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Network-connected surveillance cameras are now widespread in both home and enterprise environments, so securing them is essential to safeguarding physical spaces and sensitive assets. As these devices continue to gain new features and network connectivity capabilities, vulnerabilities in their implementation can have significant security implications.
During our research, we discovered a denial-of-service vulnerability that affects Intelbras IP cameras systems. The flaw resides in a firmware update endpoint that is accessible without authentication and allows anyone with access to the local Wi-Fi network to knock cameras offline. A single request disrupts the camera for only about a minute, but sending periodic requests keeps the device offline indefinitely. We reported the issue to Intelbras, monitored the remediation process, validated the fix in the new firmware, and will now demonstrate the exploitation procedure step-by-step.
Following our notification, Intelbras patched the vulnerability and released updated firmware (R.260804) along with update instructions. A candidate ID of CAN-2026-2035970 has been assigned by MITRE following submission, pending the final CVE assignment. Additionally, the Intelbras team recently informed us that MITRE has classified the vulnerability as Medium, assigning it a score of 5.1 under the CVSS 4.0 framework. The issue discussed in this article is no longer present in the latest firmware version.
Firmware
Intelbras provides firmware files on its official website. While users can manually install these updates via an SD card, the cameras also natively support firmware upgrades over the local network via their web interface and mobile app. We obtained the firmware version v240927 for the iM3B-C (IM3 C) camera, which was the latest available version at the time of our research. According to Intelbras, the same firmware is also compatible with the iMX C, iM4 C, iM5 SC, iME 360 C, and iM7+ FC models. Below, we can view the firmware version and the camera model used as an example.
To provide context, we will explain how the camera’s authentication mechanism works and why it is relevant to accessing the camera’s endpoints. The main firmware component is an ARM binary named sonia, responsible for controlling the kernel drivers used by the camera hardware, authentication, and livestream recording, among other things.
How authentication works
The global.login RPC method handles authentication at the /RPC2_Login endpoint. First, the client, such as the mobile app or a custom script, sends the username and an empty password. The camera responds with an authentication challenge (a set of values to verify the password without transmitting it). This response returns a temporary session, the encryption type in the encryption field, a random value, and a realm (authentication scope). At this stage, a false response is normal and does not indicate a failed login, as the authentication process is not yet complete.
Next, the client calculates the response password from the authentication challenge. It first generates an MD5 (username:realm:original_password) hash as the base. It then calculates a second MD5 (username:random:first_md5) hash, where first_md5 is the result of the previous step. To complete the authentication, the client sends this final result back to /RPC2_Login in a second global.login call, passing the username, calculated password, and temporary session ID.
If the login is accepted, the camera returns true and a new, authenticated session. This session must be used for all subsequent RPC calls, including the camera’s other endpoints, for example, the one that reboots the device or those that expose sensitive information.
Affected endpoint
The affected endpoint is the firmware upgrade route http://<ip_address>/firmwareUpgrade_service/Demo, which lacks authentication checks; furthermore, it fails to verify whether the firmware is actually valid before initiating the upgrade process. This creates a serious issue because the upgrade requires the camera to reboot, and that is precisely when the problem occurs: the camera enters reboot mode and eventually shuts down, appearing offline to the user and anyone who has the camera registered on their device.
PoC: vulnerability exploitation
Now that we have outlined how the vulnerability works, we will use a Python script on an iM3B-C camera to exploit it for demonstration purposes. The exploit contacts the camera’s endpoint to upload firmware. Below, we can see sonia creating the endpoint responsible for the firmware upgrade.
Next, the exploit will hit the endpoint and cause the camera to reboot. Consequently, mobile phones running the Intelbras app will lose connection with the registered device. Below, we can see the camera operating normally: the green light is on and the app is showing it is available for viewing.
The camera is online
After the exploit executes, we can see the effects: the camera goes offline and loses connection to the registered devices.
The camera is offline
The exploit is quite simple: it sends an HTTP POST request with the firmware, which causes the camera to accept the request and initiate the reboot process. It does not matter whether the firmware is original; the reboot process will start regardless.
New firmware version
After we notified Intelbras about this flaw in the endpoint implementation, the company contacted the OEM vendor. As a result, a new firmware version was released that requires authentication to initiate an update through this endpoint.
Below, we can compare the new firmware, which validates cookies and session data, with the old firmware, which performed no authentication checks and proceeded directly to the update routine.
Real risk
An attacker can remotely trigger the camera firmware upgrade and reboot process without authenticating or supplying a valid firmware image. This may cause the device to go offline, which results in a denial-of-service condition preventing legitimate users from accessing live monitoring or managing the camera.
The potential impact is significant due to the number of affected users. The Intelbras Mibo Smart app, which the company provides to connect and manage the devices mentioned in this report, has over 4,000,000 downloads. Brazil represents the largest user base, followed by Paraguay, Ecuador, Colombia, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Venezuela. As a result, exploitation of this issue affects a large number of users.
