge you fairly. Researchers already know that LLMs pick up human biases from their training data. New research suggests that LLMs can also develop their own biases from experience—and stereotype job applicants more than humans do. As AI companies race to build agentic models that remember the tiniest details about users, they may be handing them ammunition for forming those biases. 

Researchers at Princeton University and the University of Chicago ran LLMs, including ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini, through a simulated hiring game, adapted from a psychology study that explored how humans can form stereotypes. Each model was told it had been hired as a consultant by the mayor of a fictional city and was then asked to help hire people for 20 jobs, including doctors, lawyers, child-care aides, and janitors. Candidates came from four fictional ethnic groups: Tufa, Aima, Reku, and Weki. 

In each round, there was a new job opening and four candidates, one from each group. After the model hired a candidate, it learned whether they succeeded at their job and moved onto the next round. The model was told to make as many successful hires as possible over 40 rounds. Unbeknownst to the models, all candidates were equally likely to succeed at every job.

The models quickly started segregating candidates from different groups into different jobs on the basis of early observations of hiring outcomes. For example, when a model was told an Aima had failed as a doctor, a job considered to require high levels of warmth and competence, it veered away from hiring all Aimas as doctors. Instead, it started hiring Aimas as janitors, which the model classified as being less warm and competent than doctors. Newer models with higher reasoning capabilities, such as OpenAI’s o3 and DeepSeek’s R1, showed stronger biases.

The models were even more likely to stereotype people by demographic group than the human participants in the original study. On the study’s segregation scale, where 2 means every group has been completely confined to its own job niche, human participants scored 0.84. The models scored roughly 65% higher, with OpenAI’s reasoning model o3 scoring 1.83, close to the maximum possible.

That’s because LLMs “really are eager to create generalizations from limited data,” says Ryan Liu, a PhD student at Princeton University and a coauthor of the study, which was published in a paper at ICML in Seoul in July. “That’s literally a lot of what they’re optimized for.”

Every decision-maker, human or machine, faces a trade-off between sticking with what worked before and trying something new that might work better—a phenomenon psychologists call the “exploration-exploitation dilemma.” It’s like choosing between a new restaurant and your reliable favorite. 

Because LLMs are trained on math, coding, and science problems—tasks that reward generalizing from just a few examples—they can settle on a hunch too early. And the same instinct that helps LLMs crack logic puzzles also makes them quick to stereotype. When LLMs rush to generalize in social settings, “that’s when things tend to go wrong,” says Liu. OpenAI and Anthropic did not respond to requests for comment.

The finding is especially relevant now that chatbots are gaining improved memory and personalization features, says Angelina Wang, a computer scientist at Cornell University who did not work on the study. When a chatbot draws on its previous conversation history, it can “over-index on the same kinds of behaviors it’s experienced before” and form biases, she says.

Simply having chatbots remember less isn’t a fix, though, because users want chatbots to remember what they say. “We still are trying to figure out just the right amount that isn’t too much or too little,” says Wang.

Telling the model to be fair didn’t change its behavior much. “Either it can’t put these values into action or that process is being submerged under the tendency to try to optimize for the goal of getting the most correct hires,” says Liu. But promising the models an additional bonus for diverse hiring made them far less biased. The trick, then, is to design goals that “incorporate desirable social values in order to make the large language model act in socially desirable ways,” says Liu.

The models also became less biased when they were told more personal information about individuals. In another experiment in the same study, the researchers asked the models to resettle members of different ethnic groups in cities across Canada. When the models were told personal information relevant to the ability to adapt to a new city, such as age and education, they were less likely to segregate people by their ethnicity. But when they were given irrelevant information, such as hair color and tattoo shape, the models largely fell back to sorting people by their ethnicity again. 

To what extent AI systems will stereotype job applicants in the real world is still an open question. While the models in the experiment immediately learned whether they’d made successful hires, a model screening résumés in the real world doesn’t get an instant report card. Companies can take a long time to find out whether a new hire is any good, if they ever do.

As LLMs learn from experience to make decisions about who gets hired, who gets a loan, or who gets parole, the biases we should worry about may include ones no human ever taught them. “These novel biases—they’re sort of ever present,” says Liu.

Baek, a 35-year-old manager at the South Korean semiconductor titan SK Hynix, was enrolled in Sunoo, a matchmaking company based in Seoul, a year ago. In a move typical of anxious South Korean parents, his mother signed him up, hoping to find a good wife for her son.

Lately, says Baek (who asked to be referred to by his last name to protect his privacy), he and his coworkers are having better luck finding dates than they used to, perhaps because of the dazzling bonuses they just got. Flush with eye-popping profits from the AI chip boom, SK Hynix struck a landmark deal last year with its labor union to pay out 10% of operating profits to employees, which translates to an extra $476,000 per employee this year. A similar agreement and sizable lump sum followed for Samsung workers this May.

With their newfound wealth, chip workers like Baek have become the most sought-after bachelors and bachelorettes in South Korea. “I have a coworker who’s perpetually going on blind dates, and he’s been getting so many recently,” says Baek. “For the past few months, I’ve been getting many blind dates too, perhaps because of the bonuses I got.”

Young South Koreans joke online that the best outfit to wear on a blind date is an SK Hynix uniform. 