Takeaways
This is a medium-severity vulnerability that Intelbras is already aware of. The issue has been addressed in a newer firmware release (R.260804 along with update instructions), which mitigates this attack vector. Because the vulnerability directly affects the availability and normal operation of the affected cameras, it is highly recommended that users verify the firmware version currently installed on their devices and update to the latest available version as soon as possible. Keeping the firmware up to date is an essential security practice, especially for internet-connected surveillance devices, as outdated versions may remain exposed to known vulnerabilities.
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Back in October 2022, Kaspersky GReAT was looking into a peculiar advertisement on a hacking forum. A cybercriminal had been advertising a UEFI bootkit, dubbed BlackLotus, that could bypass Secure Boot, for $5,000. Given the low price for such powerful capabilities, the cybersecurity community initially took this advertisement with a grain of salt. As no BlackLotus samples were found in the wild, no one could at the time verify the claims made in the forum post.
BlackLotus advertisement
However, about half a year later, in March 2023, ESET confirmed that the BlackLotus advertisement was genuine. The researchers tracked down samples of this bootkit and confirmed that it can indeed bypass Secure Boot through a vulnerability called Baton Drop (CVE-2022-21894). As this vulnerability was still exploitable in 2023, Microsoft had to release multiple security updates to address it.
Since the release of these updates, the BlackLotus bootkit has gone quiet — no publicly known attacks have used it. Yet in early 2026, we discovered a malware sample similar to BlackLotus that was used in an APT campaign in Central Asia. In this report, we share our findings, including new payloads and possible attribution of this campaign.
The return of the infamous bootkit
In early 2026 we identified a complex APT attack targeting diplomatic agencies in Central Asian countries — namely Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. This attack involved a UEFI bootkit that we dubbed BlackX. Having examined it, we found it to be similar to BlackLotus.
Attackers have been deploying BlackX after compromising the victim machine networks and obtaining administrator privileges. To install the bootkit, we observed them dropping the following files:
inst.exe, an installer executable
PVMDIJGKAX2, an RC4-encrypted extensionless file containing files and strings required for the installation
The installer was launched with the command line C:\ProgramData\Intel\inst.exe PVMDIJGKAX2 Q46F6MDLI3RX2KV1. The last argument here is the RC4 key used for decryption.
Curiously, the file inst.exe does not contain any malicious strings or embedded blobs. All the files needed to install the malicious payload are inside PVMDIJGKAX2, which makes it harder for incident responders to retrieve the bootkit components.
The installer package drops a set of files to both system and UEFI partitions, designed to exploit the Baton Drop vulnerability. We noted that the implementation of the exploit is remarkably similar to the one used in the BlackLotus malware. As with BlackLotus, the goal of the exploit is to install custom Machine Owner Keys (MOK), which allows loading arbitrary EFI files on the target machines to manipulate Secure Boot.
While the vulnerability exploitation chain was implemented very similarly to BlackLotus, we spotted differences between the exploits in BlackLotus and BlackX. That said, the source code of the BlackLotus bootkit has never been published online. This could mean that the attackers behind BlackX either reverse-engineered the BlackLotus bootkit or purchased its source code from cybercriminals. Either way, this is an interesting observation, as we rarely see APT actors borrow ideas or code from cybercrime actors.
Payload launched by the bootkit
The UEFI payload delivered during the Baton Drop exploitation has a classic bootkit goal — to inject a malicious driver into the Windows kernel. This driver differs from the one deployed by BlackLotus and is signed with a certificate belonging to an organization named 温江区明宇网络技术服务工作室 (English: Wenjiang District Mingyu Network Technology Service Studio). At the time of writing, this certificate (serial number: 0bcdf5e0da32d68900b8b7638459d072) has been revoked by its issuer.
The driver aims to tamper with security solutions installed on the machine. For example, it disables process, thread, and registry callbacks related to security solutions. It also tampers with ETW providers so that security solutions cannot access their output. Curiously, some of the tampering procedures are designed to run only if Kaspersky or Avast solutions are installed on the infected machine. However, during dynamic analysis of this driver, we found that these procedures are useless — they fail to interfere with Kaspersky products in any way.
The driver also protects the bootkit’s files from tampering. It intercepts kernel requests to open these files and returns a handle to calc.exe instead of a malicious file handle.
User-mode second-stage payloads
Apart from tampering with security solutions, the driver also deploys a user-mode payload. We observed two such payloads, used for cyberespionage, in the wild. One of them is a RAT that can load further-stage .NET payloads. This RAT uses cloud storage for C2 server communications — we observed its versions using Google Drive, OneDrive, and Yandex.Disk. Having connected to a cloud storage service, this RAT iterates over files available there and interprets them depending on the file suffix. Below is a list of supported suffixes:
File suffix
Description
Type
0X01
A .NET file. The task is to parse it and run the method TEST.Class1.RunCMD(argument_array) from the module
Input
0X02
Result of the call TEST.Class1.RunCMD(argument_array)
Output
0X03
Task to upload a file to the drive
Input
0X04
Uploaded file
Output
0X05
Task to download a file to an infected machine
Input
0X06
File download status
Output
SSSR
Contains initial system info
Output
We also observed another payload delivered through the bootkit, which we dubbed OxiDLLRunner. It is a malicious DLL obfuscated with OLLVM. It is loaded by the legitimate file googleupdate.exe (original filename: jcef_helper.exe, MD5: AF8A983B9ADA07EAE1259BF2953ABD40), which is also delivered by the bootkit. The DLL decrypts the contents of the file v8_context_snapshot.bin, which resides in the same folder, and then jumps to the beginning of the decrypted content. The decrypted data starts with shellcode followed by a PE file, which is a Rust payload designed to communicate with the www[.]archivetj[.]com C2 server. During communication, this payload is supposed to receive DLL files exporting a function named create_plugin, which are then executed in separate threads.
Attribution
Based on the following facts, we have attributed this attack to the APT41 threat actor with medium confidence:
In June 2026, ESET published a blog post on attacks by the FishMonger threat actor, which the community assumes to be related to APT41. This post describes a kernel implant with a PDB path starting with C:\Users\xdd\Desktop. While describing the campaign, the post also suggests the possible use of an unspecified UEFI bootkit component, which might exploit CVE‑2023‑24932. We observed the identifier “xdd” used multiple times in the BlackX bootkit payloads, so we assess that BlackX is the UEFI bootkit referenced in the ESET blog post;
The payloads deployed by BlackX are loaded using a legitimate executable abused via DLL sideloading, and an encrypted file — this pattern is common among Chinese-speaking threat actors;
The OxiDLLRunner file has been obfuscated with OLLVM, an obfuscator commonly used by Chinese-speaking actors.
Why did the target organizations get infected?
During our initial analysis of BlackX, we thought that attackers succeeded in deploying it due to the negligence of the target organizations. Baton Drop, the vulnerability used to deploy BlackX, was disclosed back in 2023 and was patched, so we first thought that the infected machines lacked the relevant updates. However, our investigation proved this wrong — the targeted machines were fully patched.
Instead, we found out that the problem was with the patch itself. As it turned out, the patch for the Baton Drop vulnerability is designed to revoke the “Windows Production PCA 2011” certificate used to sign vulnerable UEFI components. However, this revocation does not happen automatically upon patch installation — the user has to trigger it manually. This is done with the following steps:
A registry flag is set inside HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Secureboot;
A scheduled task named Secure-Boot-Update is created.
This patch is designed to be applied manually — for instance, applying it automatically could break dual-boot systems relying on the “Windows Production PCA 2011” certificate to load. At the same time, this patch deployment practice creates a problem — as it is extremely unusual for a system administrator to take extra steps after installing an update. Usually, when applying patches, system administrators take no further action unless an installation failure occurs. These instructions for activating the patch are buried deep on the Microsoft website, and we assess that they are quite hard for an average IT administrator to notice.
Curiously, Microsoft’s plan for deploying the Baton Drop patches mentions an “Enforcement Phase” that involves revoking the “Windows Production PCA 2011” certificate automatically, without user interaction. At the time of publishing this post, this stage has not been implemented. On October 19, 2026, this certificate expired, but this does not prevent the vulnerable binaries from loading unless the certificate is blocklisted.
It is likely that the threat actor behind this campaign took into account that few organizations realized the importance of manually activating the Baton Drop patch. As such, we believe they decided to invest time in understanding how BlackLotus works and creating a copycat of this bootkit.
Conclusion
Patch management is important for every organization, as updates from vendors help protect software and hardware against known vulnerabilities. However, sometimes installed patches fail to protect against the flaws they address. The BlackLotus story we described is not the only such example — for instance, in 2025 Microsoft released an update against the ToolShell vulnerability that also had to be applied manually.
However, modern security solutions are designed to account for such cases when installed patches fail to protect against security flaws for one reason or another. For instance, the Exploit Prevention component available in Kaspersky products prevents exploits from running if the patch is not applied, or if it is a zero-day vulnerability with no available patch. It is thus crucial to equip all machines in an organization with security solutions and constantly monitor the alerts they raise.
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UPD 23.10.2026: added Kaspersky SIEM rules and events for developing custom detection rules or conducting threat hunting.
UPD 22.10.2026: added a description of how the Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response service detects the described malicious activity.
UPD 22.10.2026: added a description of how Kaspersky Vulnerability Management detects vulnerable versions of PHP.