The AI chip boom is changing the social fabric of South Korea by minting a new elite of “silicon-collar” workers earning about 20 times as much as the average South Korean. Although it’s helping some chip workers to find relationships, it’s also fueling fears of a deepening wealth disparity—and a loud public debate about inequality.

Love in the time of chips

South Korea is the epicenter of the chip boom fueling the AI race. Samsung and SK Hynix supply the vast majority of the world’s high-bandwidth memory (HBM) chips, which power Nvidia’s AI accelerators—the GPUs used to train AI models. As AI companies spend hundreds of billions of dollars on building data centers around the world, demand for HBMs is rising beyond what suppliers can keep up with, driving their prices to unprecedented levels. Samsung and SK Hynix are raking in record profits as a result. 

South Korea’s economy now orbits the two chip giants. In May, both companies topped $1 trillion in market value. And chip exports helped fuel a 1.7% surge in South Korea’s gross domestic product in the first quarter of 2026. South Korea’s main equity index, Kospi, has nearly tripled over the past year, becoming the best-performing market in the world.

Swimming in cash, chip workers are going on shopping sprees in department stores near the “semicon belt” fabs—splurging on everything from lavish furniture and electronic appliances to jewelry and watches. They’re also snapping up homes near the commuter-shuttle routes that ferry workers to campus. And they’re shelling out for matchmakers.

“Quite a lot of people ask me if I can introduce them to chip workers,” says Lee Sung-mi, a matchmaker at Sunoo, who has been playing Cupid for chip workers for years. “In fact, people who once rejected them are asking to be matched with them again, now that their salaries and bonuses have shot so far above what everyone else earns.”

One woman who lives in Gangnam, a ritzy district in Seoul lined with luxury high-rises and designer boutiques, previously turned down a chip worker at SK Hynix because his fab was too far out in Icheon, a rural city about 50 miles southeast of Seoul that’s dotted with rice farms and manufacturing plants. But in May, she asked her matchmaker to set them up again. They’ve now been dating for a month.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

In South Korea, matchmaking companies evaluate their clients on a long list of criteria such as education, job, income, looks, and family background, including whether their aging parents have saved enough for retirement. In an economy where housing prices and child care costs are soaring, competition for jobs is fierce, and the social safety net is thin, a good job is the ultimate dating credential—all the more coveted at a time when many young South Koreans are forgoing marriage and children altogether, seeing family life as an unaffordable dream.

Every client at Sunoo gets a spouse rating, determined by an algorithm that assigns scores for each criterion. Since their hefty bonuses were announced, the job ratings of Samsung employees have risen from 80 to 84, while those of SK Hynix employees climbed from 78 to 82. Scores above 90 are reserved for doctors and lawyers. Long prized as paragons of prestige and wealth, they’re now close to being overtaken by chip workers. A score of 99, the highest possible rating, is earmarked for heads of state.  

Their new status is reshaping how chip workers themselves approach dating. “Chip workers from Samsung and SK Hynix are enrolling in our services because they feel more financially ready,” says Lee. “They’re also becoming pickier, as they feel like they’re now in a good position. The women want to meet men with higher incomes and better jobs, and the men want to meet younger and better-looking women with better jobs.” 

An SK Hynix engineer in her 40s, who was once desperate to get married as soon as possible, started turning down men she would’ve dated before the chip boom. Lately, showered with more matches, she’s been sifting through her suitors more carefully. “She now has peace of mind and wants to take her time to meet someone better,” says Lee.

A mixed blessing

While chip workers enjoy the fruits of their labor, the bonus bonanza is stoking anxieties among other South Koreans. “When wealth disparity is no longer a mere difference of income but, rather, a difference in identity … it can fuel social conflict,” says Se-eun Jung, an economist at Inha University. 

Earlier this month, the Bank of Korea warned that the chip boom will create a “K-shaped” economy, where a handful of workers race ahead while everyone else falls behind. The windfall, the bank said, is flowing to high income earners and then barely trickling out to the broader economy. Such polarization could erode people’s motivation to work by narrowing the path to upward mobility, it cautioned. 

Workers in other industries are venting online about feeling demoralized by the ballooning wealth gap. “The one-billion-won ($650,000) bonuses have crushed my motivation to work. I have no energy when I teach,” an employee of the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education wrote on Blind, an app where employees can discuss their workplaces anonymously. Others are giving up the job hunt, lamenting that years of working at a small company could never match a year’s bonus at Samsung. 

In a Facebook post in May, presidential policy chief Kim Yong-beom proposed paying an “AI dividend” to citizens by taxing AI profits. The idea sparked a heated public debate over whether the government should redistribute gains from the chip boom. Some argue that the industry is indebted to the society that has educated its engineers, subsidized its infrastructure, and provided tax credits. Others counter that the profits are already being shared with the public as stocks.

Then there’s the question of how long this new social class will last. The semiconductor industry is notoriously cyclical; AI spending may cool, or rival chipmakers could catch up. There’s also the risk that chip workers will be replaced by automation. Samsung announced in March that it plans to fully automate its fabs by 2030, drawing backlash from chip workers. 

Although they’re unsure how long the boom will last, chip workers like Baek are riding high, for now. “These days, we say we want to work hard and bury our bones here at SK Hynix,” he says. “And I hope I can find [a wife] similar to me.”