Vulnerability overview
On October 20, 2026, the PHP security team published a preliminary notice regarding an upcoming emergency release that addresses two critical vulnerabilities (both rated 9.2 on the CVSS scale). The patches were released on Wednesday, October 21, 2026, at 14:00 UTC.
The release was expedited after information about the vulnerabilities was leaked to the public before the scheduled embargo was lifted. In a post on Hacker News, a user reported two RCE vulnerabilities in PHP, allegedly affecting all versions starting with PHP 5.4.0.
The vulnerabilities in question are CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. Shortly after the post appeared, researchers confirmed the existence of the vulnerabilities. Along with the leak of details, an exploit unofficially named PHP2Shell appeared online. In the leaked demo video, the exploit is shown in action on web servers running WordPress, MediaWiki, phpBB, Magento, Joomla, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, and WHMCS — platforms that power many modern websites. The authenticity of the demonstration and the exact behavior of the exploit had not been independently verified at the time of publication.
According to the researcher who published the PoC, the vulnerabilities are related to the handling of the multipart/form-data MIME type in conjunction with the session upload progress mechanism (session.upload_progress) in the PHP core and fall under the categories of use-after-free and memory corruption. This means that the flaws cannot be fixed via application code, and the only fix is to update PHP on the server. The attack requires no authentication: an attacker with network access to a PHP application can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the PHP process without needing to authenticate. Security advisories issued by the PHP team on October 21 confirm this information.
The vulnerabilities affect PHP versions 5, 7, and 8. As of this publication, branches 8.2 through 8.5 are supported. Older branches, including PHP 8.1, 8.0, 7.x, and 5.x, have reached the end of their lifecycle; however, due to the critical severity of the vulnerabilities, backported patches have also been released for versions 7.4, 8.0, and 8.1.
Sansec experts estimate that widespread exploitation could begin within 15 minutes of the update’s release. We strongly recommend that administrators responsible for publicly accessible PHP web servers take the following steps before the patch is available:
Take an inventory of all PHP-based systems in your infrastructure (such as web servers, control panels, and third-party software).
Disable upload-progress: set session.upload_progress.enabled = Off using the php_admin_flag in PHP-FPM pools.
Block multipart requests on nginx and Apache servers.
Consider temporarily isolating PHP applications that connect to the Internet until fixes are released.
Be ready to install the patch immediately upon its release.
Plan to migrate servers running unsupported versions (8.1 and earlier) to the latest PHP branch.
Detection by Kaspersky solutions
Kaspersky solutions detect the described malicious activity at various stages of the attack. Possible detection scenarios are listed below.
When an attempt is made to exploit these RCE vulnerabilities, Kaspersky Endpoint Detection and Response promptly alerts the user to suspicious actions performed in the context of a web server, on both Linux and Windows machines. This activity is detected by the following rules:
Spawning of suspicious processes by the web server;
Creation of suspicious executable files in the web application directory;
Creation of suspicious scripts in the web application directory;
Creation of files with uncommon extensions in the web application directory;
Execution of reconnaissance commands by the web server process;
Execution of persistence commands by the web server process;
Delivery and launch of web shells on the web server.
Moreover, MDR detects other malicious activity not directly related to remote code execution.
To protect companies that use our Kaspersky SIEM system, the product repository includes rules that help detect the following malicious activity.
Execution of suspicious executable files by web server processes on Windows and Linux machines:
R300_04_Windows shell started by a web application
R152_08_A running Linux shell process has a suspicious parent process
Execution of reconnaissance commands by the web server process:
R286_05_Possible web-shell (Linux)
We also recommend monitoring the creation of scripts or executable files in the web server directory when developing your own detection rules or conducting threat hunting:
((DeviceEventClassID = '4663' AND DeviceCustomString1 ilike 'WriteData') OR DeviceEventClassID = '11')
AND match(FileName,'(?i).*\.(php|asp|aspx|ashx|jsp|js|jar|jse|dll|exe|bat|ps1|vbs|wsf|wsh|msi|msp|hta|cpl)$')
AND match(DestinationProcessName,'(?i).*(php-cgi|nginx|httpd|w3wp)\.exe')
Name = 'openat' AND has(SA.Nametype, 'CREATE')
AND
length(arrayFilter(x -> match(x, '(public_html|var/www|usr/local/apache2|usr/local/httpd|var/apache|srv/www|home/httpd/html|srv/http|usr/share/nginx/html|var/lib/pgsql/data|usr/local/mysql/data|var/lib/mysql|var/vsftpd|etc/bind|var/named)'), SA.FileName))>1
AND
length(arrayFilter(x -> match(x, '\.(aspx|asp|asmx|asax|ashx|jspx|jsp|js|phpt|php|phtml|pht|cfm|shtml|htaccess|fcgi|cgi|pl|py|sh)'), SA.FileName))>1
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